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ix A.  SUMMARY  OF  THE  REPORT 
This  report presents  the results of  a  project to investigate the 
practices and  efficacy of  the European  Communities'  funding of  the 
Readaptation Aids  in  the  coal  and  steel industries,  payable under 
Article 56(2)(b)  of  the Treaty of Paris. 
The  study has  been undertaken by  academic  researchers in  the  UK, 
Belgium,  France and  Germany,  who  worked  to a  common  methodology under the 
direction of a  research  team  from  Durham  University in  the  UK.  Detailed 
studies were  made  of  these four countries,  and  less in-depth investigations 
were  made  of the position in Denmark,  Eire,  Italy,  Luxembourg  and  The 
Netherlands. 
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A major  concern of  the  study has been  to examine  expenditure on  specific 
Readaptation Aids  and  to identify the  contribution of  the  EC  and  of  the 
national  governments  to the benefits  received by  workers.  The  study has 
also examined  the history of Readaptation Aids,  the objectives which  they 
serve,  and  the interpretations which  have  been  put on  the various agree-
ments  relating to Readaptation Aids  between  the Commdssion  and  Member 
States.  Finally,  some  evaluation of  the efficacy of  the Readaptation Aids 
was  attempted. 
Objectives of Readaptation Aid 
Up  to  the mid  late 1960s  the Commission  (or its predecessor,  the High 
Authority)  had  two  objectives;  (i) assuring the social protection of 
workers  affected by restructuring,  and  (ii) promoting  the  reintegration of 
these workers  into productive life by  facilitating access  to  new  employment. 
Over  time  the  Commission  broadened its interpretation of Article 56(2)(b), 
for  example  by extending the categories of  workers  eligi-ble arid  making 
increasing use of  the substitute principle. 
In recent years  four  objectives of the  Commission  have  been  separately 
identifiable,  although  th~y are all highly interdependent.  The  ranking of ) 
these  objectives  can  and  does  change  over  time  but from  the  late  1970s 
to  the present it bas been: 
(i)  achieving  acceptance of industrial restructuring by 
those  involved; 
achieving withdrawals  from  the  labour force; 
2 
(ii) 
(iii) 
(iv) 
assuring reasonable  social protection for the  individual; 
attaining optimal reallocation of  labour. 
There  are  several underlying considerations which  ~pinge upon  these 
objectives.  The  first is additionality,  i.e.  the  long  standing notion 
in this context that  the EC  should  add  to the Member  State's contribution 
and  should not  simply replace it or provide straight reimbursement  to  the 
Member  State.  The  second  consideration  is complementarity,  i.e. 
Readaptation Aids  need  to be  satisfactorily aligned  to other EC  instruments 
such  as Article 56(2)(a),  the European  Regional Development  Fund  and  to 
the European  Social Fund.  The  third consideration is harmonisation,  the 
importance  of  which  to  the  EC  Commission  has varied over  time,  although 
it has been  a  consistent  concern.  There  are  different interpretations of 
harmonisation. 
Instruments  and  Trends 
There  are basically eight major ECSC  Readaptation Aid-instrUments: 
(i)  tideover  allowances,  (ii) earnings supplements,  (iii) early pensions 
and  related early retirement benefits,  (iv)  training allowances  and  costs, 
(v)  mobility allowances,  (v~)  severance or  lump  sum  payments,  (vii)  con-
cessionary  coal benefits,  and  (viii)  short  time  working. 
All  eight instruments  serve  the EC  objectives  of  acceptance of 
restructuring and  assuring reasonable social protection.  Four instruments 
especially concern  opt~al reallocation of labour,  namely  tideover 
allowances,  earnings supplements,  training and mobility  allowances.  Two 
instruments,  early pensions  and  severance payments,  are worth highlighting 
as especially concerned with. achieving withdrawals. 3 
There  is diversity in  the  use  of Aid  instruments across  the Member 
States and  between  the  coal  and  steel sectors within Member  States. 
Individual Aids  also differ in importance at different  times  but  some 
general  trends  are  clearly discernible.  During  the  1980s  early retire-
ment benefits have  universally become  very important as  an  EC  Aid  across 
the  Community  whether de  facto or de  jure.  In particular, early pensions 
and  related early retirement benefits  (including under  the Social Valets -
until  their final  demise  in December  1986),  training allowances,  lump 
sum  payments  and  short-time working  are  instruments  which  have  generally 
become  relatively more  important while earnings  supplements  and  mobility 
allowances  have  become  less  important.  Tideover allowances  have  remained 
a  highly  important instrument but now  have  a  more  explicitly dual  role 
depending  on  the age  of  the  beneficiary.  While  historically tideover 
allowances were  called waiting  time  allowances,  that particular use  of 
tideover allowances has become  restricted  to younger  redundant workers 
who  aspire  to obtaining alternative jobs.  For a  larger group  of 
beneficiaries, namely  older workers,  tideover allowances  are  an  early 
retirement Aid.  This  represents  a  change  in  the use  of this instrument 
dating  from  the  1970s  by which  time  for many  it had  already become  a 
de  facto early retirement measure. 
Of  the principal Aids,  training and ·early  retirement are  consistently 
the most  expensive  across  the  Community. 
The  Relationship between  the  EC  and  Member  States 
Member  States'  social security  systems definitely influence  the  shape 
and  form  of EC  Readaptation Aids when  they  are  operationalised in each 
country.  It has  always been  taken  as  given  (by  the Commission  and  Member 
State Governments  alike)  that EC  Readaptation Aid is a  topping-up  process 
so  that historically it has  relied upon  rather strong social  security 
schemes  (whether  State or industrial sector based)  functioning  in Member 
States.  Many  of  the  EC  Readaptation Aids  are  thus  clos~ly linked to -
indeed grafted on  to - each 4 
country's social security provisions.  In negotiating Bilateral Conventions 
the  EC  Co~ssion is constrained by  this factor.  The  terms  of  the 
applicable Bilateral Convention  agreed  between  the  Commission  and  the 
individual Government  and/or under  the  Social Volet  deals,  together with 
the  level of  take-up  of each Aid  instrument,  and  the  level of  social 
security payments  in a  Member  State, are  thus important  determinants of 
the size of the EC's  contribution to Readaptation Aid  in a  particular 
Member  State. 
Theoretically the EC  can  contribute up  to  50%  of  the  payments  made 
under individual EC  Aid  instruments,  i.e. matching  the Member  State's 
contribution,  subject  to ceilings in relation to  certain Aids  (e.g.  lump 
sum  payments)  which may  substantially reduce  the EC's  contribution below 
50%.  Yet  annually overall payments  made  in practice in recent years 
(since  1979)  have  sometimes  represented only approximately  10%  (or even 
less  on  occasions),  in  Belgium,  Germany  and the  UK,  of  the  gross  cost 
of EC  Readaptation Aid  payments  for  the  coal mining  sector.  In  contrast, 
the  EC  contribution for  the steel sector for  these  three countries has 
been at least 40%  of  the  gross cost.  The  size of  the EC  contribution 
is  largely determined by  the eligibility rules. 
The  factors  affecting the  choice  of Aids  offered  and  then  taken up 
shows  some  variation across  countries and  over time. 
Historically there is some  evidence  to suggest  that  ECSC  Readaptation 
Aid  has acted as  a  catalyst  to bring about additional  finance  by  national 
authorities  and  the enactment of specific social measures. 
Assessment  of Readaptation Aids 
The  report provides  some  assessment  of how  far  the Readaptation Aids 
promote  the  achievement  of  the objectives. 
The  extent to which industrial restructuring is made  more  acceptable 
is difficult to me~umre but our broad  conclusion is that  ECSC  Readaptation 
Aid  has produced a  very significant easing of the process  of restructuring 5 
(notwithstanding  the  fact  that  th~re has  been  serious social  conflict  in 
a  number  of Member  States).  The  composition of  the package  of  Readaptation 
Aids  is of  some  importance  in promoting acceptability. 
The  objective of achieving optimal  reallocation of  labour has  been 
adversely affected by  the  great  rise in  unemployment  and  training and 
mobility allowances  seem  to have  had  relatively little effect.  Lump  sum 
severance  payments  certainly seem  to  induce  a  shake-out  of  labour but 
they may  impede  the  speed of job  search and  re-employment.  However,  the 
ECSC  Contribution  to  this particular instrument is generally distinctly 
limited.  Withdrawal  from  the labour force,  which  has  become  a  prominent 
feature,  is particularly promoted  by  early pensions. 
The  objective of achieving  reasonable  social  protectio~ is contributed 
to by  all  the Aids  but  tideover allowances  have  consistently been  a  key 
element.  The  study concludes  that income  support benefits provided by 
the  EC  do  yield  some  additional  benefits and  the  level of benefits has 
been  reasonable if for.mer  incomes,  or incomes  in other sectors of  the 
economy,  are  taken  as  the  standard  comparison.  However,  the  duration of 
protection is now  arguably weaker,  in  the face  of  long-term unemployment. 
In general it is not possible to assign each particular type  of Aid 
uniquely  to one  objective.  There  are  complex  interactions which  make 
exact  calculation of  the  cost-effectiveness difficult;  but  there is some 
strong,  though  impressionistic,  evidence  that  the  package  of Aids  as  a 
whole  is provided at  a  comparatively modest  cost in relation to its 
achievements  (and  also in relation  to  the  total cost of  coal and steel 
restructuring policies). 
Information  and  Data  Requirements 
The  financial  and  statistical information which  is available on  the 
operation  of  ECSC  Readaptation Aid  is well suited to  the needs  of financial 
control,  but  in its present  form,  there must  be  reservations  about  how 
far it serves  the needs  of more  general monitoring and evaluation of  the i 
'  ( 
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Aids.  It  would  be  possible,  for example,  to make  better use of  the 
existing data. 
Some  Broad  Conclusions 
The  report  concludes  that  there is a  case,  in  the  longer  term  future, 
for giving more  attention to  the objective of optimal  reallocation of 
labour.,  though  the very real difficulties of budgetary constraints and 
having  to operate in an  economic  environment of extremely high levels 
of unemployment  are  fully acknowledged. 
Attention is also drawn  to  the continuing need  to ensure  that objectives 
are clearly and  widely understood  so  that transparency is improved. 
Furthermore, it is suggested that more  explicit consideration  could 
usefully be  given to clarifying and  perhaps  developing  the  interrelationships 
between Article 56{2)(b)  of  the  ECSC  Treaty and  other EC  instruments  for 
job creation.  It  is argued  that in areas heavily affected by  coal  and 
steel restructuring,  job creation measures will be  most  effective if they 
work  in harmony  with  the  tried and  tested Readaptation Aid  measures. 
In  times  such  as  the present, when  there are  tight budgetary constraints 
faced  by  the  Commission,  it is understandable  that any  case  for expanding 
Readaptation Aids will be  viewed with caution.  Nevertheless,  the  study 
concludes  that Readaptation Aids  serve a  sufficiently important purpose 
that any  cutting baCk  from  present  levels would  be  highly undesirable as 
Member  States would  be most  unlikely  to  take over  the  financing of  them. 7 
B.  INTRODUCTION 
This  report  presents  the  results of a  project  to investigate the 
practices  and  efficacy of the European  Communities'  funding of the  Readap-
tation Aids  in the  coal  and  stee~ industries,  payable under Article 56(2)(b) 
I 
of  the Treaty of Paris. 
The  purpose of  the study is  to: 
1)  compare  the  operation of  the system of Aids  in the  ECSC  Member  States 
which  are  recipients of the Aid,  concerning all types of Aid for  the 
major  recipients and  on  the basis of a  global  approach in the other 
countries; 
2)  examine  the degree  to which  Community  funding under Article 56(2)(b) 
contributes within the  application of the broader national policy to 
the following objectives: 
a)  acceptance  of  the  restructuring programmes  by those  involved 
(workers,  management,  trade unions); 
b)  the optimal  reall~cation of the workforce  including the withdrawal 
of the workforce  from  the  labour market; 
c)  assurance of  a  reasonable  social protection for  the  individual 
(income,  future  job prospects, etc.);_ 
3)  examine  the extent to which  Community  funding made  available under 
Article 56(2)(b)  acts  as· a  catalyst which brings about  financial 
funding  by  national authorities  (additionality)  and  the enactment of 
specific social measures  (thus  influencing social progress); 
4)  exa~ne the distribution of the Aid  across Member  States indicating 
data  requirements  for achieving and monitoring  such  a  distribution. 
The  study has  been  undertaken by  members  of  the Industrial  Relations 
Group  of Durham  University in the  UK.  They  have  been  assisted by  corres-
pondents  in Belgium,  France  and  Germany  who  have worked  to a  common 
1  methodology  prepared by  the Durham  team. An  Interim Report2  was  presented to the  Commission  in July  1985  and 
references  are made  to it throughout  this report. 
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The  plan of  the present report is  as  follows.  In Part C there  is a 
detailed discussion of  the  objectives  of  EC  Readaptation Aid  and  an  exam-
ination of  the extent  to which national policies have  been  influenced by 
Community  funding.  The  relation between  EC  Aid  and national  social 
security-systems is also examined.  In Part D the effects of Readaptation 
Aid  are  considered,  and  there is a  discussion of  the extent to which  the 
following objectives have  been  achieved:  (i)  acceptance  of  the  re-
structuring process;  (ii)  optimal  reallocation of  the workforce  including 
withdrawal  from  the  labour market;  (iii)  assurance  of  reasonable social 
protection.  Proble~ relating to data  are  explored in Part E.  Finally, 
in Part F,  a  number  of conclusions  and  recommendations  are presented. 
Substantial material is provided in  the  Appendices~  In particular, 
the full  reports of  the  Belgian, French,  and  German,  and  UK  (Phase  II)3 
studies are presented.  These  studies give  detailed information on  those 
Member  States and  it should be  stressed that what  appears in  the main 
body  of this  report is, for  the most  part,  bold  summary  statements  relating 
to  these countries.  For more  exact  and full  accounts  of  the position  in 
these countries it will be  necessary for  readers to  consult  these Appendices. 
The  Appendices  also include briefer reports  on  Denmark,  Eire,  Italy, 
Luxembourg  and  the Netherlands.  A final Appendix  outlines some  trends  in 
ECSC  output,  employment  and expenditure  on  Readaptation Aids. Notes  to Section  B 
1.  See  Appendix  1. 
2.  "Study of  the European  Communities'  Readaptation Aids  in  the  Coal 
and Steel Industries:  Interim Report"  by  D Bright,  R W Grainger, 
W  M Rees,  R B Thomas.  July 1985.  (510  pp.;  234  pp.  of main  text 
plus  21  Appendices.) 
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3.  The  UK  Phase  II study follows  up  a  number  of issues ar1s1ng  from 
the  UK  Study,  Phase I, which was  presented as part of  the  Interim 
Report.  The  UK  Phase  II  study deals with  training,  self-employment 
and  lump  sum  payments. 10 
C.  THE  READAPTATION  AIDS  SYSTEM 
I  Objectives of EC  Readaptation Aid 
1.  Historical Overview 
It is vital to appreciate that  the objectives of EC  Readaptation Aids 
can  and  do  change  over time as  can  and-does  the importance  of both  the 
objectives and  specific Aids.  Thus  a  brief historical outline of the 
objectives and  their evolution will be  presented.  For it also needs to 
be  understood that in setting objectives for Readaptation Aid,  the 
Comudssion  has had  most  influence historically.  Thus  in the  1960s  and 
early 1970s  there is evidence  showing  that  EC  Aid  acted as a  catalyst to 
bring about  the enactment  of specific social Deasures  in Member  States 
e.g.  in Ger.many  and  in relation to steel in the  UK.  Up  until 1960  the 
basis of High Authority intervention lay in para.  23  of  the Convention 
on  Transitional Provisions Which  had  the objective of reducing employment 
problems  caused by  the creation of the  Cammon  Market.  In early 1960  with 
the expiration of this Convention  the Council  of Ministers agreed  to add 
para.  2  to Art.  56  to permit  Aid  to. workers  and- to workers  declared 
redundant  due  to  fundamental  changes in market  conditions in coal  and 
steel.1 
The  first decade  of EC  Readaptation Aid was  characterised  by  ad  hoc 
and  piecemeal developments.  There  was  uncertainty within  the  Community 
as  to what  was  the best way  to proceed in utilising Art.  56(2)(b)  of  the 
Treaty of Paris.  But it was  agreed  that  a  clear model  had  to  be  found 
to follow and  discussions  took place in an  atmosphere  of strong Community 
spirit.  The  ECSC  High Authority  (the EC  Comadssion's  precursor)  initially 
agreed  a  Bilateral Convention  on  the coal industry with the French 
Government  when  faced  with no  more  than  a  couple of hundred  redundancies. 
1960  also saw  Conventions with Belgium and Germany  followed  in  1965  with 11 
Italy and  in  1966  with Luxembourg  and  the Netherlands.  Up·  to 19ti 7  the 
predominant  concern  had  been  Readaptation Aid  in  the  coal industry in 
practice.  Up  until  the  late mid  1960s,  the Commission  always  had  two 
objectives in mind,  though  the Conventions  were  certainly not  absolutely 
. f  .  h  .  .  ..  2  un1  orm  1n  t  e1r prov1s1ons.  The  first objective was  to assure  the 
social protection of  the workers  affected by  restructuring,  by  guaranteeing 
them  the  continuation of  their means  of  subsistence for a  limited period. 
The  second was  to promote  the reintegration of  these workers  into productive 
life by  facilitating access to new  employment.  The  Aids utilised to 
attempt  to achieve  these objectives were  fivefold:  (i)  tideover allowances, 
(ii)  income  (earnings)  supplements,  (iii)  training allowances,  (iv) mobility 
allowances,  and  (v)  limited lump  sum  payments.  A particular Aid  might  be 
of  considerable importance  in one  country  (or indeed  region)  but be  of 
little practical utility in another where  it would  3  be  little taken up. 
Yet  the  two  most  important Aids  overall were  (i)  tideover allowances  and 
(ii) earnings  supplements in that order up  to 1967.  Up  to  that date  the 
Commission  (or High  Authority, its precursor) was  able  to conclude  that 
its Readaptation  measures  had  as  a  whole  allowed  the  two  industries  to 
proceed with "inevitable rationalisations without  the  consequences  of 
these being too  serious  for the personnel involved",  adding  that  they 
"played  a  substantive and psychological role in reducing  the usual  fears 
at  the time  of closures  and  thereby avoided  serious social clashes". 
(Our  emphasis).  Furthermore,  "the waiting allowances  and  income 
supplements  have,  by maintaining the purChasing power  of workers  and 
their families,  helped  to prevent  the deterioration of the  social fabric
11
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thus  serving "as an  indispensable  link between closure  and  reconversion 
operations".4 
It should be  emphasised  that  from  the inception of  EC  Readaptation 
Aid,  the  scope  for Community  initiative has  been  fairly narrow given  that 
the basis of Community  intervention is defined rather·precisely in 12 
Art.  56(2){b)  and  that  the  Co~ssion (uriginally the  High  Authority) 
must  operate as  a  partner with each Member  State.  Art.  56(2){b)'s 
"matching money  principle" has  always  been  rigidly followed with  the 
EC  Commission  only contributing up  to a  maximum  of  50%,  for any  Aid 
where  the Member  State provides under  the  terms  agreed.  The  Commission, 
with its considerable interest in harmonisation  (the  importance  of which 
has  varied from  time  to time),  has  consistently had  the underlying aim 
of  giving comparable  protection to each individual in  the  different 
countries.  Yet  even  in the mid-1960s  the  Community  was  beginning  to 
accept contributing a  different amount  per beneficiary in different 
countries,  with  some  countries and  beneficiaries receiving substantially 
more  th~n others both  on  a  per capita and  global basis.  Indeed it was 
acknowledged  at  the  Commission  that  the  EC  could  contribute  four  times 
as much  to one  country as  to another.  The  Community  has  constantly 
recognised  that it is not  always  possible for EC  Readaptation Aids  to 
be  of a  uniform level  and  duration in the  light of  different  levels of 
<social  security provision pertaining in different countries with  their 
differing legal regimes.  The  Commission  has  thus  contented itself by 
contributing to Aids within its own  specified broad  ranges.  Nevertheless 
the  Commission  has  always  believed  that Art.  56(2)(b)'s major objectives 
can  be  fulfilled with the provision of different Aids  (of differing 
magnitudes)  in different countries. 
2.  Recent History 
While  over  time  in  the  light of social and  economic  developments,  the 
Commission,  as  a  highly. reactive body,  has  had  to modify its objectives 
by extending  them,  so  too inevitably it has  had  to broaden its inter-
pretation of Art.  56(2}(b).  The  latter has  involved extending  the 
categories  of workers  eligible by,  for example,  including workers not 
directly affected by  restructuring but involved in  the overall  reorganisation 
f 
.  5  plan as a  consequence  o  restructur1ng.  A notable instance of  this is 13 
the substitute principle,  originally permitted to apply  in Germany  in . 
the mid-1960s,  but which  also has  been  later applied in other Member 
States  so  that older ECSC  workers  not  directly affected by  a  dis-
continuation or reduction of activities can free  jobs  for other notably 
younger workers  so affected,  by  their taking up  EC  Aid  instead of  the 
younger.  A further development  from  1984  has  been  to extend this 
substitute principle to workers  transferring between  ECSC  undertakings 
instead of being limited to  those  redeployed within the  same  indust~~ 
Broadening the interpretation of Art.  56(2)(b)  has  also  involved 
recognising new  Aids,  most  notably  for early retirement  (early pensions).6 
Short-time  working has  also become  a  significant Aid  in certain countries. 
The  EC  Commission  in the 1970s  and  19808  (at least to  date)  has 
tended not  to go  out  and publish formal  grand declarations of its ECSC 
Readaptation Aid  objectives.  7  The  Commission's  Report,  for example, 
surprisingly does  not set out  such a  catalogue of  obj~ctives.  The 
Commission  could usefully do  more  to publicise and  give emphasis  to its 
ECSC  Readaptation Aid  objectives both at the European level and within 
Member  States.8  Yet  it is in fact  possible to glean what  the major 
objectives are  through analysis of  Co~ssion documents  and  discussion 
with senior Commission  officials.  What  we  find  is a  set of objectives 
which  not surprisingly has  a  sense of continuity with,  while also being 
a  development  of,  the Comadssion's  statement of 1967,  cited supra.  The 
first objective of EC  funding under Art.  56(2)(b)  is to obtain acceptance 
of the re-structuring programmes  by  those involved  (namely  individual 
workers,  trade unions  and  management).  This was  not  formally stated as 
an explicit major objective in 1967  but  can properly be  taken to be 
implicit.  The  second objective is to achieve the optimal  reallocation 
of the workforce.  Since 1978  to some  degree,  and  most  particularly 
since 1981  (but most  explicitly since 1983)  this objective has  the 
related and  brutally realistic objective of achieving the withdrawal 14 
of a  significant part of  the  labour force,  namely many  older workers 
(i.e.  those  over  50  or initially those  over 55)- through early retirement.9 
The  third objective is to assure  reasonable social protection for  the 
.  d"  "d  1  ff  d  10  'I'L.:  •  1  .d.  •  .  1n  1v1  ua.  a  ecte.  ~~us 1nvo  ves prov1  1ng appropr1ate  compensat1on 
for loss of earnings.  For some  workers,  notably the younger,  this also 
means  assisting them  in improving  their future  job prospects.  These 
objectives are naturally closely inter-related, with the  achievement of 
the latter objectives being plainly dependent  on  the first.  If there is 
a  total refusal  to accept  restructuring by  the  interested parties and 
were  it successful  over a  period,  then  the other objectives simply could 
not properly came  into play. 
3.  Present Ranking  of Objectives 
Thus  in terms  of ranking  the importance of  these objectives on  a 
Community  wide  basis,  there  can  be  little doubt  that  the primary one  is 
the first; namely  achieving acceptance of restructuring as part of a 
Community  programme.11  The  fundamental  aim  in each Member  State is to 
provide the basis for good  consultation between  the  social partners in order 
to avoid open  protest and  thus high levels of  social conflict, particularly 
riots and  industrial action in the  form  of strikes,  picketing and  sit-ins, 
The  second most  important objective across  the  community  in the  1980s 
has  become  achieving significant withdrawals  from  the  labour force.  This 
is regarded as most  easily and  fairly achieved by putting considerable 
emphasis  on  early retirements  (whether de  facto or de  jure)  and  avoiding 
compulsory  redundancies,  especially of younger workers. 
The  third most  important objective in each Member  State is to  secure 
~ 
reasonable  social protection for individuals affected.  The  highly inter-
dependent nature of  the ECSC  objectives is thus again highlighted.  Without 
offering what  the workers  and  their unions  regard  as at least  reasonable  , 
I  -
social protection,  the restructuring programmes  would  not ultimately be  -
even  reluctantly accepted,  or at least the  opposition' to  them  would  be all the more  vehement  and  so possibly more  effective  (given certain 
political and  social conditions).  For example,  in  the  UK  coal  industry, 
the highly generous  lump  sum  redundancy  payments  under  the  RMPS  have 
facilitated what  the mining  unions  (most  notably  the NUM)  have  character-
ised as  the "selling of  jobs11 :  in  short,  financial  compensation  for being 
declared  redundant  looks  so attractive that many  miners  find  the lure 
irresistible.  It must  be  emphasised,  however,  that  the  Community  was 
not  heavily involved in  these severance payments.12  The  recent experience 
in  the  UK  coal industry would  also appear to underline that offering 
reasonable  social protection is not  the primary major objective,  though 
the  two  other major objectives cannot  be  achieved without it.  If assuring 
reasonable  social protection seriously means  to incorporate a  guarantee 
of  future  job prospects, it has  become  a  much  less important element of 
the objective in recent years operationally. 
While  the EC  Commission  under existing circumstances would  place  the 
objective of achieving workforce withdrawals  from  the labour market  under 
the broader and  more  traditional objective of obtaining  the optimal  re-
allocation of  the  labour force,  we  would  suggest that it might be  better 
treated today  and  in future  as a  separate objective.  For in a  theoretical 
sense it is difficult to  regard  achieving early retirements of able  bodied, 
fit and  en.thusiastic workers  as  an  optimal reallocation assuming  that  they 
never work  again. 
It would  appear  to represent  an  acceptance of a  shrinking workforce 
not  just in  the  traditional basic industries of coal  and  steel which  have 
been broadly in decline in Europe  in recent years but  in  the  EC  economies 
at large.  While  this may  be  a  realistic, practical and  defensible  response 
to the  present economic  crisis in  the  short  te~, it would  be  undesirable 
for  the  two  potentially distinguishable objectives  to be automatically 
run into one  in the .future.  This is not  to say that a  goo_d  case cannot 
be made  out for automatic early  retirement of all workers  undertaking hard 16 
manual  jobs represented in the  coal  (viz.  underground  face  worker)  and 
steel industries.  But  should  the European  econamdes  begin  to  expand 
significantly again, many  older steelworkers  and  miners might wish to 
work  and  be  able  to compete  successfully for jobs in different growing 
sectors  of  the economy.  Then  there would  be  an  optimal  reallocation of 
labour. 
This  optimal reallocation in  the positive sense of  the phrase  (rather 
than  in a  negative euphemistic sense)  has  become  the  least important 
.  b.  ~  h  h  .  .11  .  13  Th"  .  f  maJor  o  Ject~ve,  t  oug  ~t  st~  ex~sts.  e  retent~on o  younger 
workers  in ECSC  industries who  would  otherwise have  been  declared redundant 
without  the substitute principle represents one  limited application of 
this objective of optimal  reallocation,but one  which is very important 
within organisations. 
we  shall next consider what  the EC  Readaptation Aid  objectives mean 
in operational  terms  in  individual Member  States.  In Belgium achieving 
acceptance  of restructuring has  been  a  highly important objective;  to 
facilitate closure decisions,  this  being a  measure  of  last resort by 
companies,  and  to make  the position easier for Government  and  unions. 
Also  a  second major objective is to secure  reasonable  social protection 
by providing an  additional level of social protection above  that  of state 
social security.  The  reallocation of  labour objective  can  be  related to 
re-deployment within coal and  steel enterprises in Belgium,  though more 
importantly  the  objective of achieving withdrawal  from  the  labour market 
through the use  of early retirement has  been central  (as it avoids dismissals 
i.e.  compulsory  redundancies).  In France  too  this objective of achieving 
withdrawal  from  the  labour market  through early retirement has been vitally 
important for the  same  reason  as  in Belgium.  It also  safeguards younger 
workers'  jobs which is considered important in France.14  Also  the  achieve-
ment  of  the acceptance  of restructuring has been high on  the  list of 
priority objectives  so as  to avoid social conflict,  fQr  example  in  the declining coal producing  regions  of  the Nord  Pas  de  Calais  and  Lorraine, 
which are  regarded as "high risk" areas. 15  The  objective of providing 
17 
reasonable  social protection has  been  the necessary means  of  achieving 
16  management  of the  recession in  the  short  term.  The  optimal reallocation 
of  labour can still be  regarded as an  objective in France,  although now 
extremely difficult to achieve with an  emphasis  on  self-employment,  the 
service  sector and  new  industries having  to  become  the practice,  instead 
of,  for  example,  the approach of  the 1970s of  taking car plants into  the 
mining regions. 
The  operationalisation of  the  EC  objectives in west Germany  reflects 
a  very similar pattern to that prevailing in Belgium and  France,  though 
there is no  specific statement of EC  objectives in relation to  the 
"Sozialplanpolitik
11  of enterprises  and  unions of which  EC  Readaptation 
Aid  is an  integral part.  Achieving acceptance of  restructuring comes 
first as an  objective so as  to avoid open  workers'  protest:  this concern 
is for example  strongly reflected in the  statements of personnel manage-
ment.  Achieving significant withdrawals  from  the workforce  through early 
retirement is also a  most  important objective in Germany  being  linked 
with  the  desire  to avoid compulsory  dismissals as  far as possible.  The 
young,  skilled and  generally well qualified workers often  leave their 
jobs  in coal  and  steel before  there  is a  need  for  the  EC  Readaptation Aid 
policies  to  impact,  leaving  the  older workers who  appear unable  to move. 
The  objective of achieving an  optimal  reallocation of  labour in  the 
positive sense has  a  lower priority in the  1980s  as  there  can  be  very 
little re-employment  given  that we  are not  in a  period of  econo~c growth 
when  new  firms  in  the affected regions  can  be  readily established.  Yet 
redeployment  within coal  and  steel enterprises  through  transfer of younger 
workers,  has  a  longer history of utilisation in Germany  under EC  a~spices 
than  in any  oth_er  Member  State.  The  EC' s  objective of assuring  reasonable 
social protection for workers affected has constantly had  a  high priority 18 
through "Socialplane" financial aid.  We  would  emphasise  that  the  British 
experience  has  also been  that achieving  acceptance of restructuring has 
been  of  the highest priority.  Since  the  advent  of  the  1970s  the  NCB  has 
been  able  to avoid declaring compulsory  redundancies  with  the  judicious 
use  of  the  RMPS.  Achieving withdrawals  from  the  labour  force  has  been 
a  second priority in  the  two  British industries. 
4.  Aids  and  Objectives  Related 
We  shall now  attempt  to specify which  Aids  (i.e.  instruments)  serve 
which  objectives before  considering which Aids  are most  important in 
practice.  17  Some  general points will be  raised first before  considering 
the position in Member  States. 
The  whole  package  of EC  Aids,  taken  both  individually and  as  an 
integrated whole,  is designed  to contribute to  the first objective of 
achieving acceptance  of the restructuring programmes  by  those  involved. 
Generous  early retirement and  lump  sum  Aids  need nevertheless  to be  high-
lighted as potentially highly attractive "carrots"  to workers. 
Three  Aids,  namely  earnings supplement,  training ~ll~wances and 
mobility allowances specifically attempt  to serve  the objective of achieving 
an  optimal  reallocation of  labour. 
Early retirement measures,  including early pension and  severance pay-
ments,  are particularly serving the objective of achieving workers' 
withdrawal  from  the  labour market. 
The  whole  package  of Aids is designed  to assure  reasonable social 
protection for the individual:  namely,  tideover allowances  for  those not 
working;  earnings supplements for  those  redeployed  or in some  instances 
re-employed;  early pension  for  the early retired;  training allowances  for 
those unemployed  seeking new  types  of work;  mobility  &lowances  for  those 
redeployed  or re-employed;  severance payments  in the  form  of  lump  sums 
granted to workers  who  then choose  what  to do  with  the money  (it might 
be,  for  examp~e, to purchase new  or replacement  consumer  durables, 19 
property, holidays,  for  investments  to secure  their future,  for establishing 
themselves  in self-employment or any  combination of these purposes18); 
concessionary  coal entitlements for miners;  and  short  time  working  Aid  in 
certain countries,  particularly for steelworkers.  In their individual 
countries workers  may  qualify for and  receive more  than  one  sort of aid, 
depending  upon  their age and  situation. 
In  determining which  Aids  are most  important,  we  shall take  an 
instrument-centred approach  taking into account practice in Member  States. 
It should be  noted  that not all Member  States are using all available EC 
Aids:  they  can  only seek assistance  from  the Commission  on  the  basis  agreed 
in  the Bilateral Conventions  and  under  the  Social Volet.  Belgium has not 
always  gone  for EC  Training Aid  as has  been  the  case  historically for  the 
British coal  industry.  In  1981,  for example,  not untypically  the  UK 
Government  made  no  claim on  the  EC  for earnings supplements or for any 
sort of mobility allowance  (either for travelling or transfer allowances) 
in the  coal  industry.  Belgium also has not been  receiving an  ECSC 
contribution  to  the special earnings supplement for older or disabled 
miners after being  redundant  through  a  closure which was  agreed back  in 
1969.  we  shall now  consider each individual Aid  in turn. 
(i)  Tideover Allowances 
Tideover allowances,  now  more  properly  called by  their longer title 
of "Income  Support in the event of Unemployment",  above all serve( the 
EC  objective of attempting to assure  reasonable social protection.  But 
this first Aid  also makes  some  contribution  to achieving  the  objective 
of achieving withdrawal of  older workers  from  the  labour market~  19 
Historically this EC  instrument  was  called "Waiting Allowance"  as it was 
designed  to help workers awaiting a  new  job  so  that it was  cushioning 
them  financially whilst they  found  a  new  job.- Up  to 1967  the High 
Authority's  o~jective was  to provide  something additional  to what  was 
already being provided by  the Member  State.  There  was  the strong desire 20 
that ECSC  should neither bolster up  nor subsidise  the Member  State's 
social security system.  Interestingly the German  Government  has still 
continued  to  favour  additionality,  as does  the  Commission  itself 
theoretically,  rather than  a  system of  reimbursement,  thus  reflecting 
the  view of the  founding  fathers  of  ECSC  Aid  over a  quarter of  a  century 
ago.  The  Commission  has historically favoured  this Aid  in  the  form  of 
the percentage  of protection of former earnings dropping over time with 
the  objective of helping  the worker  through the post-redundancy period 
while also giving h~ a  greater incentive to  find  a  new  job over time. 
During  the  1970s  the  Commission  engaged  in debate with Member  States over 
the duration of its contributions  to  "Income  Support  in  the  event  of 
Unemployment".  Before  the start of  that decade  there was  a  commitment  to 
a  maximum  duration  of 12  months  of payments.  In  the  1970s  some  Governments 
would  not accept  a  2-3 year., commitment  because  of  the impact of such 
"good  deals" on  sectors  outside  coal and  steel.  The  Commission's  freedom 
of action is thus constrained by  the norms  and  wishes  of Member  States. 
Increasingly there  has  been little or no  prospect  of alternative 
employment  for  those  receiving "Income  Support in the  event  of Unemployment", 
especially older people.  Hence  this income  guarantee cannot now  properly 
be  called "waiting  time  allowance".  Even  in the 1970s it had  becane  a 
de  facto early retirement measure,  though not called such.  The  other 
important  development  has been  that as  and when  Member  States  themselves 
offer 100%,  90%,  and  80%  protection of  former earnings,  the EC's  scope  to 
provide additionality is effectively taken away  so  that  the  Commission  is 
just subsidising  the social security system  (whether it be  nationally or 
sectorally based)  of  the Member  State and  is reimbursing.  The  Commission 
is prepared to acknowledge  tha't,  for  example,  in  the  case of Italian steel 
it is now  just reimbursing in contributing 18.75%  of  the income  guarantee 
and  15%  of  the state social security contributions for 12  months. 
Yet it should be  emphasised  that it is still the  Commission's 21 
objective  to provide additionality whenever it can  rather than  just 
reLmburse.  There is a  strongly held view within  the Commission  that 
80-90%  is a  sufficient proportion  of  former  earnings as  an  income  guarantee 
for  those not working •. The  Commission's  general view is that  15%  is  the 
appropriate element  for it to  contribute to  the  total cost of this Aid, 
not  least as  this can  permit  a  reasonable degree of harmonisation.  For 
the  Commission  to go  higher  would  require a  much  bigger Social Volet 
but since December  1986  the'Social Volet has  been  completely cut.  While 
the Social Volet may  on  occasions provide additionality, it often appears 
to offer reimbursement  to Member  States rather than  directly providing 
extra Aids  to ECSC  workers.  It should be  noted however  that the  Social 
Volet was  always  a  package deal  and  has  played  some  role in negotiations 
especially in Germany;  and  even where  there is a  strong element of re-
~bursement, it facilitates  the  financing and makes  the payments  easier 
This  first Aid  is now  available  to those who  are early retired  so  that 
under a  combination of Bilateral Convention and  Social Volet it is 
possible for the EC  to contribute for up  to three years. 
(ii)  Earnings  Supplements 
Earnings  supplements,  sometimes  called Income  or Wage  Guarantee,  has 
become  a  less important EC  Aid  in recent years.  This  second Aid  still 
seeks  to  fulfil  the objective of assuring  reasonable  social protection; 
but it has  became  less significant,  as has in practice the EC  objective 
of  achieving  the  optimal reallocation of the workforce  in a  positive 
sense,  which  this Aid  serves.  This  has been  the  case  recently,  for 
example,  in Belgium,  France and  Germany  in steel and  coal.  Thus  by  the 
early 1980s  this Aid  accounted  for  only  about  5%  of total ECSC  Aid 
d
•  20  expen  1ture. 
(iii)  Early Retirement Aids 
The  EC's  early retirement Aids,  which  seek to serve  the  objective 
of achieving withdrawals of older workers  from  the workforce,  as well  as 22 
the objectives  of  getting restructuring accepted  and  of  assuring  reasonable 
social protection,  have  quickly become  undoubtedly  the most  important  type 
of  EC  Aid.  In  the early 1980s  early retirement and  analogous Aids  rep-
resented  50%  of expenditure on  traditional Aids and  over  95%  of  the  steel 
Social Volet No.  1.21  Whilst historically the  EC  would not  contribute  to 
early retirement and  stuck strongly  to  this view  throughout  the  1960s, 
the  Commission  was  slowly but surely forced  to accept  the  new  facts of 
industrial life in the  1970s  and most notably in  the present decade.  Thus 
while early pensions  were  being provided  in  the  Belgian  coal  industry 
from  1969,  it was  not until 1974  that  the  Commission  agreed,  in principle, 
. f  .  .  .  . b  22  .  1  .  .  d  d"  1  not qu1te  1n  pract1ce,  to contr1 ute;  1n  re  at1on to pr1me  e  epart 
(leaving bonus),  best seen. :as  a  severance payment,  the  CoDillission  only 
agreed  in principle  to contribute in  the  same  year  (1974)  to  those over 
40  (with 5  years  service)  when  this Aid  had actually applied more  broadly 
in  the  Belgian  coal industry for at least a  couple  of  years before. 
The  Commission  did not use  the  language of early retirement in  this 
context.  In  1978  there had been  two  political breakthroughs in the 
development of the Commission's  acceptance of early retirement though 
\I 
significantly  this phrase was  just not used  in relation  to  the  agreements 
to constitute  a  "waiting  time  allowance"  for Luxembourg  and  "Dispenses 
D'Activit~"  (work  exemption)  for France. 
In  the preliminary discussions within  the Commission  to establish 
the Social Volet,  now  best  regarded as a  financial  instrument covered  by 
Article 56(2) (b)  to cope  with extra expenditure necessitated by  a._ crisis, 
the view was  strongly expressed  that early retirement Aid  could not  be 
paid under Article 56.  Discussions  took place as  to whether Article 56 
should be  amended  and  as  to how'Article 95  coulo be  a  useful  l~gal b.asis 
for  certain new  social measures.  Yet draft amendments  to Article 56(2)(b) 
proved unnecessary .in  the  light of strong arguments  from  Member  States  that 
early retirement was  the only means  of  dealing with the  social consequences 23 
of accelerated restructuring in steel.  Discussion had  been  ongoing 
between  the  Commission  and  Council of Ministers  for almost  a  full  three 
years  (from 1978  to 1981)  about  the  Social Volet  and  its early retirement 
element before  the  Council realised that it was  unnecessary  to amend  the 
Treaty of Paris, which was  recognised would  be  a  fraught  process not 
necessarily  guaranteeing a  satisfactory amendment  ultimately.  It was 
agreed  in 1981  that Article 56(2)(b) would  in future  be  more  broadly 
interpreted as permitting Aid  for early retirement and  that  there would 
be  some  extra funding of  the ECSC  budget  from  the general EEC  budget  or 
through direct contributions from  different Member  States.  Thus  was  born 
new  aid to operate alongside traditional  (or classic)  aid basically 
agreed under the Bilateral Conventions. 
By  1983  early retirement was  being accepted  under the terms  of the 
Bilater·al Convention on  Readaptation Aid  for  steel between  the Commission 
and  Italy.  Thus  it was  no  longer being treated as a  temporary  mode  of 
assistance to meet  a  crisis as  it nad  been under-the Social Volet  in 
1981.  Early retirement  has also  been  provided for in Bilateral Conventions 
with France,  the Netherlands  and in an agreement with Ireland.  It has 
been  in the process of being formally  agreed with Belgium  too.  For  the 
UK  early retirement as such has  not been  formally explicitly recognised 
for  a  formal  legal distinction is made  between  redundancy  and  early 
retirement  so  that a  worker must  be formally "dismissed by  reason of 
redundancy"  to qualify for ECSC  Aid.  But  for the steelworkers "Income 
Support  in the event  of Unemployment"  can  be  converted into a  de  facto early 
retirement benefit as it can  be  capitalised into a  pension.  For  UK  coal 
miners  the  RMPS  has  been used as  a  de  facto early retirement  scheme  for 
many  miners  for  some  years. 
In France,  for example,  early retirement had  definitely  become  the 
most  important EC  Aid  with the early retirement  arrangements  being greatly 
facilitated by  the ECSC  contribution.  This applied to both their coal and  steel industries in the early  1980s  even  without  the  Social Volet; 
the  same  applied to  Belgium,  Germany  (combined  with  lump  sums),  the UK 
(with  the  phraseology being  loosely applied for  it there)  and  to the 
steel industries of Luxembourg  and  the Netherlands. 23 
(iv)  Training Aid 
24 
Training Aid  serves  the objective of assuring reasonable social 
protection and  in the  medium  term  (plainly not in  the  immediate  short 
term)  of  contributing towards  a  more  optimal  reallocation of  labour.  As 
with mobility Aids,  the Commission  has  been  content  to  follow national 
authorities'  norms.  The  EC  Commission  has  given  training a  high priority 
whic~ is symbolised by its willingness in practice  to contribute its 
maximum  possible share,  namely  50%  of total benefits/organisations'  costs. 
Training is very often the most  expensive Aid  on  the  basis of per capita 
costs because it provides  income  supplement  and  covers  the  cost of  the 
training,  though  this has  not applied in Italy recently. 
Given  that historically EC  Readaptation Aids'  primary objective had 
been  to achieve productive  re-employment  and  that  this  can  no  longer 
realistically remain  the  case  given  the difficult economic  situation, 
retraining has  became  increasingly important to  the  Commission  as a  mode 
of its contributing towards  providing optimal reallocation of labour, 
albeit deferred.  ·The  Commission  fully  appreciates that  Training Aid  does 
not per se create employment.  The  objective' is that it should  change 
the  individual beneficiary's position  in the queue  of job seekers,  though 
the Commission  recognises  that training may  only theoretically improve 
job prospects.  Even  in relation to this Aid  in the  1970s  the German 
Government's  strong adherence  to  the  requirement  for additionality and 
that Government's  own  commdtment  to generous  financing  caused  a  P!oblem 
for  EC  financing. 
Training has  become  more  important as  an  Aid  to  the EC  in  the  1980s. 
In  the British conteKt younger  steelworkers have  had  to be  declared 25 
redundant which  gave  particular reason  to offer training to  try and 
improve  their job prospects.  EC  Training Aid  in  the  late  1970s  early 
1980s  has  been most  significant for British steelworkers.  In France  the 
union  CGT  in particular has been  hostile to  the precise  form  of EC 
Training Aid  agreed between  the French Government  and  the  Commission  (as 
well as  to  the EC  Aids  agreed more  generally).  The  outcome  in France  has 
been  that relatively few  redundant steelworkers undertake training;  those 
opting for it are  tending  to train for occupations in the service sector, 
where  there is most  scope  for reconversion. 
(v)  Mobility Allowances 
Mobility Allowances  (for removal  and  travel) which  serve  the  three 
objectives of getting acceptance of restructuring,  of  going for optimal 
reallocation of labour,  and  of assuring reasonable  social protection,  have 
had  a  relatively low take-up  rate as an  EC  Aid  with  the  EC  element not 
representing  a  big incentive to Member  States  to claim  (by  comparison with 
other more  expensive Aids).  It should also be  noted that,  for example, 
in both France  and  the UK,  miners affected by  restructuring often  do  not 
easily accept  the  idea that  they  should transfer regions.  The  fact  that 
it is now  less important as an  EC  Aid:is also partly due  to the  ECSC 
workers being  redeployed and  re-employed  in  ~he 1980s  being not so 
numerous.  Thus  in  the early 1980s  where  this Aid  was  claimed, mobility 
allowances  represented under  5%  of each sector of each  country's total 
ECSC  Aid  granted.24 
(vi)  Lump  Sum  Payments 
Lump  sum  payments,  which  can  serve all four major  EC  objectives,  are 
not  (and never have  been)  much  favoured  as  an  Aid  by  the  EC  Comadssion. 
This is the  leading example  of the  C~ssion strongly resisting the  lead 
taken by Member  States on  a  particular Aid.  Historically this resistance 
has been  largely.effective.  In 1976-77  same  Governments  were  strongly 
arguing  that  lump  sums  should become  a  priority EC  Ai.d.  Yet  the Commission stuck to its principle that it should contribute up  to  a  maximum  fixed 
figure  as  compensation  for  loss of income,  opting for  admdnistrative 
simplicity.  This  figure  has  been  raised from  750  ecu  to  1,000 ecu  and 
since 1985  has  gone  up  to  2,000 ecu.  Yet  some  20%  of total EC  Aid 
expenditure was  given  in lump  sums  in the  late 1970s  and  early  1980s, 
whi~h was  broadly the  same  proportion as  for tideover allowances. 25 
Recently  the  Commission  has  given a  certain emphasis  to  lump  sums 
in special cases.  The  Commission  was  able  to  justify this in Ireland's 
case  (for steel)  on  grounds  of size of problem and  country so  that  the 
global  sum  contributed was  small by  comparison with that granted to 
larger countries.  Nevertheless  the Irish desire for  an  EC  contribution 
of 10,000 ecu per man  could not be met.  The  Commission  agreed  to double 
its previously normal  contribution,  settling for  2,000 ecu per man. 
MOre  recently the Commission  has also permitted putting an  emphasis  on 
severance payments  in the case of new  member  Portugal for its steel 
industry.  Again,  as with Ireland,  a  factor for the Commission  was  the 
relatively weak  social security system in Portugal,  so  that unusually 
the bulk of the ECSC  contribution will  go  on  lump  sum  payments  there.26 
(vii)  Compensation  for Loss  of Concessionary Coal 
Compensation  for loss of concessionary  coal  for redundant miners, 
given this .concessionary coal's symbolic importance to them,  contributes 
in a  small but  certainly not in an  insignificant way  to serving the 
objectives of getting restructuring accepted,  of securing withdrawals 
26 
from  the  labour market  and  of  helping  to assure  reasonable  social 
protection in each of the four remaining Member  State coal  industries. 
Overall this Aid  has not undergone  significant changes  since its inception. 
(viii)  Short Time·Working 
Short  time working as  an  EC  Aid  contributes  towards  the EC  objectives 
of getting acceptance of the restructuring programmes  and most  particularly 
of  assuring reasonable  social protection in terms of income.  It has  only 27 
been  used in  the Netherlands,  Denmark  and  Italy.  The  Aid  is normally  only 
granted for workers  who  keep  their jobs.  It is not  for  job  losses.  The 
aim is to ease restructuring by  phasing it over a  longer period.  It cannot 
be  said to have  the objective of directly contributing  towards  an  optimal 
reallocation of the workforce  as  the workers  concerned  are still steel-
workers,  though  temporarily withdrawn  from  the  labour market;  but it does 
promote  optimal reallocation in one  sense  in  that  the alternative would 
be  job loss or withdrawal  from  the  labour market.  The  Commission  may 
contribute up  to  50%  of the eligible cost of  these  laroffs.  In  the 
Danish context for example,  the ECSC  contribution has actually worked  out 
at  11%  of  the  cost. 
5.  Underlying Conditions  and  Considerations 
Having  set out  the objectives and  the instruments by  which  they  may 
be  attained,  we  must  now  briefly outline the major underlying  conditions 
and  considerations which  impinge  upon  the Article 56(2)(b)  objectives. 
Firstly,  we  must  consider the notion of harmonisation in  this context. 
27  As  we  have  previously stated,  harmonisation  is_  a  multi-faceted  concept, 
the  importance of which  to  the EC  has  varied at different times. 
-HaEmonisation  is nevertheless undeniably a  consistent  concern of the  EC. 
In relation specifically to EC  Readaptation Aid,  there are  two  inter-
pretations which are of particular importance.  The  first is ensuring that 
every  ECSC  worker affected by restructuring obtains  the  same  income  in 
relation to his former earnings.  For example,  if a  Member  State had  a 
relatively ungenerous  social security scheme,  then  the EC  could be 
expected to contribute more  in order to achieve  a  given proportion of 
former  earnings  (say  80%  or 90%).  In  this<case  the EC  contribution is 
inversely related to  the size of"the Member  State's payments.  This 
interpretation takes  the worker  as  the basis for harmonisation.  The 
second interpretation is that  the EC  should make  the  same  payment  to  ECSC 
workers in different Member  States regardless of the Member  State's own 28 
payments.  This  second  interpretation takes  the Member  State as  the basis 
for hanDonisation.  Plainly there may  be conflict between  these  two 
interpretations.  The  central question is to  find  the  optimal balance 
between  them  since we  consider that  they are both legitimate interpretations 
of the meaning  of harmonisation. 
It is essential to take full account of  the objectives of EC 
Readaptation Aid  when  seeking to  determine  what  this balance  should be. 
For example,  it may  take different  amounts  of Readaptation Aid  on  a~ 
capita basis  in different countries  to achieve acceptance of  the re-
structuring process.  The  same  consideration would  apply  to achieving 
withdrawals  from  the  labour force.  The  issue can be  well  illustrated with 
reference  to  the  objective of assuring reasonable social protection for / 
redundant/early retired workers.  With  respect  to  the  second interpretation, 
i.e.  the EC  making  the  same  contribution on  a  per capita basis  in different 
countries, it can  be  argued  that  there should be  limited variation across 
Member  States in order  to  ensure that  the EC  contribution is acceptable 
within each Member  State.  For instance,  disparities of more  than  say  30% 
across Member  States might  be  considered either undesirable or unacceptable 
in Community  terms.  Precisely what  the  acceptable  range  of disparity should 
be  is an  important policy consideration with political ramifications.  It 
is not within our brief to provide a  simple  answer  to  this particular issue. 
Concerning  the first interpretation, i.e. ensuring that every ECSC  worker 
affected by  restructuring obtains the  same  level of benefit  (regardless of the 
size of his Member  State's contribution),  it is appropriate to  consider 
whether  there  should be  a  minimum  standard of benefit for each eligible 
worker.  Such  a  minimum  standard could be  specified in absolute  ter.ms 
(e. g.  so many  ecus per worker  for a  given period)  which would  be  common 
to all Member  States,  or in terms of  some  reference point within each 
Member  State  (e.g.  benefits  should be at least X%  of average wages). 
Where  such a  minimum  standard existed the EC  contribution would 29 
have  to ensure  that affected  .. workers  were  brought  up  to  this  level at 
least. 
Thus  the appropriate balance  to be achieved between  the  two  inter-
pretations is to have  more  or less equal  EC  contributions on  a  per capita 
basis subject to  the minimum  standard being achieved.  This  basic proposition 
needs qualifying in two  ways.  Firstly,  the proposition applies  to the 
entire paCkage  of EC  Aids  and  there might  be  legitimate and  substantial 
differences in relation to individual EC  Aids  as  long as  they did not 
undermine  the equalisation desired for  the package  of Aids as a  whole. 
Secondly,  our discussion has  concentrated upon  Aid paid on  a  per capita 
basis, whilst consideration also needs  to be given  to  the  total •mount  of 
Aid  which is  contributed by  the  EC  to the Member  State.  Clearly,  for 
example,  the  UK  receives much  more  total EC  contribution  than  Denmark  or 
Eire where  the number  of affected ECSC  workers has  been  and  is considerably 
less. 
A second  underlying condition  which  impinges  on  the Article 56(2)(b) 
objectives is the need  to  aligl:l  Readaptation Aids  to other EC  instruments. 
It has  sometimes  been  the  case that where  different instruments  complement 
each other closely there  can  be  some  confusion  on  the part of national 
authorities.  An  example  of  such confusion  in practice is the Aid  for 
vocational  training programmes  which is paid both by  the European  Social 
Fund  and  as part of ECSC  Readaptation Aid. 28  Such  confusion might not 
only  cause administrative problems but also carries the danger  that 
training projects may  be  financed  twice  over.  Clearly any  developments 
of the instruments  of Readaptation Aid must  have  a  clear and well under-
stood relationship with other EC  instruments. 
Further underlying  ~onditions are  the need  to  secure genuine addi- , 
tionality and  the need  to work  within  the  50%  ceiling for ECSC  contributions. 
Finally, it is imperative  to keep  the  overall position of  Re~daptation 
Aids  in view by  giving due  weight  to cumulative effecta·of the separate 
inatnaments. 30 
II  The  EC  Readaptation Aid  System  in Operation 
1.  The  Social Security Schemes'  Links with EC  Readaptation Aid 
and  the  Importance  of  the  ECSC  Element  in relation  to  the 
Gross  Cost  of  EC  Readaptation Aid 
We  shall next offer same  brief comments  on  how  the  EC  Readaptation 
Aid  scheme  links with national  social security schemes  including high-
lighting  same  more  interesting and  important aspects.  Also  we  shall begin 
to offer some  answers  to  the  key  questions  of  how  important EC  Aid  is in 
29  relation to  the  gross cost  of Aid  for the  four  EC  Member  States with 
both coal  and  steel industries. 
(i)  Some  Anglo-German  Comparisons 
It has always  been  taken as  given  that EC  Aid  is a  topping-up process. 
Indeed historically EC  Aid  has  relied upon  a  strong  social security scheme 
operating in Member  States.  This has  been  strongly  the  case with Gennany. 
Without  strong national  social security schemes,  EC  Aid  might  have  looked 
very different.  The  system of Aids  including EC  Aids  available in  both 
Germany  and  the  UK,  for example,  is very directly linked with  the nationally 
applicable social security system.  In Germany  both Federal and  State 
Governments  may  contribute  to  the  social security system.  The  Gennan  social 
security system is among  the strongest in the  Community  whereas  the British 
national social security system has become  relatively less strong and 
generous  to beneficiaries in  the 1980s  (viz.  e.g.  the abolition of  earnings 
related supplement on  unemployment  benefit which  caused particular 
difficulties for  the  steelworkers'  scheme,  !SERBS,  early this decade  and 
necessitated amendment  to EC  Aid  arrangements).  It needs  to be emphasised 
that the coal  and  steel workers  in Germany  earn more  than  the national 
average  wage,  as has  tended also  to be  the  case  with  many  such workers 
in the  UK  (historically particularly coal faceworkers). 31 
(ii)  The  German  Position 
(a)  Exposition  of  the  System 
In  Germany  there are  high "replacement rates"  for redundant 
workers  who  became  unemployed or who  are  retraining,  starting at  68%  of 
the  last wage.  In practice both Federal and  State Government  help  to 
guarantee  (at best)  90%  of the workers'  p~evious net income  for  2  years. 
In  some  areas  this has gone  down  to  80%.  The  procedure  in practice  is  that 
the enterprises  top-up either unemployment  benefits30  or training allow-
ances  paid under  the unemployment  insurance  scheme.  It is difficult to 
assess precisely what  additional public money  is being given.  For miners 
the EC  topping-up  element apparently represents between  5  and  10%  of 
bl.  31  11  .  1981  pu  1c money  overa  1n  •  While  the  EC  theoretically can  contribute 
up  to  50%  of  the Member  State's contribution,  in practice  the  EC's 
contribution in  the early 1980s  to coal overall would  not  exceed  10%,  but 
for steel the  EC  contributed  50%  and  the  Government  50%  of  the topping-
up  element  for both individual  and  total Aid  (see  Gennan  Report  at 
3-30  to  3-60). 
In  German  coal mining  there has been a  long  standing special social 
insurance  system,  which needs  to be mentioned in this  context  of  discussing 
EC  Aid  and  social security.  Historically miners retired early at 60  at 
higher "replacement  rates"  than other workers.  In  1963  the  retirement 
age  was  lowered  to  55  for miners with very  long  underground  service 
(Knappschaftsausgleichsleistung:  KAL  for  short).  In  1971  miners'  retire-
ment  age  was  reduced  to 50  (Anpassungsgeld:  APe  for  short);  the  German 
Federal Government  helped  to pay  for  this,  though the  EC  Commission 
initially refused co contribute at all but later relented  to  contribute 
in part until 1984  when  the Social Volet  further  changed  the EC's position. 
The  normal  retirement  age  in Germany  has  been  65  (subject  to a  couple  of 
exceptions). But  the quasi-retirement age  for  steelworkers  has  come  down 
to  55  under  the early retirement arrangements.  The  early retirement Aids 32 
are now  extremely important in relation  to  bo~ the  coal and  steel 
industries but it is important  to appreciate  the significant differences 
between  the  two.industries concerning financial  assistance  to  their 
respective workers  from  Federal and  Land  (i.e.  Central  State  and  Regional 
State)  funds  and  also  the EC's  contribution.  Indeed  these differences 
are more  important  than  the specific variants in  the  individual Aid 
32  instruments  and  their legal  fonD.  Since  the early  1970s  the  considerable 
h  .  1  d  1  .  .  h  1  .  d  33  ha  h  emp  as1s p  ace  on  ear y  ret1rement 1n  t  e  coa  1n  ustry  s  meant  t  at 
the  Federal Government,  supported by  Land  funds,  bas  had  to pay  in large 
measure  itself  with  the EC  making  only a  relatively small  contribu~ion 
to APG  from  1972  until, as already noted,  this was  extended in 1984. 34 
A  further difference between  the  two  industries has  been  in  the 
timing of  the  restructuring with there  being a  much  longer history of 
major restructuring - and  on  a  grander scale - in the  coal  industry where 
the process has  been  ongoing  for over 20  years.  Indeed  the  total number 
of  coal industry Readaptation Aid  beneficiaries and  the  level of their 
individual benefits have  considerably exceeded  those  applying  in the  steel 
industry with its major restructuring occurring in  the  last ten years. 
Thus  the  total cost of  the social support measures has been  significantly 
more  for  coal  than  stee1.35 
Another difference between  GeDman  coal and  steel has  been  that  only 
in  the coal industry has  there been  an  attempt  to go  for a  single national 
Readaptation  scheme.  Indeed  a  standard minimum  level of social protection 
for all miners affected  by  restructuring has  been  largely achieved under 
the overall social support plan.  Thus  only in coal  have  the various 
.types  of Aid  been  consolidated into a  single body  of tightly interlinking 
rules of a  statut·ory or binding nature.  In steel  there has  been  no 
comparable  extension of the social insurance system,  nor have  we  seen  the 
introduction of comparable  quasi-pension  type benefits.  The  pattern for 
steel has been  one  of gradually improving  topping-up provision since  the late 1970s  (and most  particularly in  the early 1980s)  applying  the 
Bilateral Convention  agreed  in  accordance  with Article 56 (2) (b)  of  the 
36  ECSC  Treaty. 
Nevertheless  the  ECSC  Readaptation Aid  scheme  applied  in Germany 
has  developed directly out of  the statutory social security system.37 
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It is noteworthy,  for example,  that all eligible workers have  been  entitled 
under  general German  social security law  (under  a  1969  statute)  to  un-
employment  insurance benefit at a  rate  of  68%,  of previous net earnings 
(until the end  of 1981),38  for up  to  a  year.39  However,  from  1984  the 
rate has  been  cut to  63%  for  those  without dependent  children.40  We  shall 
now  provide a  brief outline of the complex  EC  Readaptation Aid  scheme  in 
Germany  with special  reference  to the position in 1981  (from July).41 
The  Commission  contributes up  to 50%  of  such Aid  for  a  specified period.42 
Income  support in  the event of unemployment  (tideover allowance)43  was 
provided  for 2 years  (from  1983  for 3  years)  for married beneficiaries 
amounting  to the.difference between  present net income  (unemployment 
insurance benefit or assistance benefit and  any additional allowance)  and 
55%  of  fonner gross  income;  the latter figure is reduced  to  50%  for single 
ECSC  workers.  Earnings  supplement44  was  paid for  those  re-employed  in a 
less well paid  job  for 2  years  (agin  from  1983  for 3  years)  at a  rate  of 
the difference between present net income  and,  if married  75%  or,  if 
unmarried  70%,of  previous  gross  income.  We  next consider an  EC  Aid  which 
was  relatively mu£h  more  significant for  steel than for  coal  (APG  for 
miners  is discussed supra).  This  is early pension  allowance,  or supplement 
to unemployment  benefit for displaced workers near retirement  age,  which 
was  available with  the  EC  contributing for up  to 2  years  (again  from  1983 
45  for 3  years)  at a  rate of  DM  2,500 per month  plus  DM  100  for  each  dependent. 
Retraining Allowance46  may  be  paid for the duration  of  the  training at the 
monthly rate of  DM  75  for married  trainees and  DM  60  for unmarried.  Mobility 
Allowances47  have  consisted of potentially three different elements: i)  Daily Travel Costs,48  ii) Removal  Costs,49  and  iii) Separation 
50  51  Allowance.  Lump  sum  severance payment  has been payable  to workers 
laid off  and  amounts  to a  cumulative  advance  payment  of _several  months' 
tideover allowance worth  DM  6,000. 
(b)  Summary  of Costs and  the  ECSC  Contribution 
For APG  for coal for  1981  the average  gross cost per recipient was 
DM  70,093  (for 37  months  i.e.  DM  22,733  for  12  months)  of which  the  EC 
contributed  DM  4,148  (i.e.  18%  of  the  12  month  total).52  Concerning  the 
steel industry for 1981,  for Aid  payable under Article 13  of  the 
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Bilateral  Convention  (lump  sum  severance payments)  the average  gross 
cost per recipient was  DM  6,000 of  which  the  EC  contributed  DM  3,0oo.53 
Five  samples  concerning the_.operation of Article 9 of the Bilateral 
Convention  (earnings  supplements)  in steel showed  variation in the 
average  gross cost per beneficiary ranging  from  DM  625  to  DM  4,159 with 
the EC  contributing  50%  in each case;  the overall average  gross cost per 
beneficiary across  the five  samples  was  DM  2,332 with the  EC  contributing 
DM  1,166 per head  on  average. 
The  position in the German  coal  industry in 1981  is summarised  in 
Table  1. READAPTATION  AID:  GERMANY;  COAL  1981 
GROSS  COST-
PER  % OF 
TOTAL  CAPITA  TOTAL 
Mecu  et1u 
Tideover Allowance 
(Anp;assungsgeld)  32.929  27,882  93.7 
Tideover Allowance  1.226  1,746  3,5 
Lump  Sum  Severance Payment  0.543  933  1.6 
Earnings  Supplement  0.005  273  (a) 
Travel and  Removal 
Allowances  0.414  272  1.2 
Concessionary  Coal  0.022  31  {a) 
Notes:  Source App.  4 
(a)  less  than one  tenth  of  one  percent 
Table 1 
ECSC  CONTRIBUTION 
PER  % OF 
TOTAL  CAPITA  TOTAL 
Mecu  ecu 
1.949  1,650 
0.613  873 
0.274  467 
0.002  136 
0.011  16 
(1  ecu  •  DM  2.5139) 
ECSC  NUMBER  OF 
CONTRIBUTION  BENEFICIARIES 
AS%  OF 
GROSS  COST 
5.9  1,181 
50.0  702 
50.0  588 
50.0  20 
1,520 
50.0  728 
w 
V'l 36 
(iii)  The  Belgian Position 
(a)  Exposition of  the  System 
When  Belgium  first took  up  EC  Readaptation.Aid,  significant  changes 
were  made  in  the  relevant  social security regulations.  For example,  ECSC 
workers  had  to  take  up  EC  Readaptation Aid  before being entitled to 
comparable  Belgian social security regulations.  Subsequently,  however, 
EC  Aid  has not had  a  big influence  on  national  social  ~ecurity in  Belgi~m. 
Belgium has  a  highly elaborate  social security system,  including an 
earnings related unemployment  benefit scheme  with which  the  complex  EC 
Aid  Scheme  links.54  For example,  severance payments  for  certain miners 
(called prime  de  d:part),  where  EC  participation  (subject  to a  maximum 
of 1,000 ecu  per worker)  is based on  correspondence  rather than  a 
Bilateral Convention,55  may  be enhanced under the  general  Belgian social 
security law  of June,  1966,  by a  payment  from  a  special  fund  (called 
"Fonds  pour  les  fermetures d'enterprises"), although  this is unusual. 
Since  the  Royal  Decree  of  19.63  under general  social security law,  a 
mobility allowance  is available to  the  unemployed  moving  to a  new  home 
to  find  employment  apart ·from  those  Aids  specially available  to ECSC 
workers  under the Bilateral  Convention. 
Most  importantly  the  tideover allowance  granted  to an unemployed 
redundant  ECSC  worker  on  a  degressive basis under  the Bilateral Convention 
(Articles  6  and  14)  supplements  general  state unemployment  benefit  (UB) 
which  (under  the Royal  Decree  of  December  1963)  is worth  60%  of  their 
former  average daily income  (subject  to  a  maximum  of  1763  BF  in 1985)  in 
the first year of unemployment  and  in the  second and  third years if the 
beneficiary is  the head  of  a  family;  but  otherwide it is worth  40%.  This 
tideover allowance is calculated on  the basis of  four periods with the 
reference  income  limited  to a  maximum  of  48,6000  BF  in 1985. 
In the first period,  2 months  long,  the  allowance  received is the 
difference between  100%  of  their reference  income  and  UB.  In  the  second 37 
period,  4 months  long,  the allowance is  90%  of  the  reference  income.  In 
the third period,  again 4 months  long,  the allowance  is  80%  of  the 
reference  income.  And  in the fourth  - to the  end  of the  Readaptation 
period- the allowance is 70%of  the  reference  income. 
A redundant miner,  entitled to Readaptation Aid,  neither re-employed 
nor redeployed at the  end  of  the Readaptation period,  is entitled to  an 
ea~ly pension provided that  (i) he  was  at least 40,  or  (ii)  had  20  years' 
service underground,  or (iii) had  25  years'  service on  the  surface.  The 
early pension,  index  linked, is worth  the  same  as  the full miners'  pension 
if age  and  service  conditions  are met  and  includes holidays and  coal 
allowances plus a  health insurance  cover  allowance.  It lasts until 
entitlement  to a  full pension is reached.  The  miner  can  opt  for an 
early pension  instead of  tideover allowance  from  the sixth month  of  the 
Readaptation period.  Entitlement to full miners'  pension  is reached at 
55,  with  25  years'  underground  service,  and at 60  for  surface workers: 
this is a  benefit available under general Belgian social security  law 
as applicable to miners  (see  Royal  Decrees  of October and  December  1967). 
It should be noted  that Belgian  ECSC  workers  have  four early pension 
schemes  compared  with  the  generally applicable pensions  for all workers: 
the four  are:  a)  a  general early pension scheme  under the national 
collective agreement  of December  1974;56  b)  the general miners'  pension 
h  (d  "b  d  h  1  f  h  .  h)  57  sc eme  escrL e  supra.  as  t  e  ast sentence  o  t  e  prev1ous  paragrap  ; 
58  c)  the  early pension  scheme  for miners'  described  in  the previous paragraph; 
and d)  the early pension  scheme  for  steelworkers  aged  55,59  (under  the 
Social Volet),  which is under  the National  Collective Agreement  of 
December  1974;  the arrangements  are  complex  but with  there being no  fonnal 
overlap between  Readaptation Aid  (RA)  and  Social Valet in  the  EC  Commission's 
view,  workers  can  choose  between  UB  and  RA  ~  early retirement,  whichever 
is best for  them. 
In  Belgium  the average  ratio·  of ECSC  contributions  to gross  cost of Readaptation Aid  over the  7  year period 1979-1985  was  fractionally over 
6%,  though  there are substantial variations  around  this  figure. 60 
The  position in  the  Belgian coal  industry is  summarised  in 
Table  2. 
For  the  steel  industry the ratia  of ECSC  contributions to gross 
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costs is much  higher  ranging between  42.2%  (for 1983)  and  44.4%  (for 1979), 
with  the  average  ration being  43.5%,  over this  7 year period.  In  cash 
tenDs  the EC  has  contributed  twice  as  much  to steelworkers  as miners 
(378.IM  BF  as  opposed  to  190.1M  BF),  while  the gross  cost has  been  three 
times  greater for  coal  than  for steel for  the  Belgian Government61  over 
62  the  7 years.  The  reasons  for this disparity between  coal  and  steel are 
partially explained ~·  (af~er discussion of the  relative importance 
of traditional Aids).  Gross  cost is defined  in our Methodology as "the 
figure  given by  applicants in  the  formal  application to the Commission  of 
the  EC  for assistance,  under Article 56(2)(b)  of  the Treaty of Paris 
(as  amended),  as  being  the  total cost of  the benefits for workers 
affected". 63  It must  be  emphasised  that none  of  these  above  Belgian 
figures  takes  account of the  Social Volet payments,  which  cannot be 
divided up  o~ a  year by year basis for this purpose. 
The  ratio of  ECSC  contribution  to gross  cost  can  be  considered in 
relation  to.  specific Readaptation Aids  for Belgium.  We  can  thus  see  how 
important particular Aids are  in  tenDs  of  (a)  total expenditure,  and 
(b)  EC  contribution to those payments.  Belgian experience  of expenditure 
on  payments  bears  out an  earlier point  (supra.)  of  tideover allowances 
having become  more  important  than  earnings  supplements  in recent years, 
though  in their steel  industry in two  of  the  seven years  from  1979-85 
payments  on  earnings  supplemen.ts  exceeded  those for  tideover allowances 
(in 1980  and 1983).64  Taking  these two  Aids  together,  tideover allowances 
accounted  for  80.9~ of their gross  costs;  tideover allowances  accounted 
for  77.5%  in 1984  whereas  earnings  supplements  then  ac~ounted for just 
22.5%  of  their gross  costs that year.65 For steelworkers' tideover allowances  ECSC  participation quite 
consistently amounts  in practice to 45.4%  of the gross  cost  (including 
on  a  yearly basis) whereas  for steelworkers'  earnings.,· supplement it is' 
66  quite consistently 40.4%  of  gross cost. 
In relation to  the coal industry,  ECSC  participation in practice 
has  extended to  severance payments  and  the  removal  allowances  type of 
mobility allowances  as well  as  contributions to the tideover allowances 
67  and  earnings supplements.  The  declining  importance of the  latter in 
the  1980s  has meant  less  payments  each year culminating in none  (by 
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Government  or EC)  for both 1984  and  1985.  Where  the ECSC  has  participated, 
which is every year when  earnings supplements-have been paid,  its con-
tribution has  been  45.4%  eaCh  year  (i.e.  slightly higher than  for  steel) 
in the  1980s.  This  same  proportion has  also applied each year in the 
1980s  for  ECSC  participation in tideover allowance  payments  (exactly as 
for steel).  In relation to removal  allowances-ECSC participation has 
been consistently 50%.  In relation to  severance payments  for  coal,  the 
percentage of EC  contribution has  varied from  year  to year:  in both 
1979  and  1984  it inexplicably68  marginally exceeded  50%  (50.7%  and  52.8% 
respectively) with otherwise the proportion being  between  40%  (in 1981) 
and  45.6%  (in 1985);  the average% of EC  participation was  45.4%  over the 
seven years.  In  terms  of  rank ordering of  importance  for  those  coal 
industry Readaptation Aids  in which  the EC  has actually participated in 
the  1980s,  severance  payments  have  came  top both in terms of total pay-
menta  and  total EC  participation,  closely followed  by  tideover allowances 
on  both of these bases, with earnings supplements  third and  removal  allow-
ances  fourth  (once  again in  terms of both total payments  and  total 
EC  participation). 
One  reason why  the  EC  has appeared to contribute much  more  proportion-
ately of the total  gross cost of steel payments,  by comparison with  coal 
payments,  in Belgium,  is that it has  not apparently actually contributed 
to all the  Readaptation Aids  that it might have  done  for  coal,  most notably the very expensive early pensions69  between 1979-85.  For coal 
the Belgian Government  spent just over 16·times  as much  on  early pensions 
as  on  tideover allowances  in 1979  and  just over 5  times  as much  on  them 
in 1985.  Annual  Belgian Government  expenditure on  early pensions in this 
seven  year period has varied between  a  low  of 240.2M  BF  (approx.  5.3 Mecu) 
in 1984,  and  a  high of  391.~ BF  (approx.  8.7 Mecu)  in 1985. 70  The  EC 
furthermore has not contributed over the  7 years  to either the  coal re-
deployment  benefit or the special redeployment  benefit paid for coal-
•  71  lb  .  h  11  .  f  1  (  .  k  .  m1ners,  a  e1t muc  sma  er 1n  terms  o  tota  payments  at 1ts pea  m 
1979  the  combined  coal  redeployment  benefits being 14.8M  BF,  approx. 
0.37 Mecu). 
(b)  Summary  of Costs  and  the  ECSC  Contribution 
The  position in the Belgian coal and  steel industries is summarised 
in Tables  2  and  3. Table  2 
READAPTATION  AID:  BELGIUM;  COAL  1981  (1  ecu  •  BF  41.2946) 
GROSS  COST  ECSC  CONTRIBUTION  ECSC  CONTRIBUTION 
PER  % OF  PER  %OF 
~  %  OF  GROSS 
TOTAL  CAPITA  TOTAL  TOTAL  CAPITA  TOTAL  COST 
Mecu  ecu 
Earnings  Supplement  0.199  1.9  0.090  16.5  45.2 
Tideover Allowance  0.326  3.1  0.148  27.1  45.4 
' 
Removal  Allowance  0.002  0  0.001  0.1  50.0 
Severance Payments  0.766  7.2  0.307  56.2  40.1 
Redeployment  Benefits  0.046  0.4  0  0  0 
Early Pension  (Workers)  8.388  79.7  0  0  0 
Early Pension  (Employees)  0.670  6.7  0  0  0 
Special Redeployment  0.123  1.2  0  0  0 
Benefit 
10,521  100.2  0.546  99.9  5.2  . 
Notes:  Source App.  2.  p.  39-40 
~  .... Table  3 
READAPTATION  AID:  BELGIUM;  STEEL  1981  (1  ecu  •  BF  41.2946) 
GROSS  COST  ECSC  GONT.RIBUTION  ECSC  NUMBER  OF 
PER  % OF  PER  % OF  CONTRIBUTION  BENEFICIARIES 
TOTAL  CAPITA  TOTAL  TOTAL  CAPITA  TOTAL  AS%  OF 
Mecu  ecu  Mecu  ecu  GROSS  COST 
Earnings  Supplement  0.972  743  68.6  0.396  304  68.6  40.9  1,307 
Tideover Allowance  0.445  2,572  31.4  0.183  1,058  31.4  41.1  173 
(Early Pension) 
TOTAL  TRADITIONAL  AID  1.417  957  100.0  0.581  393  100.0  41.0  1,480 
,· 
~:  Source,  App.  2  p.  51. (iv)  The  French Position 
(a)  Exposition of  the  System 
The  French position is similar to that  ~evailing in  the major  ECSC 
Member  States with the EC  Aids,  national social'security system  and 
special industry social security schemes  (the miners having their own 
social security fund  called  CAN)  closely interlinked.  Tbe  resulting web 
of provisions is highly complex:  hence its more  extended  treatment here. 
In short,  in the 1980s  the French national social security system has 
became  geared  towards  encouraging early retirement.  The  system's recent 
evolution will be  briefly charted.  National  legislation in April 1983 
reduced  the official retirement,age to 60  from  65,  which  had  been  fixed 
in the  Social Security Code  just after the end of-the Second  World  War. 
Pre-1983,  people  could  receive a  state retirement pension at 60  provided 
they had the  requisite length of  insurance to their name  with the  amount 
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of pension depending  on  the duration of the insurance.  Under  the Social 
Security Code72  there was  a  supplementary allowance  for the disabled and 
special cases  (including Alsace-Lorraine miners).  From  1971  certain 
workers73  could retire at 60  with a  pension at  the rate nonDally applicable 
at 65.  March  1972  saw arrangements agreed providing an  income  guarantee, 
integrated into unemployment  benefit,  for those  redundant over 60.  1980 
saw  the introduction of a  guaranteed allowance of  70%  of gross  salary 
(which would  exceed  80%  of ~  salary) initially for  those  redundant after 
aged  56  years and  2 months  (exceptionally if aged  55).74  These  provisions, 
soon  further expanded,  represented in effect an  early retirement  system 
and  were  posited on  departures  agreed  be~een employer  and  employee. 
We  shall next briefly consider special  allowance in cases  of  total 
unemplo~nt caused by  redundancy  for workers  under  60  still seeking 
emplo~nt and  who .basically have  worked  182  days  in  the  12  months  preceding 
their unemployment.  Until  1982  this allowance  was  a  fixed  sum  (26.50 FF 
per day
1  in 1981)  added  to a  proportion of previous wage  operating degressively by  5%  over 4 quarters  from  65%  initially down  to  50%.  A 
decree  of  April  1984  replaced  these  provisions with a  basic allowance75 
which  was  initially fixed at 40  FF  (later becoming  42.80  FF)  per day 
76  plus  42%  of gross wages  for  6-18  months  for the  under  50s  and  for 
6-42  months  for  the  over  50s.77 
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Importantly for our purposes  this basic allowance  became  a  reference 
for  the ECSC  tideover allowance  for both redundant miners  and  steel-
78  workers.  The  EC,  under  the  Bilateral  Conventions  agreed by  the Commission 
and  the French Government,  has been paying up  to  50%  of  the difference 
between  the French national unemployment  benefit  79  and 'the  complex  tide--
over allowance payments  for redundant  ECSC  miners  and  steelworkers which 
over the  single year of payments  during  the  1981-83  period were  degressive 
with,  for example,  the previously low  earners  receiving  90%  of  previous 
wages  for  the first two  months  and  then  60%  for  the next  10  months.  Those 
in the next  fonmer  income  bracket  (earning in 1983  between  4280  and 
6440  FF)  received  80%  for  the first  two  months,  70%  for six months  and 
40%  for the last four months.  The  third former  income  bracket  (fonnerly 
earning up  to FF  12,830)  got  60%  for the first -two  months,  40%  for six 
months  and  20%  for  the last ··four  months. 
The  complex  earnings  supplements arrangements  for French miners and 
steelworkers have  been quite different in recent years with even  the 
duration of payments  being twice  as  long  (24  months  as  opposed  to 12  months) 
so  for  steelworkers.  Furthermore,  the  previous  earnings bands  as an 
important basis for detenmining what  earnings supplement  should be  recieved 
have  been different for each industry,  though  all the  calculations based 
on  various percentages are essentially the  same. 
There  are special arrangements  for transferred  coalminers under the 
coal social volet, with the  EC  contributing up  to  50%  but with a  ceiling 
81  of 2,000 ecu  per man. 
The  early retirement arrangements  for French coal  and  iron ore 45 
mine  workers  have  been quite similar in  tenns  of traditional Aid  ia 
recent years.82  The  broad basic requirements  of having had  30  years' 
service or to be  the  holder83  of an  invalidity pension indicating at  least 
30%  pe~anent incapacity have  applied to both.  The  benefits  themselves 
are diliectly comparable.  Iron ore workers,  however,  have  had  a  maximum 
of  2  years'  payments  whereas  coal miners  receive early pension until  they 
are ·entitled to full pension at 55  (the normal  retirement age  in French 
•  •  )  84  m1n1ng  •  For  coal,  the  EC  contribution has been  up  to  50%  of  the  total 
for 2 years subject  to a  ceiling of  6,000 ecu  per beneficiary.  The  EC 
element of early retirement  payments  for  steelworkers has been  up  to  50% 
of the cost under the Social Volet  though  subject to  a  number  of  limits 
described below.  The  Social Volet controls early retirement payments  for 
steelworkers. 
~  shall briefly consider the early retirement  arrangements  specif-
ically under the  Social Volet.  For coal miners  under  the  Coal  Social 
Volet  there is the  early pension and  early retirement allowance85  available 
in their third year of retirement,  with the  EC  theoretically contributing 
up  to 50%  but with a  ceiling of 3,000 ecu per man. 86 
Under  the steel Social Voleta  there is "dispenses  d'activit~"  (DA) 1 
i.e. work  exemption,  for those  aged  5o-55,  remaining part of  the workforce, 
who  receive  79%  of  their old gross  income  until  they become  58  when  they 
qualify for  'proper'  early retirement.  So  in addition  there is 'proper' 
early retirement,  called "cessation  anticip~ d'activit~"  (CAA)  for  those 
at least aged  55  (up  to 60)  who  receive a  monthly pension,  with  70%  of 
former  income  plus a  further-payment  of  20%  of gross previous  annual 
income.  The  EC  contributes up  to ·so%,  but with a  ceiling of  2,000 ecu, 
for at least 18  months.87 
The  EC's strong commitment  to  training is well  reflected  in both the 
coal and  steel arrangements for Training Aid  to which  the  CaDmission  is 
pleased to contribute up  to 50%  of  the  cost.  Workers  may  undergo  training jJ 
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before  or after  redundancy and  qualify for  EC  Aid.  For steelworkers  we 
need  to distinguish between  internal training and  training-conversion 
contracts.  This  does  not  apply  to coal  ~ners.  Miners'  length of 
training is normally a  year,  though potentially extendable  by  special 
agreement  to 2 years;  this also applies  to  steelworkers undergoing internal 
training.  Two  years is the normal  duration for training conversion.  A 
miner and  a  steelworker undergoing  internal  training  receive  the  equiv-
alent of basic salary and normally an  end  of  course  bonus  (of  between 
just over FF  5,000 and  just over FF  10,000).  Those  on  training  con~ 
I 
version,  who  must normally be under  45,  receive  70%  of their  fonDer 
wages  (or  65%  if what  they would  have  earned is capitalised).  One 
interesting feature  for  those  on  training-conversion is that if they do 
not receive  two  job offers at the  end  of  this course,  their training 
continues at  the enterprise's expense.  As  an  incentive to placement of 
trainees this is admirable and  could  perhaps  be  usefully applied  as a 
requirement  in other Member  States. 
The  quite expensive Mobility Aids  are not  the  same  for  coal miners 
as  for steelworkers  though  the job  search allowance arrangements are 
.  .1  88  s1m1  ar. 
Severance payments  (or more  precisely,  "bonuses  on  departure") 
exist in both coal and  steel industries  in France with  the  EC  contribution 
11  b  .  1.  .  d  2  000  b  f.  .  89  s  1  k  norma  y  e1ng  1m1te  to  ,  ecu  per  ene  1c1ary.  tee wor  ers  can 
receive  a  FF  50,000 bonus if they_leave voluntarily:  the  EC  share is 
1,000  ~cu per person.  But  for cbal miners it takes  the  form  of a  re-
conversion bonus,  i.e. obtaining a  job outside the  coal industry,  and is 
worth between  3 months  and  a  year's wages  (depending on  length of  service). 
The  require~nt of 10 years'  service in the  industry  to qualify for  this 
reconversion bonus  was  dropped in 1984.  For steelworkers  re-employed 
outside  the steel. industry the bonus  is based on  years  of  service;  from 
1984  such  reconversion  aid has  also been  linked  closely with training 
contracts. 47 
Concerning miners'  concessionary  coal," capitalisation of  the value 
of beating allowances is possible under  the  bead  of  surrender of benefits 
in kind.90  Under  the  Coal  Social Volet, miners retiring before  aged  60 
can  receive  transition allowance91  in the  foDD  of benefits in kind  for 
heating,  with  the  EC  contributing up  to  50%  for  3 years. 
The  short  time  working Aid  under  the  steel Social Volet has  two 
aspects,  offering aid to businesses  who  recruit and  financial  compensation 
for  the unemployed  who  take up  short  time working  where  they are paid 
below the  unemployment  benefit rate.  The  EC  contributes  25%  for  1  year 
for  those  under 50  and  for 2  years for  those 
92  over 50. 
Under  the steel Social Volet  there is also partial unemployment 
•  93  h  k.  h  d  d  hich  f  compensat1on  w ere wor  1ng  ours  are  re uce  ,  w  compensates  or 
loss of wages  up  to  70%. 
(b)  Summary  of Costs  and  the  ECSC  Contribution 
Having  provided a  short exposition of all the  EC  Aids  we  shall offer 
some  comments  on  their relative  importance,  which  is a  much  more  difficult 
94  task in relation  to  France.  Early retirement measures  have  become  most 
prominent.  Their importance  in coal  by  1981  is clear from  the pit closures 
in Nord-Pas  de  Calais in 1981  when  70.5%  of  those eligible took up  this 
sort of Aid95  and  also in  relation  to  the Destival closure in  the  Cevennes 
•  h  85  7%  k  1  .  Aid  96  reg1on w en  •  too  ear y  ret1rement  • 
For  the steel industry in France  entirely  satisfactory figures  are 
also extremely difficult to provide.  But  in relation to the Social Volet 
No.  1  (1979-81)  and  the early retirement benefits Aid  element,  that is 
i)  DA  and ii) mixed  DA  and  CAA,  it would  appear as if the  EC  contributed 
approximately  31%  of these  Aids  (on  a  backdated,  reimbursement  basis) 
whether  these specific Aids  are  taken  individually or collectively.97  For 
steelworkers  receiving  the  FF  50,000 voluntary departure bonus,  to which 
the EC  contributes up  to  1,000 ecu  per  person,  the  EC's  contribution 
98  under the  Social Volet No.  1  represented  12%  of  the  gross cost. 48 
The  EC's proportion of the gross  cost of  the reconversion  bonuses  was 
surprisingly 50%. 99 
The  position in the  French coal and  steel industries is summarised 
in Tables  4  and  5. Table 4 
READAPTATION  AID:  FRANCE;  COAL  1984  (1  ecu •  FF  6.87165) 
GROSS  COST  ECSC  CONTRIBUTION  ECSC  NUMBER  OF 
PER  % OF  PER  % OF  CONTRIBUTION  BENEFICIARIES 
TOTAL  CAPITA  TOTAL  TOTAL  CAPITA  TOTAL  AS  % OF 
Mecu  ecu  Mecu  ecu  GROSS  COST 
TRADITIONAL  AIDS 
Training 
Transfers  to EDF 
Training prior to  2.025  7,130  1.013  3,565  50.0  284 
transfer 
Specialised  training  3.394  14,320  1.697  7'  160  '  50.0  237 
Other transfers 
externally  0.362  16,444  0.180  8,182  50.0  22 
Internal transfers  0.892  7,130  0.446  3,568  50.0  125 
- -
6.672  10,656  12.1  3.336  4, 994-,- 18.9  50.0  668 
Reinstallation 
Transfers  to EDF  0.966  4,074  0.483  2,037  50.0  237 
Other  transfers  0.045  4,511  0.023  2,255- 50.0  10 
Repatriation  1.099  4,657  0.055  2,329  50.0  236 
Internal transfers  0.362  1,455  0.181  728  50.0  249 
--
'  2.472  3,377  4.5  1,236  1,689  7.0  50.0  732 
s;:.. 
\0 Table  4  contd 
GROSS  COST  ECSC  CONTRIBUTION  ECSC  NUMBER  OF 
PER  % OF  PER  % OF  CONTRIBUTION  BENEFICIARIES 
TOTAL  CAPITA  TOTAL  TOTAL  CAPITA  TOTAL  AS%  OF 
GROSS  COST  Mecu  ecu  Mecu  ecu 
Job  Change  Grant 
Transfers  to EDF  2.707  5,195  1.353  2,597  50.0  521 
Other transfers  0.281  6,534  0.129  3,012  45.9  43 
Repatriation  2.693  11,409  0.474  2,008  17.6  236 
5.680  7,100  10.3  1.956  2,445  11.1  34.5  800 
Capitalisation of Benefits in Kind 
Transfers  to EDF  3.624  6,956  1.046  2,008  28.8  521 
Other transfers  0.390  9,081  0.086  2,007  22.1  43 
Repatriation  2.943  12,472  0.474  2,008  16.1  236 
6.958  8,698  12.7  1,.607  2,008  9.1  23.1  800 
-
Early Retirement 
-- 33.178  16,723  60.4  9.506  4,792  53.9  28.7  1,984 
TOTAL  TRADITIONAL  AIDS  54.961  99.7  17.642  99.5  32.1 Table 4  contd 
GROSS  COST 
PER  % OF 
TOTAL  CAPITA  TOTAL 
Mecu  ecu 
SOCIAL  VOLET 
Normal  Retirement 
Heating & Habitation  ) 
Grant  )  27.841  9,954  65.1 
Installation Grant  ) 
Mobility Allowances 
Internal transfers  1.683  6,757  3.9 
Early Retirement  13~231  6,668  30.9 
TOTAL  SOCIAL  VOLET  42.755  8,500  100.0 
Notes:  Source - EC  Comudssion 
Gross  Costs are estimates of expected Gross  Costs 
ECSC  Contribution is the  ceiling 
ECSC  OONTRIBUTION  ECSC  NUMBER  OF 
PER  % OF  CONTRIBUTION  BENEFICIARIES 
TOTAL  CAPITA  TOTAL  AS  % OF 
GROSS  COST  Mecu  ecu 
13.921  4,977  66.2  50.0  2,797 
0.500  2,008  2.3  29.7  249 
6.615  3,334  31.5  50.0  1,984 
21.036  4,182  100.0.  48.0  5,030 READAPTATION  AID:  FRANCE;  STEEL  1981 
Early Retirement 
Pension  (DA)  (a) 
Early Retirement 
Pension  (CAA)  (b) 
Mixed  DA/ CAA  C  c) 
Re-employment  Bonus  (b) 
Voluntary Departure 
Bonus  (b) 
TOTAL  SOCIAL  VOLET 
GROSS  COST 
PER 
TOTAL  CAP ITA 
% OF 
TOTAL 
Mecu  ecu 
164 
137 
50.8 
5 
48 
404.8 
19,255  40.5 
18,026  33.8 
18,642  12.5 
1,658  1.2 
8,290  11.8 
14,529  99.8 
Table 5 
ECSC  CONTRIBUTION 
PER 
TOTAL  CAPITA 
Mecu  (d)  ecu 
50.74 
42.63 
15.75 
2.56 
5.89 
117.53 
5,958 
5,609 
5,780 
829 
1,000 
4,218 
% OF 
TOTAL 
43.2 
36.3 
13.4 
2.2 
4.9 
100.0 
(1  ecu  •  FF  6.03992) 
ECSC 
CONTRIBUTION 
AS%  OF 
GROSS  COST  (e) 
31 
31 
31 
50 
12 
NUMBER  OF 
BENEFICIARIES 
8,517 
7,600 
2,725 
3,089 
5,930 
27,861 
Notes:  The  French steel figures  are  subject to  very wide  margins  of error.  The  figures  in this  table,  based  on  information 
in Appendix  3,  are for the  Social Volet 1979-81 and a  subsequent adjustment  in  1984.  This  adjustment also 
included workers who  were  put into early retirement  in 1982. 
(a)  These  figures  have  been calculated by  adding data  from  line 1  of the  table on p.  159  in Appendix  3  to an 
adjusted  figure from  the  table on  p.  164  of Appendix  3.  The  latter figure  has  been  adjusted downwards  to 
try to keep  1981 values. 
(b)  Appendix  3,  p.  159, 
(~)  Appendix  3,  p.  164  for  the ECSC  Contribution,  the Gross  Cost is an  estimate  based on  information in the  table 
on  p.  164. 
(d)  Some  of the  figures  in this  column  are over-estimates because  they include appropriations under  the first 
Social Valet which  added  up  to  78.21 Mecu,  though  this total was  subsequently  reduced  to  68.51  Mecu. 
(e)  Calculated  on  the  basis of  the  Per Capita figures.  Ul 
IV (v)  The  UK  Position 
(a)  Some  General Considerations 
100  Since  very detailed expositions  of  the  UK  Social Security system 
53 
and  of the Readaptation Aid  schemes  in  the  UK  coa1101  and  stee1102  industries 
were  given  in our Interim Report,  we  propose here  only  to highlight some 
important features.103  EC  Readaptation Aid  as  reflected primarily in 
ISERBS104  and  the  RMPS  has  not had· an  influence on  the  UK  Social Security 
system at  l~rge generally,  though  the  latter has  certainly very strongly 
influenced the  shape  of both ISERBS  and  the  RMPS  particularly as  far as 
weekly  payments  for  the unemployed  are concerned. 
Under  the Bilateral Conventions  the basic position has  been  as  follows: 
RMPS  weekly  payments  i.e.  tideover allowances  have  been  designed historically 
to provide for  the  redundant udner aged at least 55,  with 10  years'  coal 
industry service,  a  guaranteed make-up  to approximately  90%  of  his  previous 
net  earnings  for a  married man,  with  the  EC  contributing up  to 50%  of  the 
difference between  the guaranteed income  and  UK  State Benefits  for  two 
years.  In contrast  ISERBS  tideover allowances  under  the steel Bilateral 
Convention  have basically offered £16  per week  for a  year to men  under  55 
with  the  EC  contributing up  to  50%  of  the benefits for 12  months,  which 
is a  liudted measure.  However,  for men  of 55  and over the. weekly  ISERBS 
payment  has been £16  per  week  for 6 months,  then  a make-up  to  90%  of 
previous  gross  earnings for 12  months,  and  fin~lly 80%  make-up  for 6  months, 
making  two  years  in toto,  with the EC  contributing 50%  of benefits  (less 
tax and  abatement  for other potential state benefits.  Both  the  RMPS  and 
ISERBS  pay weekly  payments  for  longer than  the  Commission  is prepared to 
contribute. 
(b)  The  Coal  Industry,  RMPS  and  Social Security 
We  shall now  explain the  complex  link with the State Social Security 
scheme  under  the  1980  RMPS  operative in early 1981105  (our year highlighted 
fo~ special study).  A married man  with no  children declared redundant in  1981,  at aged  55  or over,  who  had  average pre-redundancy weekly 
earnings of £9!6.32,  would  have  received £36.79  RMPS  "basic benefit" plus 
£33.40  State Unemployment  Benefit  (UB)  for  the first 52  weeks,  with  the 
weekl:t  benefit being  taxable.  "Basic benefit"  could have  been  reduced 
by  the  amount  of, or increase  in  the amount  of,  these  six  benefits 
if they  became  payable after the last date worked:  i)  Earnings  Related 
Supplement  (ERS)106;  ii) Special Hardship  Allowance  (SHA)  excluding 
general  increases; iii) Injury Benefit payable in excess  of Sickness 
Benefit;  iv)  Workmen's  Compensation  and  Supplement;  v)  Colliery Workers 
Supplement;  and,  vi)  Supplementary Benefit  (SB)  iD  the fifth and  sub-
sequent weeks  following redundancy.  However,  State Disablement  Pension 
awarded  under  the  Industrial Injuries legislation was  not  deductible. 
The  minimum  amount  of "basic benefit" payable under  the  RMPS  in early 
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1981  was  £7.37  per week,  and  from  6.4.81  £8.92  per week,  from  which was 
deductible  the  following state benefits:  i)  ERS,  ii) State Injury  Benefit 
to  the  extent that it exceeded  Sickness  Benefit or Invalidity Pension, 
and  iii) SB. 
Under  the  RMPS  operative in 1981,  payment  of "basic benefit"  terminated 
after 156  weeks  of entitlement until 11.3.81 and  then from  that  date after 
5 years,  or at  65  (for men),  whichever  came  first. 107  If the beneficiary 
failed at  ~y time  to satisfy  the  conditions for State Unemployment  (UB), 
Sickness  or Invalidity Benefit, "basic benefit" would  have  terminated. 
This  also would  have  occurred if he became  re-employed  for  over 16  hours 
per week  in the  coal industry; if obtained outside  the industry,  "basic 
benefit" would  have  been  reduced  to a  maximum  of  £8  per week,  but  from 
25.3.81  this became  £20  per week.  "Unemployment  Benefit  Equivalent"  (UBE) 
was  paid under  the  RMPS  between  the expiry of the "basic benefit" period 
and  retirement age  and it was  dependent upon  registration for employment 
(as  is UB).  UBE  would never be payable  to  those in jobs or receiving  ,-
State Sickness or Invalidity Benefit. 55 
Let us  take  the  example  of a  married miner,  aged  57,  declared 
redundant on  1  May  1981  with 37  years  NCB  service.  Apart  from  immediate 
receipt of non-taxable  redundancy  lump  sum  payments  in  total of  £7,280  of 
108  which  the  RMPS  lump  sum  element would  be  a  half  - £3,640 - so  that  only 
the latter figure would  be eligible for gross  cost for  EC  contribution 
purposes,  what  would  he  receive in his first five years?  After tax 
deductions his net weekly  RHPS  benefit over  the  five years would  be  about 
90%  of his  fotmer net pay:  his  total weekly pre-tax income  would  be  £87.02 
for  the  five  years  up  to age  62.  The  ordinary state benefits  element 
would  have  been weekly  UB  of £33.40 for a  year plus ERS  o-f  £15  for  6  months. 
UBE  would  have  been paid under  the  RMPS  when  UB  ended  after a  year for as 
long as  he was  unemployed.  What  would  happen  to him  after 5 years?  At 
this point in 1986  - at 62  - he  would  have  received a  (non-taxable) 
Mineworkers'  Pension  Scheme  (MPS)  a)  lump  sum  of £2,028,  and  b)  weekly 
pension of £13  per week  (to neither would  the  EC  contribute)  together with 
RMPS  payments  which would  be  UBE  only now  (i.e.  £33.40 per week  at pre-
November  1981  level)  up  to age  65,  though  up-rated by  the  time  he  would 
have  received it.  At  this stage the  EC  would not be  contributing to any 
RMPS  payments. 
(c)  The  Steel Industry,  !SERBS  and  Social Security 
We  shall now  provide  some  comparative analysis with !SERBS  for  re-
dundant,  unemployed  steelworkers and its links with  the Social  Security 
109  .  110  System.  In  1981  su·ch  male  steelworkers  under 55  received  a  flat 
rate  £16  per week  "ISERBS  unemployment  benefit11  for  12  months  together 
with state UB  (£33.40 per week)  for this period, making  a  total of £49.40 
per week.  However,  if the steelworker was  male  and at least aged  55111 
at  the date of  redundancy,  he  received flat rate  !SERBS  benefit at  £16 
per week  for  26  weeks;  then from  the  27th week  of unemployment,  he 
received a  make-up  to  90%  of previous gross earnings  for  52  weeks  and 
80%  for a  further 26  weeks,  less any  of  the  following·six  state social 56 
security benefits that  he may  have  been  receiving.  The  six were: 
i)  UB;  ii}  Sickness Benefit;  iii}  Invalidity Benefit;  iv)  SB;  v}  any 
increase  in, or new  award  of'.  SHA  awarded  after the date of  redundancy; 
vi)  Non-contributory Invalidity Pension  (NCIP). 
Let us  take  the example  of a  45  year old male  redundant  steelworker 
with 20  years'  service who  had  been  earning £120  per week  at  the  date of 
redundancy  in 1981  but was  unemployed  thereafter.  He  would  have  received 
£16  per week  !SERBS  benefit  for a  year, making  £832  in toto  for  the year, 
to which  the  EC  would  contribute up  to  50%  (less,  as it was  1981,  any 
ERS  payable),  together with state UB  weekly  (to which  the  EC  would  not 
contribute}.  A 55  year old steelworker in the same  situation and  with 
the  same  credential  would  have  received £16  per week  !SERBS  benefit for 
112  113  26  weeks  (plus  state UB)  plus  90%  of previous earnings  for  52  weeks 
plus  80%  for a  further 26  weeks  less theoretically any  of  six state 
benefits that  he  might have  received.  The  !SERBS  element over  the  two 
year period would  have been  a  maximum  of  £7,563.40.  The  EC  contribution 
114  would  be  up  to 50%  less  tax,  ERS  payable  and  other potential state 
benefits.  Incidentally a  60  year old steelworker in the  same  situation 
would  have  received  the  same.  Each  of  the  three would  have  stood to 
have  done  better if he  had  been  a  miner benefiting under  the  RMPS  as 
operational in 1981. 
The  Aid  of  Income  Support  in the event of obtaining another job -
Earnings  Supplements  - does  not directly impinge  upon  the  Social  Security 
system where  it concerns workers  obtaining full-time  employment  at  a 
lower  pay  rate.  Nevertheless receipt of certain state benefits theoretically 
could affect  the make-up  to  90%  of for,mer  earnings.  This has  been more 
important  as  an  EC  Aid  in the  UK  steel industry  than in the coal  industry 
in recent years.  It has been  a  central element of  ISERBS  for the re-
'  ' 
employed  or  redepl~yed and  from  1976  the self-employed,  but not in  the 
RMPS  for  any of  these three groups. 57 
(d)  Early Pensions  in Coal  and  Steel 
.  .  1  .  d  115  h.  .  Concerning  the early pens1on  option  1n  the  coa  1n  ustry,  t  1s  1s 
available only  to non-industrial  (white  collar)  workers,  aged  at least 50 
with 10 years'  service,  with the  equivalence of  24  months'  income  support 
being put into the  NCB  Staff Superannuation Scheme  Pension  Fund  for 
improvement  of  the early retirement pension  through  the purchase  of 'extra 
years';  the  EC  is prepared to contribute up  to  50%  of  the  cost.  Under  the 
Coal  Social Volet  the  Commission  was  prepared to  contribute towards  an 
extra 12  months  benefits for beneficiaries over 55.  The  RMPS  does  not 
provide  for an  early pension as  such. 
The  early pension option is of  much  more  broad significance in  the 
steel industry  than in the  coal  industry as it again has  been  a  central 
116  plank of ISERBS  for unemployed  men  aged at least 55.  A lump  sum  equal 
to  18  months'  tideover allowance goes into the pension  fund  to  supplement 
the worker's  income.  The  rules  concerning eligibility for  the  early 
pension have  been strict:  the  requirement  to be  unemployed  when  making 
the  option and  to have been unemployed  since the date of  redundancy  has 
meant historically (including in 1981)  that workers  should sign on  as 
unemployed  at the  (State)  Unemployment  Benefit Office  to  safeguard  their 
position. 
(e)  Training 
Training as  an  EC  Aid has historically only been  of  any  significance 
•  h  UK  •  h  1  .  d  llJ  .h  1  h  de  f  1n  t  e  1n  t  e  stee  1n  ustry.  T e  coa  sector  as  ma  no  use  o 
it historically as an  EC  Aid,  despite having  the wherewithal under 
Article  8  of  the major 1974  Bilateral Convention  for individual Aid118 
119  and  under  the 1975  Bilateral Convention  on  Training Expenses  to  claim 
from  the Commission.  The  reality has  been  that the  RMPS  has  had no 
provision for training whereas it has  been  a  central plank of ISERBS. 
However,  in 1985  the NCB  announced its Job  and  Career Change  Scheme 
(JACCS)  offering retraining opportunities with.lts main  target for  courses 58 
being men  under  50:  negotiations with  the  EC  Commission  are under way  for 
specific EC  support  for  JACCS.  In relation  to steelworkers  on  Training 
Aid,  the guarantee  of  100%  of previous net  earnings  for  52  weeks  from  the 
inception of !SERBS  in 1974,  was  always  subject  to  abatement  of any  state 
benefits being received.  Thus  state social security provisions  can 
impinge  on  this Aid. 
(f)  Mobility Allowance 
Mobility Allowances  as an  EC  Aid  as  such  appear in recent years  to 
have  been  more  important to  the  steel sector than the  coal  sector because 
1'20  of  the  lack of claims  in recent years  for  the latter sector.  It is 
noteworthy also that,  for example,  in 1981,  a  steelworker moving  to  a 
new  job beyond  daily travel distance in  the  same  ~teel company  obtained 
siudlar benefits under  ISERBS  ·to  those under  the  DE  Transfer Scheme. 
This  EC  Aid  does  not  link directly with  the State Social  Security Scheme 
as  such.  The  RMPS  is not concerned with Mobility Allowances:  these are 
provided by  a  unilateral NCB  scheme. 121  At  the end  of  1981  there-
settlement allowances in particular within  both coal and  steel were 
0  11  h  122  v1rtua  y  t  e  same. 
(g)  Lump  Sum  Payments 
Given  that  ISERBS  does  not  provide  lump  sum  payments  and  there is 
indeed no  provision for lump  sum  severance payments  in the steel Bilateral 
Convention  (even  as amended),  the EC  generally contributes nothing to 
such payments  made  to  steelworkers  so  that  then  they are not part of  the 
''  ''  .  h  f  EC  1"  . bl  123  0  .  h  RMPS  gross cost  1n  t  e  sense o  e  1g1  e  cost.  ver t1me  t  e 
placed an  increasing emphasis  on  lump  sum  payments  following  their intro-
duction in 1973:124  the  second statutory instrument on  the  RMPS  in 1980,125 
the  1981  RMPS, 126  which  introduced extra  lump  sums  for those  redundant 
aged  between  21  and  59,  the  1983  RMPs,127  and  the first 1984  RMPs128  were 
the implementing  instruments.  In 1985  the  EC  Camudssion  agreed to  con-
tribute up  to a  new  ceiling of £1,175  for certain minera  receiving RMPS 59 
129  lump  sums.  Technically  lump  sum  redundancy  payments  under  the  EP(C)A 
1978  represent  the  interface between  Social  Security Law  and  Labour  Law 
in  the  UK,  though British lawyers more  generally regard  this matter as  an 
integral part of Labour Law. 130  Same  use is made  of  the EP(C)A  redundancy 
lump  sum  figure  in  the  calculation of RMPS  lump  sums.  There is certain 
technical interlinking between  the  RMPS  and  EP(C)A  redundancy  regimes. 
(h)  Summary  of  Costs  and  the ECSC  Contribution, 
Coal 
We  shall next  consider the ratio of  ECSC  contributions  to gross 
cost of Readaptation Aid  for  the UK.  we  shall  summarise  the major results 
from  our Interim Report  for ease  of  comparison  with the position in other 
Member  States.  We  shall first consider the  coal industry by  individual 
Aids  on  the basis of actual pazments  (not  appropriations)  for  re~undancies 
made  for  1981  (the year  chosen  in our Methodology  for detailed  st~dy). 
The  data that we  obtained was  quite sophisticated.  The  EC  contribution 
to RMPS  weekly  benefits for mineworkers  (tideover allowances)  was  39% 
(£12  M out of  £30.5  M)  and  to RMPS  lump  sums  9%  (£209,000  out  of  £2.2 M), 
making  a  combined  total EC  contribution  of  37%  for  the  RMPS  weekly  and 
lump  sum  benefits  for  1981  (i.e.  £12.2 M out of  £32.7  M). 131  However,  we 
would  reiterate that these  figures  represent an  over-estimate  of  the 
actual  EC  contribution because  •••  "there would  be  subsequent payments 
by  the  UK  for those still entitled to benefit  (our emphasis).  This will 
substantially inflate  the  total of  £32.77 M and  thereby  lower  the percentage 
contributed by ECSC"  ••• 132  In  1981  for  the  concessionary coal Aid,  which 
is under  the  RMPS,  the  EC  contribution was  precisely 50%  (in each of  the 
half dozen  NCB  Areas  examined,  making  the  sample  some  75%  of total payments) 
with  the  EC  contribution being  £221  per head  on  average;133  we  estimate 
the  total gross  cost  of  the  concessionary  coal Aid  for  1981  redundancies 
for  the  whole  UK  as_  £2.52 M with  the EC  contributing £1.26  M. 
We  shall briefly mention  the position in  1981  of non-industrial, i.e.  white  collar,  NCB  redundant employees  to which  the  EC  contributed 
same  10%  of  the  £4.56  M total134  of weekly  payments  and  lump  sums,  which 
do  not  come  under  the  RMPS. 
Typically - and  1981  was  no  exception  - in  recent years  the  UK  has 
made  no  claim on  the  EC  for earnings supplements  on  mobility allowances 
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(the  ostensible  reason being stated as  the uneconomic  cost of  the exercise 
to the NCB).  The  lack of  claims for these  two  Aids  historically again 
brings  down  the  percentage of EC  contribution to  the  gross  cost of total 
Readaptation Aids. 
Our  estimate of  the actual percentage  of EC  contribution  to  overall 
coal  industry Readaptation Aid  in the UK  is presented in Table  6.  It 
cannot  be  emphasised  t90 strongly that  the ECSC  contribution is exaggerated 
in  this  table.  The  principal  reason  is that  the  gross costs of  RMPS  are 
likely to be  substantially more  than  the  figure  shown,  because  payments 
relating to  1981  redundancies  were  only  taken up  to 1983,  at which  time 
all the  ECSC  obligations had been met  though  there were still subsequent 
payments  to be  made  by  the  UK.  The  true figure of the  ECSC  contribution 
could easily be  10%  or less. 135 
It should be noted  that the UK  Deparbnent  of Energy  has  recently 
stated that the  terms of  the Bilateral Convention  between  the  Commission 
and  the UK  have  in recent years failed  to reflect improvements  made  in 
redundancy benefits  paid under  the  RMPS;  furthermore,  the improvements 
agreed  in  the Bilateral Convention's  terms in 1985  (after two  years of 
negotiations)  "fell well short of  those sought.  As  a  result Cbmmumty 
support in  this  area does not  come  anywhere  near matching  the  UK 
G 
t  d'"  11  136  overnment  s  own  expen  ~ture • Table 6 
READAPTATION  AID:  UK;  COAL  1981  (1  ecu  •  UKL  0.55311) 
GROSS  COST  ECSC  CONTRIBUTION  ECSC  NUMBER  OF 
PER  % OF  PER  %OF  CONTRIBUTION  BENEFICIARIES 
TOTAL  CAPITA  TOTAL  TOTAL  CAPITA  TOTAL  AS  %OF 
GROSS  COST  Mecu  ecu  Mecu  ecu 
Tideover Allowances 
RMPS,  Weekly  Payments  55.219  9,459  74.4  21.752  3,724  83.3  39.4  5,838 
Cokeworkers,  Weekly 
payments  1.812  9,199  2.4  o. 703  3,567  2.7  38.8  197 
White-collar,  Weekly 
payments  7.376  9.9  o. 738  2.8  10.0 
Lump  Sums 
RMPS  4.021  12,847  5.4  0.378  1,207  1.5  9.4  313 
Cokeworkers  0.347  2,343  0.5  0.173  1,172  0.7  49.9  148 
White-collar  0.867  1.7  0.087  0.3  10.0 
Concessionary Coal  4.562  799  6.2  2.281  400  8.7  50.0  4,280 
Training  0  0  0  0  0 
Earnings  Supplement  0  0  0  0  0 
MObility  Allowances  0  0  0  0  0 
74.204  100.5  26.112  100.0  35.2 
0' 
Notes:  Source - Interim Report  Section  C viii and  Appendix  16.  ..... (i)  Summary  of Costs and  the ECSC  Contribution, 
Steel 
Turning our attention to  the  UK  steel industry,  we  were  able to 
analyse  !SERBS  payments  for redundancies  declared in 1981137  in terms  of 
a worker-based classification, which  can  also be  directly related back 
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to an  instrument-based classification.138  The  worker-based classification 
could be  provided under four heads:  i}  unemployed,  ii}re-employed /re-
deployed,  iii) "early retirement",  and,  iv)  retraining.  In  terms of the 
instrument-based classification this basically converted into i)  tideover 
allowance,  ii) earnings supplement,  iii) early pension option,  and 
iv)  training Aid.  We  shall next present  the EC  contribution element of 
gross cost under  each of the  four  heads,  which now  have  a  two-way  class-
ification (both worker and  instrument based). 
The  ECSC  contribution under i) was  47%;  under ii)  50%;  under iii) 35%, 
and  under iv)  50%.  Overall  the ECSC  contribution to !SERBS  payments  for 
1981  redundancies was  46%.  The  ECSC  contribution to iv),  Training Aid, 
represented slightly over twice its combined  contribution to Aids  ii) 
and iii), as  shown  in Table  7. Table  7 
READAPtATION  AID:  UK· 
' 
STEEL  1981  (1  ecu •  UKL  0.55311) 
GROSS  COST  ECSC  CONTRIBUTION  ECSC  NUMBER  OF 
PER  % OF  PER  % OF  CONTRIBUTION  BENEFICIARIES 
TOTAL  CAPITA  TOTAL  TOTAL  CAPITA  TOTAL  AS%  OF 
GROSS  COST  Mecu  ecu  Mecu  ecu 
Tideover Allowance  62.415  3,119  29.6  29.272  1,462  30.0  46.9  20,016 
Earnings  Supplement  15.179  1,536  7.2  7.590  768  7.8  50.0  9,864 
Early Pension  42.298  13,007  20.0  15.023  4,620  15.4  35.5  3,252 
Training  91.300  12,569  43.2  45.650  . 6,285  46.7  50.0  7,264 
211.192  5,228  100.0  97.735  2,419  99.9  46.3  40,396 
·Notes:  Source- Interim Report  Section  C viii, where  figures  were  given  for a  sample  of  approx~ately 25%.-These 
figures  have  been  grossed up  from  the  sample. In  terms  of  average  amounts  paid on  a  per capita basis,  for steel 
redundancies  in 1981,  the EC  contributed most  to Training followed  by  -
Early Pension with Tideover Allowances  and  Earnings  Supplements  coming 
third  and  fourth respectively in rank ordering on  this basis.  It is 
noteworthy,  however,  that Early Pensions were  the most  expensive Aid  on 
a  per capita basis for the  UK  Government  as  the  gross  cost of this Aid 
exceeded that  for rraining on  this basis.  The  EC  contributed less on  a 
per capita basis  to Early Pensions  than  to  Training for workers  declared 
redundant  in UK  steel in 1981.139 
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By  far the  largest number  of beneficiaries on  !SERBS  EC  Readaptation 
Aid,  who  had  been  declared·redundant in 1981,  had  a  period of unemployment 
on  !SERBS  and  received Tideover Allowance  in  the  form of weekly  payments; 
indeed,  almost  twice  as many  as  received Earnings  Suppl~ents, which  were 
by  far the cheapest Aid  to both the UK  Government  and  the  EC  on  a  per 
capita basis and  in toto.  Thus  assisting workers  who  are  re-employed/ 
redeployed is by  far the  cheapest way  of assisting redundant  steelworkers, 
costing about  half as much  in £ sterling for  both  the  UK  Government  and 
EC  Commission  on  a  per capita basis as Tideover Allowances.  Just over 
twice as many  !SERBS  beneficiaries  declared  redundant in 1981  went  for 
Training Aid  than for an  Early Pension. 
Data;  for the  25%  sample,  are  given on  a  weekly basis in Table  8. 
Th•  h  b  b  1  .  140  Th  f  1s very muc  ears  out our a  ove  ana  ys1s.  e  average cost o 
Training per person per week  is considerably more  expensive  for both the 
EC  and  UK  Government  than are Tideover Allowances  and  Earnings  Supplements 
but  on  average  a  lower number  of weeks  is spent on  Training than on  these 
other  two  EC  Aids. Table  8 
UK  STEEL:  AVERAGE  AMOUNT  PAID  PER  MANWEEK  IN  THE  SAMPLE  FOR  1981 
Aid/Position of Worker  Gross  Cost  ECSC  Contribution  % EC  Average  Duration  in  Weeks  on  ISERBS. 
by  Category  in £  in £  Contribution  Benefit per  Person by  Aid 
i)  Tide  over 
Allowance  Unemployed  32.06  15.03  50%  53.8 
ii)  Earnings  Redeployed 
Supplements  Re-employed  19.47  9.73  50%  43.7 
iii) Training  Training  183.91  92.00  50%  37.8 66 
U>  An  Explanation for  the Disparity of ECSC 
Contribution to EC  Readaptation Aid  Between 
the  Coal  and  Steel Industries 
The  UK  steel industry has,  from  the  UK's  very accession  to member-
ship  of  the Community,  been much  more  geared  to  the EC's predominant 
approach  to  the  problem of redundancy  and  thus  to Readaptation Aid  over 
the past three decades.  ISERBS  arose  out of very extensive consultations 
between  EC  C~ssion officials,  the  UK  Government  (Department of  Industry) 
•  .  •  141  h  and  the part1es 1n  the steel 1ndustry.  In contrast t  e  RMPS  was  already 
a  statutory instrument  some  41  years before  the UK  entered  the  EC.  Yet 
the  1973  RMPS,  introduced before  the  UK  Coal  Bilateral Convention was 
agreed,  could have  reflected ECSC  priorities like training.142  Like  the 
EC,  ISERBS  is concerned with Training,  whiCh  is expensive  for both 
Government  and  Commission,  and  not with lump  sums,  in relation to which 
the EC  places severe restrictions on  its contributions in terms  of  ceilings. 
Thus  by  opting for a  scheme  with an  emphasis  on  Training,  with a  50% 
contribution from  the  Commission,  and  weekly payments  for both the  un~ 
employed  and make-up  payments  for the  redeployed/re-employed,  again with 
basically a  50%  contribution from  the  Co~ssion in practice as well as 
in  theory,  together with an  early pension option,  !SERBS  is designed  to 
maximise  its EC  contribution.  Indeed its very name,  the European 
Communities  Iron and  Steel Employees  Readaptation Benefits  Scheme,  is 
symbolic.  In contrast the  RMPS  has never attempted  seriously to  reflect 
the ECSC  priorities: it has never had  a  Training option within it.  The· 
RMPS  has  been placing an  increasing emphasis  on  lump  sum  payments.  It 
does not go  for extensive weekly make-up  payments  should a  redundant miner 
get  a  job outside  coal mining.  In our view the major reason  for the 
differences in level of EC  contribution  to Readaptation Aid  in  the  UK  coal 
and  steel industries lies in the process of history rather than  in an  ex-
plicit recognition  of differences between  the  two  industries and  their 
workers.143 67 
Furthermore,  as already mentioned,  the  UK  has in recent years  (e.g. 
in 1981  and  1982)  tended not  to  claim from  the  EC  for earnings supplements 
or mobility allowances  for miners  despite being able  to do  so under  the 
Coal  Bilateral Convention.144  Yet  in  the  five years  1981-85  there have 
been  a)  1237  Long  Distance Transferees  (i.e.  involving moving  home  to a 
new  area)  within  the  NCB,  and  b)  34,346  Short Distance Transferees  (i.e. 
they do  not need to move  h~e).
145  The  UK  can  claim EC  contributions  for 
Transfer  (i.e.  Removal  and Resettlement)  Allowances146  for a)  and  for 
Travel Allowances  for b)  for such workers under the  terms  of the Bilateral 
Convention.  The  average  cost per man  for b)  would  be  much  less than  for 
a).  The  decision not  to claim for these Aids  by  the  UK  is thus  one  small 
factor in helping  to explain  the recent disparity in EC  contributions  to 
UK  coal and  steel Readaptation Aid. 
(vi)  Other Countries'  Steel Industries 
An  analysis  of  the position in  the  steel industries of Denmark, 
Eire,  Italy,  Luxembourg,  and  the Netherlands is presented in Tables  9  - 13. 
Same  commentary  on  the situation in  these countries is provided  in 
Appendices  6 - 10  of  this Report. READAPTATION  AID:  DENMARK;  STEEL  1981 
GROSS  COST 
PER  % OF 
TOTAL  CAPITA  TOTAL 
Mecu  ecu 
Early Retirement  0.961  35,573  48.6 
Short-time Working(a)  0.399  703  20.2 
Tideover Allowances(b)  0.618  5,237  31.2 
1.978  2,778  100.0 
Notes:  Source - based  on  figures  in Appendix  6 
(a)  Average  of years  198Q-82 
(b)  Average  pf years. 1979-84 
Table  9 
(1  ecu •  DKR  8.0698) 
ECSC  CONTRIBUTION  ECSC  NUMBER  OF 
CONTRIBUTION  BENEFICIARIES  PER  % OF  AS%  OF  TOTAL  CAPITA  TOTAL  GROSS  COST  Mecu  ecu 
0.214  7,915  37.7  22.3  27 
0.044  78  7.7  11.1  567 
0.310  2,620  54.6  50.0  118 
0.568  797  100.0  712 Table 10 
READAPTATION  AID:  EIRE;  STEEL  ~985  (Appropriations)  (1  ecu•  IRL  0.71516) 
GROSS  COST  ECSC  CONTRIBUTION  ECSC  NUMBER  OF 
CONTRIBUTION  BENEFICIARIES  . PER  % OF  PER  %OF  AS%0F  TOTAL  CAPITA  TOTAL  TOTAL  CAPITA  TOTAL  GROSS  COST  Mecu  ecu  Mecu  ecu 
Tideover and  Early 
Retirement Allowance  0.3585  52.8 
Eamings  Supplement  0.0074  1.1 
Training  0.1000  14.7 
Mobility Allowance  0.0126  1.9 
Redundancy  Severance 
Payment  0.2000  29.5 
TOTAL  l'RADITI~AL AID  1.8438  15,895  0.6785  5,849  100.0  36.8  116 
Notes:  Source - Appendix  7  Table  4 
There  was  also a·  possible arrapgement of 147,000 ecu under  the  Social Volet 
.· READAPTATION  AID:  ITALY;  STEEL  1981-1987  (Appropriations) 
GROSS  COST 
PER 
TOTAL  CAPITA 
Mecu  ecu 
TRADITIONAL  AID 
Tideover Allowanies 
CIG  (1983-4)
8
'  46.859  9,583 
Other  (1983)b  0.141  7,038 
Wages  SuRplement 
(1985-6)  ,e  0.606  4,627 
Trainingdand Retraining 
(1982-7)  18.918  3,942 
Early Retirement 
(1983-4)
8 'e  219.880  17,451 
TOTAL  TRADITIONAL  AID  286.404 
SOCIAL  VOLET 
1st Social Volet  (1981-2) 
Tideover Allowances 
Early Retirement 
2nd  Social Volet  (1983-6) 
Early Retirement 
TOTAL  SOCIAL  VOLET 
% OF 
TOTAL 
16.4 
0.1 
0.2 
6.6 
76.7 
100.0 
Notes:  Source - figures  supplied by  the  Commission. 
(a)  1  ecu •  LIT  1495.13.  lbis exchange  rate was 
by the  Commission  for  these figures 
(b)  1  ecu •  LIT  1349.92:  exchange  rate in 1983 
(c)  1  ecu •  LIT  1447.99:  exchange  rate in 1985 
(1  ecu  •  LIT various,  see 
notes  a  - d) 
ECSC .  COOTRIBUTION .  ECSC 
CONTRIBUTION 
AS%  OF 
GROSS  COST 
NUMBER  OF 
BENEFICIARIES 
TOTAL 
Mecu 
8.470 
0.070 
0.302 
9.054 
41.353 
59.249 
5.436 
12.480 
7.970 
25.886 
supplied  (d) 
(e) 
(f) 
PER 
CAPITA 
ecu 
1,732 
3,475 
2,305 
1,887 
3,282 
3,580 
% OF 
TOTAL 
14.3 
0.1 
0.5 
15.3 
69.8 
100.0 
18.1 
49.7 
49.8 
47.9 
18.8 
20.7 
1  ecu •  LIT  1397.71:  exchange 
1982(1)-1987(1) 
not yet paid:  no  demand made 
short-time working 
4,890 
20 
131 
4, 799 
12,600 
3,486 
rate average 
...., 
0 Table 12 
BEADAPTATION  Am:  LUXEMJK>URG;  STEEL  1981  GAll  Beneficiaries) 
GROSS  COST  ECSC  CONTRIBUTION 
PER  % OF  PER 
TOTAL  CAPITA  TOTAL  TOTAL  CAPITA 
Mecu  ecu  Mecu  ecu 
Trai7:1ing  0.723  3,090  2.9  0.362  1,545 
Early Retirement  7.560  13,499  30.3  0.624  1,114 
DAC  2.143  1.10} 
Travaux Extraordinaires  16.656  66.8  0.408 
Re-employment  Earnings 
Supplement  0.135  550 
-
24.939  100.0  3.673 
Notes:  Source - Appendix  9 
% OF 
TOTAL 
9.8 
17 .o 
73.1 
99.9 
(1  ecu  •  LFR  41. 2946) 
ECSC  NUMBER  OF 
CONTRIBUTIW  BENEFICIARIES 
AS  %OF 
GROSS  COST 
50.0  234 
8.3  560 
1,942 
16.1 
245 
14.7 
,· 
......  .... ·Table 13 
~tATION  AID:  NETHERLANDS;  STEEL  1978-86  (1  ecu •  HFL  2.75409  to 
HFL  2.51885) 
GROSS  COST  ECSC  CONTRIBUTIC6  ECSC  NUMBER  OF 
PER  % OF  PER  %OF  CONTRIBUTIC6  BENEFICIARIES 
TOTAL  CAPITA  TOTAL  TOTAL  CAPITA  TOTAL  AS  % OF 
GROSS  COST  ecu  ecu  ecu  ecu 
BILATERAL  CONVENTION  197 8-80 
Tideover Allowance  417,804  12,000  7.1  207,984  598  11.7  50  348 
Pension Rights  4,459,760  12,815  76.1  1,478,210  4,248  83.4  33  348 
Income  Guarantee 
Moving  Allowance  426,956  1,220  7.3  86,306  247  4.9  20  350 
and  Reinstallation 
Training  557,072  5,926  9.5  0  0.0  0  94 
5,861,592  100.0  1,772,500  100.0  30 
SOCIAL  VOLET  1981-82  (APPROPRIATIONS) 
Short Time  Working  1,012,953  66  15,365 
Early Pension  1,405,047  4.,812  292 
SOCIAL  VOLET  1983-86 .(APPROPRIATIONS) 
Mecu  ecu  Mecu  ecu 
Early Retirement  1.040  1,437  0.520  718  50  724 
Short  Time  Working  0.252  0.126  50 
Notes:  Source - Appendix  10 
-...J 
N (vii)  Conclusions 
Some  Concluding Comments  on  ECSC  Aids  and  Their Interrelationship 
with National  Social  Security Schemes: 
From  the above  analysis it should  be  abundantly  clear that Member 
States'  social security systems  do  influence  the  shape  and  foDD  of  the 
EC  Readaptation Aids  when  operationalised in Member  States.  Many_of  the 
EC  Aids  are  linked  to  the social security provisions in Member  States. 
In negotiating Bilateral Conventions  the EC  Commission  is constrained 
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by  this  factor,  particularly as  there has  been no  serious attempt  to 
harmonise  social security systems within  the EC  since  the  Community's 
inception.  This latter point raises much  broader questions  than  just 
ECSC  Readaptation Aids'  practical operation.  Concerns  about  ECSC 
Readaptation Aid  (and  its equalisation across Member  States)  will 
plainly not  generate harmonisation of European  social security systems, 
though it would  be  one  small factor in  the  longer term which might 
encourage  sudh  a  gradual bigger process. 
ie have  considered the hypothesis  that countries with lower  social 
security levels obtain relatively more  from  the EC  under the ECSC 
Readaptation Aids  scheme  than  those with higher social security provision. 
We  have  so  far been unable  to test this hypothesis  in a  systematic way, 
which is really the only worthwhile  way  of approaching  such  testing.  For 
we  would  need  to be  able  to obtain genuinely comparable  data from  the 
Member  States,  including the precise amounts  of money  received in  terms 
of former earnings and  now  Readaptation Aid  by  typical  individuals  (if 
such can be  found)  as well as their precise  social security entitlements 
and  payments  post-redundancy.  We  could  then ascertain real replacement 
rates in percentage  terms.  ie would  also need precise data  on  the  cost 
of  living  (and possibly standards of living) in each Member  State.  What 
determines  the eligible cost for EC  contribution are  the  terms  of the 
Bilateral Conventions, various  correspondence with Governments  and  the 74 
deals under  the  Social Volet.  In  relation to income  support in  the  event 
of unemployment  (tideover allowances for  short) it should  be  possible  to 
calculate the crucial "differential allowance" by  subtracting  the social 
security element  (generally unemployment  benefit)  from  the  totality of  the 
income  guarantee in  ea~  country.  There  is a  view within  the Commission 
that a  considerably higher percentage is eligible for EC  contribution in 
the  UK  (70%)  than  in Germany  (20%),  for example,  because  of  Ge~any's 
more  generous  social security system. 
A Concluding  Comment  on  the Importance  of the ECSC  Element  in 
Relation  to the Gross  Cost of EC  Readaptation Aid: 
It is noteworthy that  the  EC  contributions  to  the  gross  cost of 
Readaptation Aid  payments  are  considerably less for coal  (approximately 
10%  or less of the whole)  than  for steel  (broadly over  40%  of  the  whole) 
147  in Belgium,  Germany  and  the UK.  We  cannot  comment  on  the position in 
France with quite the  same  degree of authority because  of the enormous 
difficulties encountered by  our French research  team  with the  data in 
relation to their country.  But  there again appears  to be  a  considerable 
differential with the French steel getting a  much  higher proportion in 
terms  of EC  contribution  than  its coal  counterpart. 
In short,  can  and  should this position be  justified?  we  should 
emphasise  that it is, of course,  very largely because of  the  basic shape 
of the eligibility rules  that  the  EC  payments  are  of  the  size that  they 
are.  We  have  already offered a  partial explanation in relation to 
Bel  •  148 
~1UJL  It can  also be  explained by  the fact  that  the  coal Bilateral 
Conventions in  the FYench,  Belgian  and  German  cases date  from  a  slightly 
earlier period.  We  also need  to bear in mind  the  Social Volet  for steel, 
which with its retrospective effect applied to the very end  of  the  1970s 
as well as  the 1980s. 2.  The  Interrelationship Between  EC  Readaptation Aid  and 
·National Policies 
(i)  Does  EC  Readaptation Aid  Act  as  a  Catalyst? 
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We  wish  to consider  the issue of  the extent to which  EC  Readaptation 
Aid  acts as a  catalyst to bring about additional finance  by  national 
authorities and  the enactment of specific social measures.  An  historical 
perspective on  this subject is very necessary because it has  been 
historically that the EC  has most  acted as  a  catalyst in these  respects. 
For example,  the Geman  team  found  some  evidence that in  t·he  very early 
1960s  and  the early 1970s  EC  Readaptation Aid  acted as  such a  catalyst 
in Germany  by  directly influencing "Sozialpl1ln_e"  policy and  practice. 
It must  be  remembered,  however,  that the  Sozialpllne is not strictly a 
national policy in so far as  the Public Authorities have nothing directly 
to do  with  the negotiations between  the  two  sides of industry though  they 
can  exert  some  influence on  the process.  The  catalytic role of  EC  Aid  in 
Belgium is exemplified by  the major EC  influence on  the  original intro-
duction of Readaptation Aid  there in 1958  and  then its fundamental  change 
by  the first Bilateral Convention  of February 1965.  The  very considerable 
influence of  EC  Readaptation Aid  on  the  terms  of the Bilateral  Convention 
for steel in the UK  in  the early 1970s  is an  excellent example  of the 
eatalytic effect of EC  Aid.149  !SERBS  was  designed  to maximise  EC 
financial participation, which  encouraged  the UK  Government  to help 
design a scheme  which would  provide greater and more  expensive benefits 
for workers  than might otherwise have  been  the  case.150  The  training 
provisions and  the emphasis in !SERBS  on  weekly payments,  instead of 
lump  sums,  were  clea~ examples  of  the EC's  catalytic influence  on  the 
enactment of specific social measures. 
More  recently it has  become  more  difficult to specify the extent to 
which  EC  Aid  has been acting as a  catalyst.  Part of  the reason for this 
is that  once  the Readaptation Aid  system has  became  highly established, 76 
many  of  the new  solutions  tend to be  worked  out in  the national  arena. 
There  is certainly evidence  of this in relation to Germany.  Yet  that is 
only part of  the story.  For  the German  team  r~port that  there  has been 
at least one  occasion when  workers'  representatives at local enterprise 
level have  made  use  of  the existence of  the EC  element in Readaptation 
A  .. d  .  b  ..  •  151  1  1n  arga1n1ng.  Pressure .was  placed  on  the  Ge~an Federal 
Government  to obtain more  financial  assistance  from  the EC.  While  on 
that occasion the final  outcome  of  the bargaining process may  not have 
been much  influenced by  the  EC,  it symbolises  the  continuing potential 
catalytic effect of EC  Aid  in  generating  the expenditure  of additional 
finance  in Member  States. 
It should not be  overlooked  that the very existence of  the EC 
facilitates and  even  encourages inter-country cross-fertilisation in 
terms  of  specific Aid  instruments being tried or enlarged in one  Member 
State and  then later being used  or expanded  in another.  This process 
can  have  an  influence on  EC  policy and  in that sense the  EC  can work  as 
a  catalyst.  The  shape  of  the new  French Bilateral Convention  for coal, 
for example,  has  been  influenced in certain particulars by  the  Italian 
Bilateral Convention concerning stee1.152  The  acceptance and  use  of 
early retirement measures  by  the EC  has had  a  distinct but  limited 
influence .overall on  some  national authorities spending more  money  on 
this  type of Aid.  Yet  the German  Federal  Government  changed  its guide-
lines  to Article 56(2)(b)  to give enterprises the  opportunity to offer 
ECSC  workers early retirement.  This is an  example  therefore of an 
enactment of a  specific social measure  where  the EC  acted as a  catalyst. 
Furthermore there  is, one  major  case  in  the  GeDDan  steel industry 
emanating  from  1981  where  there is evidence that the  substantial  improve-
ment  of  tideover allowances,  reimbursed by  the EC  out of the Social 
Volet  to  the  tune. of 50%  of  the costs, directly influenced the decision 
making  of the Federal Government  and  the  outcome  of labour-management  , 
bargaining. Methodologically there are essentially  two  ways  of  seeking answers 
to the question of assessing  the extent to which EC  Readaptation Aids 
acts as a  catalyst.  We  can  look to the documentary evidence and  under-
take  interviews.  The  Belgian  team  found  that  the  former  was  lacking and 
officials  tended to state that no  relevant policy decisions  on  social 
measures have  recently been  affected by  the  EC.  EC  Readaptation Aid 
could not add  much  to available benefits  to facilitate redundancies  as 
they were  already rather generous  to redundant ECSC  workers.  The  Social 
Volet did not generate any new  Aids  in Belgium:  all the  Aids  used  since 
the introduction of the Social Volet had  been  in place before  so  that 
the Social  Volet's role was  above all one  of extending co-financing. 
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While  there is no  direct evidence for this,  the  Belgian  team  considered 
that  the existence of EC  Readaptation Aid  probably influenced Belgian 
thinking in lowering  the  age  for early  pension entitlement since officials 
may  well have  had  the expectation that the EC  would  contribute later to 
such  payments.  Also  during re-negotiations  for  the Bilateral Convention 
it is believed that  the EC  had  some  influence,  albeit unmeasurable,  on 
the Belgian authorities.  It is indeed not always  possible to pinpoint 
precisely whether or how  the EC  Commission  has  had  a  catalytic  influence 
in generating either additional finance  by national authorities and/or 
specific social measures  given  the  course  of extensive  two  (or even 
three)  way  negotiations for a  Bilateral Convention  conducted both 
formally and  more  infoDDally.  Nevertheless in relation to Belgium  on 
existing evidence we  must  conclude  that EC  Readaptation Aid  has had  a 
limited role as a  catalyst in recent years  in bringing about  specific 
social measures.  The EC's  role  thus has  been more  consolidatory,  but 
not  less important  for that"' reason. 
(ii)  Broader  Considerations 
In considering the  interrelationship between  EC  Readaptation Aid 
and  national policies more  broadly,  we  must  at -least raise  the issue of whether  the Member  State Governments  and  enterprises in  the ECSC  sector 
have  objectives  and/or priorities which  are different  from  those of the 
EC  Commission.  In  Belgium,  for example,  both  coal and  steel employers 
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have  in recent years had  twin major objectives:  these  are avoiding major 
closures and  compulsory  dismissals  by  heavily relying on  early retirement. 
In  British coal  too an  emphasis  has  been  placed on  avoiding compulsory 
redundancies in the 1970s  and  1980s.  The  EC  Readaptation Aid  objectives 
are not in conflict with these particular national objectives.  Indeed 
they facilitate the national ones.  In Belgium it is vital to appreciate 
that  there would  be  stronger pressure to reduce  the cost of social policies 
in steel if there was  no  EC  participation.  Any  reduction or elimination 
of  EC  Readaptation Aid  would  be  vehemently  opposed  there - as  indeed 
elsewhere.  The  importance  of EC  Aid  to Member  States is reflected in 
the  strong way  in which  they negotiate with the Commission  on  both 
Bilateral Conventions  and  also for Social Volet monies  (viz.  France  and 
the  UK  for example).  In relation to Belgium it is possible  to argue  that 
the EC's  contribution  to Readaptation Aid  is of greater direct assistance 
to the  States'  and  enterprises'  efforts  to restructure the  coal and  steel 
industries than it is to redundant workers.  This  underlines  our earlier 
point that  the primary objective of  EC  Aid  is to secure  acceptance of 
restructuring.  In France  EC  Aids  do  provide additionality because 
without  them,  the social measures  in coal and  steel would  not be  at  the 
same  level and  the French  Government  could not have  got the workers 
affected to accept the restructuring witho~t these social measures. 
Within Member  States while EC  Readaptation Aid  will  f~equently have 
played  a minor or barely any  role in their  decision making  about  the 
volume  of  capacity reductions  (viz.  a minor  role in Belgium  and  virtually 
none  in the UK  coal industry), it will have  had  a  more  significant impact 
in so far as  the Aids'  availability will have  influenced Member  State 
Governments  to accept  the Commission's  proposals for steel restructuring. 79 
In  this way  national policy will have  been  influenced  by  EC  Readapta~ion 
Aid. 
(iii)  Constraints  on  the  Influence  of  EC  Readaptation Aid 
on  National Policy in Perspective 
Yet  the EC  Commission  historically has not generally attempted  to 
influence Member  State Governments'  industrial policy  through its social 
policy directly,  though  (as  we  have  noted)  the latter can  and  does153 
have  an  ~pact here.154  The  Aids are certainly not  intended  to interfere 
with industrial policy making.  Perhaps  a  more  important constraint on 
the  amount  of  influence which  the  EC  element of Readaptation  Aid  can 
have  lies in its limited  funds.  This will become  a  more  acute problem 
if there  are no  new  Social Volets.  Given  that  the  total amounts  paid by 
the  ECSC  under Article 56(2)(b)  represent a  relatively  small percentage 
of  total restructuring expenditure  (significantly smaller  in coal),  they 
cannot  be expected to have  a  big  ~pact on  national policy making. 
Obtaining  agreement  on  a  Bilateral Convention  involves a  process  of 
compromise  by  both Commission  and  Member  Stata Government.  The  Commission 
generally refers  to practice in other Member  States partly in order to 
try to get  agreement more  on  its terms  (and with  ha~onisation con-
siderations in mind).·  But  the  Coumission  is under constant pressure to 
fit in wit.h  the wishes  of Member  State Governments.  It should  be  remembered 
that if there is no  agreement  then  there  can  be  no  EC  Readaptation Aid 
because of  the matching principle. 
3.  Factors Affecting  the  Choice  of Aids  Offered and  then 
taken  up 
(i)  The  German  Position 
From  the  individual worker's perspective  the  choice of Aids 
depends  very largely upon  their age.  In Germany  with  the  emphasis  on 
encouraging older workers to leave  the  ECSC  industries,  a  major measure 
now  used is early retirement  (whether official, unofficial  or quasi). Thus  if a  coal miner is aged  at least 55  (official national retirement 
age  being  65)  and  a  steelworker is aged  at least 60  UJfficial national 
retirement  age  being 65),  they are eligible for early retirement. 
From  the employers'  and  Government's  viewpoint,  their objective is 
to maximise  the  amount  of money  that  can  be  obtained  from  the EC.  Thus 
the  aim  is  to maximise  the number  of lost jobs  recorded  as  redundant.155 
These  job losses are  the figure  which  represents  the  head  count  of  the 
number  permitted by  the EC  Comodssion  as  the  basis for EC  contribution. 
In the German  steel industry it has  proved possible for all workers made 
redundant  to be  directly matched  with job  losses  so  that each worker 
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affected has been eligible for  ECSC  Aid.  The  substitute  (or "one  for  one") 
principle's application has  considerably assisted in maximising  the EC 
contribution, particularly in the  steel industry. 
In the German  steel industry the major measure used  in  recent years 
has  been  early retirement,  which has  been  the avenue  for departure 
accepted by employers  and  workers alike.  Earnings  supplements  and  mobility 
156  allowances  are measures  taken up  by miners  to a  much  greater.~xtent 
than steelworkers.  In  the steel industry  there are no  travel allowances 
for  local transfers so that there  are no  cost calculations for  them.  For 
in relation to younger  coal miners  the  enterprise normally has  to offer 
an  altern~tive job.157  The  German  research team could find  no  evidence 
of  any  significance that those workers  who  qualify for  any  type  of  early 
retirement  do  not  take up  ECSC  Readaptation Aids  which are part of  the 
Sozialplane.  Coal  miners  have  a  choice of  two  types  of early retirement 
Aid:  APG,  to which  the EC  less heavily  contributes,  or alternatively Aid 
specifically provided under the Article 56(2)(b)  guidelines.  Miners  can 
choose  the Aid  which guarantees  the  best "replacement rate",  i.e.  the 
highest proportion of  their former  income.  The  enterprise is required  to 
offer the miner another job if his replacement  rate, with  the assistance 
of any  type of relevant Aid  applicable,  is under  60%  of his  former  gross 81 
income.  In  contrast  there is only one  type  of  early retirement Aid  for 
steelworkers;  there if problems arise  concerning  unemployment  payments, 
which  are means.tested after one  to  two  years,  the enterprise will offer 
the worker  another job. 
(ii)  The  Belgian Position 
In  recent years in Belgium  (as  in each Member  State)  the  long  standing 
objective of  trying to maximise  the  amount  of  EC  contribution has  been 
reflected in the efforts  to obtain co-financing with  the  EC  for  the most 
expensive Aids,  particularly early pensions.158  As  to whether  the  Belgian 
Government  in its applications  to  the  EC  Commission  for EC  contribution 
places  the emphasis  on  reimbursement for  tideover  allowances or earnings 
1  b  1  1  .  .  h  h  .  159  supp  ements  ecomes  arge  y an  accountancy  1ssue w1t  t  e  enterpr1ses 
also being much  concerned  in this whole  formal  process.  In  recent years 
in  the Belgian steel industry  there has  been more  emphasis  on  tideover 
allowances  than  on  earnings  supplements,  which has also broadly been  the 
position in Germany.  This is in line with  the  emphasis  on  early retire-
ments.  Basically the  same  sort of  pattern of Readaptation Aids  - and 
their take-up  - has  emerged  for both coal  and  steel in Belgium.  Mobility 
allowances are a  minor feature  by  comparison with severance payments 
and  tideover allowances. 
From·the individual worker's  perspective,  as  in Germany,  the  choice 
of Aids very much  depends  on  their age.160  Indeed  in Belgium  there is no 
real  choice for workers.  If  they qualify for early retirement in the 
context of a  closure,  then  that will be  the  basis for  their departure. 
Exceptionally and  in recent years  increasingly less often,  workers  of 
early pension entitlement age  could be  redeployed  in the  enterprise  for 
a  limited period if they have  broad based abilities and  are quickly 
adaptable.  Belgian union officials recognise  that a  better deal  for 
workers  can  be secured  as a  result of  EC  Aid;  the  wage  guarantee arrange-
ments  facilitate  the  task of union officials.  Lastly,' EC  Training Aid 82 
could  be  important  in  relation  to a  massive  reorganisation in a  major 
steel company.  Transferring workers  within companies  has  yielded  no  EC 
reimbursement  though  this is a  high cost for  companies:  reorganising 
shifts is notably very  expensive. 
(iii)  The  French Position 
In France  the emphasis  again has  been on  early retirement Aids,  with 
workers volunteering for early retirement  (though. compulsory  redundancies 
are  looming).  Enterprise  level is that which  applies  the  system in 
practice  so  that managerial attitudes  are an  important  factor.  Coal 
.  d  h  d  d  .  1  .  161  ~n ustry management  as  spent a  eca  e  promot~ng ear y  ret~rement measures. 
Also  the worker's occupational  status is a  relevant  factor.  Aids  concerned 
with  transferring workers  have  been  less  important.162  Yet  the  transfer 
programme  for  redundant  coal miners  to  Electricit~ de  France  (EDF)  has 
been  significant. 
(iv)  The  UK  Position 
In  the UK  it is important to distinguish between  the  coal  and  steel 
industries when  isolating the factors affecting  the  choice  of Aids.  As 
in  the  three other Member  States which  have  both coal  and  steel industries, 
the  choice  of Aids  depends  largely upon  the  worker's  age. 
(a)  The  Coal  Industry 
The  fact  that  the  choice of Aids  depends  upon  age  applies particularly 
strongly in relation to  the  UK  coal  industry.  There  the individual generally 
has  little or no  choice  of  the particular EC  Aid:  it is dete~ined for him 
by  the shape  of  the  RMPS  operating at the  time.  In  the  1970s  the  RMPS 
was  used  primarily as a  de  facto early retirement  scheme  particu~arly for 
those aged  over 55  as well as  those  over 60.  As  the  average age  of  the 
NCB  workforce  diminished,  so in the 1980s  has  the management  need  developed, 
particularly with the  restructuring process gaining pace in the  mid-1980s, 
for men  under  55  to leave the industry on  the basis of voluntary redundancy. 
As  it has developed,  the  RMPS  has always  been  designed  to  shake-out miners in particular age  groups.  In  the  early part of 1981  redundant miners 
zged  at least 55  only  received  RMPS  weekly  payments  (tideover allowance} 
if they had  ten years'  coal  industry service;  those aged  at  least  55 
without  this  length of service received  only  RMPS  lump  sum  payments  as 
did  those declared  redundant  when  aged  between  21  and  54.  In order  to 
~ttempt broadly  to  triple the  rate  of  redundancies  from  the  1980  level 
in 1981-82,163  for  those  declared  redundant  from  11  March  1981,  a  new 
1981  RMPS  was  introduced offering improved  and  extended weekly payments 
for  those  aged  at least 55  (tideover allowances)  plus  for  the first  time 
an  RMPS  lump  sum  payment.  For  those  redundant  aged  21-54  an  extra  RMPS 
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lump  sum  was  made  available.  The  Government's  (and  NCB's}  main  objective 
here was  quickly  to  reduce  those  remaining  in  the  industry over  60  and 
to  shake-out  those  aged  50-54  and  55-59.  The  hope  and  expectation was 
that  the  retention and  transfer of  younger miners  would  be  facilitated 
by  this  1981  RMPS.  ·The  substitute principle could be  used.  Transferred 
workers  could use Mobility Aid, albeit not in fact  EC  mobility Aid. 164 
Achieving  these objectives has  been  a  priority for  the UK  Government  and 
NCB.  While  consistently negotiating strongly in attempt  to maximise its 
EC  contribution,  the Government's  commitment  to offering lump  sums  as 
the best method  of persuading workers  to leave  the  coal  industry has 
remained  undiminished  (despite the EC's  reluctance  to contribute more 
than  a  very small  element,
1 ~
5 which  cannot be  said to have  increased 
proportionately with the increase in RMPS  lump  sums}. 
In short,  then,  Government  and  NCB  managerial  decision making  above 
all determined  the  choice of  EC  Aids  utilised by miners in the early 
1980s.166  Earnings  supplements  as  an  EC  Aid  were  not being utilised. 
By  way  of  contrast the concessionary  coal  EC  Aid  has  been  used  con-
sistently from  the  inception of the  coal Bilateral Convention  for 
redundant miners  aged  at least 55;167  not  least because  of its symbolic 
importance it has helped  to encourage miners  to leave .the  industry, secure  in the  knowledge  that  they  have  a  social protection guarantee  in 
the  form  of  a  package  of Aids  under  the  RMPS. 
(b)  The  Steel  Industry 
In contrast  to  the  RMPS,  !SERBS  has  been directly and  extensively 
geared  to  facilitating steelworkers,  whatever  their age,  in obtaining 
another  job.  The  structure of !SERBS,  the  steelworker's  age,  perceived 
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job market  possibilites and  individual aspirations  and  wishes  are all key 
factors  in determining  the choice of Aids  taken up  by  individuals. 
With  there being no  !SERBS  lumps  sums  and  thus  generally no  EC  lump 
sum  Aid,l68  the  redundant  steelworker's  age  determines his  overall period 
of  !SERBS  eligibility and  which  level of  ISERBS  weekly  tideover allowance 
payments  (and  their duration)  that he  receives.  Steelworkers  have  had 
some  real  choices  of  EC  Aid  instruments  to  take up  in contrast  to many 
miners.  We  shall pay  particular regard  to  the  1981  position in our 
discussion.l69  ISERBS  has  been  so  structured  that  redundant  men  under 
170  55  have  only been  permitted  to  take weekly  tideover allowance  for  a 
relatively short  period,  indeed  for  a  maximum  of  12  months.  This  category 
of worker  has  been permitted  through  the  structure of !SERBS  to use  up  to 
three  !SERBS  Aids,  (one  at  a  time),  namely,  weekly  tideover allowance, 
Training Aid  and  earnings  supplements,  in a  flexible  manner  to suit their 
particular needs  over  their total  1~ year eligibility period:  they could 
receive  these different  ISERBS  benefits at different  times  until  their 
!SERBS  entitlements were  exhausted.  The  intention of  the  authors  of 
ISERBS  was  that  the most  attractive deals  to  the  redundant  male  steel-
worker  under  55  should be  Training Aid  and  Earnings  Supplements  Aid. 
In  the early 1980s many  less  that half of  those  eligible for  Training 
Aid  opted  for it, even given its offering  100~ protection of  ~ormer net 
earnings  for  a  year  and  the  hope  for  a  future  job.  The  EC  strongly en-
couraged  the  take-up of this Aid  by  agreeing  to the particular  terms  of 
the Bilateral Convention  and  by  attempting  to  ~ake it ·particularly attractive as  an Aid  to workers  in itself and  by  comparison with  the 
171  alternatives.  A further dimension  to  i~s possible attractiveness has 
been  its flexibility so  that it might  be  taken up  before a  worker was 
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formally  declared  redundant  provided  that he  w~s actually redundant with-
in six months  of  the  end  of  the  course.  The  worker might  thereby  avoid 
undergoing any  period of unemployment. 
It should  be  noted  that a  redundant  steelworker has  been able  to 
couple  receipt of Earnings  Supplement  with  EC  Mobility Allowance,  the 
latter not being part of !SERBS,  at  the  same  time if his needs  required 
this.  Alternatively,  depending  on  his circumstances,  he  could  receive 
either Aid  alone.  The  value of Earnings  Supplements  as  an  EC  Aid  was 
shown  by  the  fact  that about  a  quarter of all !SERBS  beneficiaries declared 
redundant  in 1981  took up  this Aid.  The  newly  self-employed can receive 
Earnings  Supplement  to give  them  901  protection of their previous  earnings, 
which  protection is a  factor  in encouraging workers  to risk a  self-employment 
venture. 
!SERBS  offers older workers  longer overall periods of eligibility for 
its benefits:  for  those aged  55-59  the  period has  been  2  years  and  for 
those at least 60  the  period has  been up  to  2~ years.  The  older workers 
were  considered  to be  in greater need  of benefits of longer duration with 
the  younger  being expected  to be  more  adaptable and  being encouraged  to 
find  a  new  job as  soon as  possible.  In  the early and  mid  1980s  the older 
workers would  be  expected  to  opt more  for  tideover allowances  given  the 
rise in unemployment  in the  1980s.  About  half of all !SERBS  beneficiaries 
opted  for  tideover allowances  in 1981.  Those  over  55  theoretically would 
have  greater flexibility  to switch  individual  EC  Aids  under  !SERBS  because 
of their longer entitlement  to benefit.  But  today  they would  not  be 
expected  to go  for  training.  The  rise in unemployment  levels has  thus 
reduced  the practical choices  for older workers  so  that  the  1980s  have 
seen  !SERBS  being employed  as  a  de  facto early retirement  scheme  for 86 
older workers,  mainly over 55,  though  technically  they have  to be  declared 
redundant  to qualify for !SERBS  benefits.  The  early pension option has 
been  confined  to  redundant male  steelworkers aged  at least 55  (and  to 
women  aged at least 50)  given  the widespread understanding  (in  the  1970s 
as  well as  the  1980s)  that  they would  often find it impossible  to obtain 
another job and  so would  otherwise be unemployed  for  long periods if they 
did not have  this opportunity of de  facto early  retirement.  In  the  early 
1980s  about  one  third of  those eligible opted for  the Early Pension Aid, 
which  automatically cut them  out from  receipt of any  other !SERBS  benefits. 
In conclusion, we  would  just emphasise  that the  strength of particular 
factors affecting the  take-up of EC  Aids by  redundant  steelworkers  can  and 
does  change  over  time. Notes  to Section  C 
1.  See  Official Journal  of the European  Communities,  No  33, 
16  May  1960,  p.  781. 
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2.  See  Commission  of the European  Communities,  Memorandum  for  the 
Members  of  the Consultative Committee  concerning  Community  measures 
regarding  Read~ptation and  reconversion,  dated  20  October 1967 
(Luxembourg)  Doc  No  4998/l/67f,  which  produced  an explicit  statement 
on  its objectives. 
3.  See  further Annexe  II, Doc  No  4998/l/67f. 
4.  ~· cit.  In part the  Commission  relied upon  the  findings  on  its 
Readaptation measures  in West  Germany,  Belgium  and  France.  Summary 
and  results 196Q-1965"  for these  conclusions. 
5.  This is well documented,  for example,  in the  EC  Commission's  "Report 
on  ECSC  Readaptation Aid  (Article 56(2)(b)  of  the  ECSC  Treaty) 
(1976-1983)",  Doc  No  SEC  (85)  175. 
6.  Discussed  further  infra. 
7.  Op~  cit. 
8.  There  is evidence  that even  in the UK  Department  of Trade  and  Industry 
there is still some  uncertainty as  to  the exact objectives of  the 
EC  here. 
9.  The  Social Voleta  have  been  particularly important  from  their 
inception  in  the  1980s  in extending EC  early retirment benefits  so 
that  the  SVs  have  been  intended to contribute most  to the  objectives 
of gaining acceptance of restructuring and achieving withdrawals 
from  the  labour force.  On  the  Social Voleta  see  further Interim 
Report,  Part C at pp.  168-175. 
10.  One  function  of  the  Social Volet has been  to extend the duration of 
the EC's contribution to Aids,  particularly by  combining with Bilateral 
Convention  prov1s1on.  The  SV's  are  thus intended  to  contribute to 
this  third objective. 
11.  The  Community  offered Readaptation Aids  as a  compensatory measure 
whiCh  accompanied  the industrial policy at  the  supra-national  level. 
12.  Itvisiinteresting to note  that even  while  the  social protection 
offered to UK  miners was  more  than  'reasonable'  - relatively in 
monetary  terms  - at least in  the short tenD  (Cf  the  1984  version of 
the RMPS),  the NCB's  unilaterally imposed pit closure programme 
ostensibly caused  a  year long miners'  strike in 1984-85. 
13.  The  Steel Social Volet No  1 and  that for coal were  no~ designed to 
contribute  to this,  though  the reintegration grants under  the  Steel 
Social Volet N9  2 have  been.  intended to contribute to this. 14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
22. 
23. 
24. 
25. 
26. 
27. 
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See  further "Report  on  ECSC  Readaptation Aid 
p.  26. 
••• "Doc  No  SEC  (85)  175, 
This is confirmed by  the  statement of  the Chairman  of Usinor in his 
Reply  in  "The  Report  of the  French Court  of Auditors  to  the President 
of  the Republic",  Official Journal,  July  1986,  "Steel making:  State 
Interventions,  Financial  Situation of the Nationalised Companies, 
Management  of  Sheet Metal  Sector"  (at page  34  of the English 
translation)  "•••  the magnitude of  the steel crisis was  so  great 
that  there  was  an  aLmost  insurrectional climate in certain of the 
more  affected regions  ••• " 
Concerning  the  level  of  prot~ction,  the  Usinor  Chairman  concluded in 
this reply  (op.  cit.):  "  •••  one might  consider,  now  that  calm  has 
been  restored,  that  the price paid was  excessive  •••  " 
We  do  not consider here  the  unique Anti-crisis unit  "DAC"  Aid 
exclusive to steel in Luxembourg  and  now  apparently having a  limited 
life.  But it is discussed in Appendix  9  devoted  to Luxembourg. 
Not  all these  purposes might  be  properly  considered  to be  providing 
social protection as  such.  This  issue is further discussed in 
Part D of  the  Report. 
It is noteworthy  that about half of  the workers  leaving the French 
Steel Industry between  May  1979  and  December  1982  under  the  Social 
Protection Agreement  of  1979  went  out  on  the  basis  of early retirement, 
receiving tideover allowances  "to help them  through to normal 
retirement age";  some  40%  of Usinor and  Sacilor workers  were  aged 
5Q-54  at the date  of  their early retirement  (i.e.  in  the  two  major 
undertakings) • 
See  "Report on  ECSC  Readaptation Aid  •••  "  Doc  No  SEC  (.85)  175,  p.  27. 
It should be noted that the expenditure figures  in this Report are 
based upon  appropriations  (not actual  payments). 
Ibid., p.  26. 
It was  only from  January  1984  that  the  Comudssion  effectively 
contributed to  the  cost of early retirement pensions when  the 
1,000 ecu limit for  severance payments,  which  was  enti~ely used  up 
for the latter, was  doubled. 
d  •  Aid  "  See  further Annex  4  of  the  "Report on  ECSC  Rea  aptat1on  ••• 
which  provided a  breakdown  of  EC  Aid  by  category  giving  ranges  of 
percentage  figures  of  the  total EC  Aid  granted in the Member  States 
concerned. 
This applied to the coal and steel sectors in France  and  Germany  as 
well as  to UK  steel.  See  "Report on  ECSC  Readaptation Aid  •. • ",  Annex  4. 
See  further op.  cit., p.  27. 
In relation to  Ireland under  the  Commission's  decision of  December  1985 
on  appropriations,  applying  the  Ad  Hoc  Agreement  between  the  Commission 
and  the  Irish Government  of  1985,  almost  lO%  of  the  total appropriations 
was  for severance payments.  See  Appendix  7,  p.  5. 
This is discussed at considerable length in  the Interim Report,  Part B. 89 
28.  ECSC  Aid  for  training is for workers  obliged  to  change  their 
occupation or leave  their job prematurely as  a  result of re-
structuring, whereas  initial training given  to workers  newly  recruited 
to ECSC  industries and  recurrent and  continuing  training measures 
which  are not  linked  to restructuring are eligiblemr support  from 
the European  Social Fund.  Italian experience provides  an  example  of 
confusion on  this issue,  c.f. Appendix  8. 
29.  As  defined in  the Methodology  for this study,  see Appendix  1,  p.  23. 
This  is discussed  further infra.  in relation,  for  example,  to Eire 
and  Italy in the  respective Appendices  devoted  to those  countries 
(Appendices  7 and  8). 
30.  These  are not means  tested  for between  1  to 2 years.  It should  be 
noted  that workers early retired may  receive  lump  sums. 
31.  See  German  Report  expecially at 3-5 which  shows  an  overall EC 
contribution of 8.2%  for  laid off workers  for  the year 1981. 
This  low  percentage is due  to  the  low  EC  contribution  (5.9%)  to 
APG  then prevailing.  For  earnings  supplement  and  concessionary 
coal  the  EC  contribution was  50%.  See  further generally German 
Report at 3-1  to 3-27. 
32.  See  the.Ge~an Report at 1-7  (p.  6  of  the  English translation). 
33.  Over  70,000 workers  from  the  single firm covering mining  in  the 
Ruhr  (Ruhrkohle)  have  been  declared  redundant  between  1970  and 
1986  with some  2/3 of  them  receiving  the expensive early retire-
ment  tideover allowance,  APG.  See  the  Ge~an Report at 1-8 
(p.  7  of  the English  translation). 
34.  See  further  the  German  Report at 2-9  to  2-12  especially  (pp.  15-18 
of  the  English translation).  From  1972  APG,  originally designed 
to  tide over miners  aged  at least 50 until they became  eligible for 
retirement pension or for KAL,  got an  EC  contribution at a  flat 
rate of  DM  2,750 per worker when  the  Commission  finally accepted 
that it was  within  the scope of Article 56(2)(b)  together with a 
calculated  sum  (which  amounted  to  DM  103  per month  in 1983). 
Thus  the maximum  EC  contribution  to APG  as  such was  DM  3,640 ior 
workers  under 55  plus  DM  1,000 towards  the  lump  sum  paid under 
Article 13  of  the Bilateral Convention.  From  1984  the new  maximum 
EC  contribution  to APG  became  DM  11,150 per worker. 
35.  See  the  German  Report at 1-9  (p.  8  of  the English  translation). 
36.  The  State Aids  for steel  are  paid  on  a  more  ad  hoc  basis  than  for 
coal which  has more  of an  overall readaptation  programme. 
37.  See  the  German  Report at 2-1  to 2-4  (pp.  9-12  of  the  English 
translation).  The  special miners'  social  insurance arrangements 
are usefully discussed at 2-6  to 2-8 of  the  German  Report  (pp.  12-14 
of  the  English translation).  Interestingly our German  correspondents 
consider that  the development  of  the  EC  Aids  and  the  general under-
lying policy of social plans should be best seen as an  integral 
part of  company  restructuring policy rather than  state social policy 
(see  the  German  Report  at 2-26:  p.  30  of  the English translation). 
38.  From  1982  overtime has been  disregarded. 39.  See  further  the German  Report  at 2-2  (p.  10  of the English. 
translation). 
40.  When  entitlement runs  out,  the unemployed  person must  fall back 
on  to unemployment  assistance benefit which is means  tested and 
paid at a  lower rate  (like supplementary benefit  in the UK). 
41.  The  EC  Readaptation Aid  scheme  as  developed  and  applied in Germany 
is clearly and  fully set out in the Gennan  Report  at  2-8  to  2-27 
(pp.  15-33  of  the English translation). 
42.  See  Tables  at 3-2 and  Chart  at  3-3 of the  Ge~an Report. 
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43.  Basically under Article  12  of the Bilateral Convention  (our 
Category 1 Aid  under  our Methodology),  workers may  actually in 
practice receive more  than  this but  the extra is not  then part  of 
gross  cost  or EC  eligible cost  (unless paid  under  the Social Volet). 
44.  Basically under Article 9  of the Convention  (our  Category  2  Aid). 
45.  Basically under Article  14  of the  Convention  (our Category  3 Aid). 
Often called Interim Assistance.  The  Federal Government  supports 
this Aid  for 4  years. 
46.  Basically under Article  11  of the Convention  (our  Category  4  Aid). 
47.  See  the German  Report  at 2-25  (p.  28  of  the English t·ranslation for 
the details);  this is our Category  5 Aid. 
48.  Article 6  of the Bilateral Convention. 
49.  Article 7  of the Bilateral Convention. 
50.  Article 8  of the Bilateral Convention. 
51.  Article  13  of the Bilateral Convention;  this is our Category  6 Aid. 
52.  See  the  German  Report  at 3-5. 
53.  See  the German  Report  at 3-30 et seq.  These  figures  are  based  on  a 
number  of samples. 
54.  See  generally Ch.  1  of the  Belgian Report  in Appendix  2. 
55.  This is more  fully discussed in the Belgian Report  at para.  2.1.2. 
at pp.  6-7. 
56.  See  Belgian Report,  para.  3.1/c at p.  15. 
57.  See  Belgian Report,  para.  2.5.1/c at pp.  12-13. 
58.  See  Belgian Report,  para.  2.5.1/a at pp.  11-12. 
59.  See  Belgian Report,  para.  3.1/a at pp.  14-15. 
60.  See  Belgian Report,  Table  a  on  p.  37. 
61.  The  total "gross  cost"  for coal was  2,762.9M  BF  whereas  it was 
865.8M  BF  for steel. 91 
62.  Ibid. 
63.  At  page  23.  A synonym  is the "eligible cost
11  to be  taken  into account 
as  the basis for EC  participation of up  to  50%  of the total cost. 
It thus  covers all the specific ECSC  Readaptation Aid  measures 
(rather than ordinary social security elements). 
64.  See  Belgian Report,  p.  37. 
65.  For  the  raw  figures,  see Belgian Report  p.  38. 
66.  But  for  the 1981  sample  of steel closures  examined  by  the Belgian 
team  the ECSC  proportion of participation in the payments  was  41.1% 
for tideover allowances  (including early pensions)  and  40.9%  for 
earnings  supplements;  see Table  3. 
67.  See  Belgian Report,  pp.  39-40  (Table C). 
68.  Possible explanations  include exchange  rate variations,  timing of 
payments  and  administrative inconsistencies. 
69.  See  Belgian Report,  p.  40.  Though  under the Social Volet  for  coal 
(the 1984  Coal  Mining  Social  Support  Programme)  it should be 
remembered  that 1 million ecu  (out  of  the EC  total of  60  million ecu) 
was  granted to Belgium.  In relation to 515  redundant workers  at 
Roton,  under  this Social Volet  an  intervention of 1.22 million ecu 
was  approved ultimately. 
70.  See  Belgian Report,  p.  38. 
71.  Loc.  cit. 
72.  See  FSE  Book  IX,  Art.  684. 
73.  Under  'Loi  Boulin'.  See  French Report,  p.  2. 
74.  Called special FNE  allowance  funded  from  the  FNE,  the National 
Employment  Fund,  and  from  contributions by  employers  and  employees. 
75.  Known  as  the  ASSEDIC  allowance. 
76.  Before deduction of national insurance contributions. 
77.  The  period worked  before unemployment  is also a  factor  take~ into 
account,  though  the  amount  paid  should be  between  6o%·and  75%  of 
previous  gross basic income. 
78.  See  French Report,  p.  26  especially and  our Interim Report,  pp.  492-3 
and  502  for the 1981-83 position. 
79.  i.e.  the  ASSEDIC  basic.allowance. 
80.  See  French Report,  p.  27  and  our  Interim Report,  p.  494  and  p.  503. 
81.  See  French Report,  p.  32. 
82.  See  French Report,  p.  28  and  our  Interim Report,  p.  504. 
83.  Of  at least  40  years of age. 84.  By  contrast  the French steelw0rkers normally  retire at  60. 
85.  Plus benefits in kind  considered infra. 
86.  See  French  Report,  especially p.  32. 
87.  See  French Report,  especially p.  32. 
88.  See  French Report,  p.  30. 
89.  See  French  Report,  p.  31,  and  our  Inter~ Report,  p.  500. 
90.  See  French Report,  p.  31.  It also includes capitalisation of 
accommodation  allowances. 
91.  See  French Report,  p.  32.  The  benefits in kind  can  also cover 
accoumodation. 
92.  See  French Report,  p.  31. 
93.  Op.  cit. 
94.  See  French Report,  pp.  148-166. 
95.  See  French Report,  p.  154, i.e.  323  of the 458  eligible for  EC  Aid; 
of  the  remainder  18.6%  transferred  (i.e.  could have  received 
earnings  supplement~and mobility allowances basically)  and  10.9% 
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were  relocated  (i.e.  could have  had  relocation allowance  .. and benefits 
in kind). 
96.  See  also French Report,  p.  154,  i.e.  300  of  the  350  eligible for 
EC  Aid,  though  133  of the 300  actually left in 1979. 
97.  See  French Report,  p.  159. 
98.  See  French Report,  p.  159. 
99.  Ibid. 
100.  See  Interim Report,  Part  C v.  and  Appendix  15. 
101.  See  Interim Report,  Part c ii. and  Appendices  2,  3'  6'  7'  8' 10' 
11,  12b)  and  14. 
102.  See  Interim Report,  Part C iv.  and  Appendices  4,  9,  10,  11  and  12a). 
103.  See  also tupra. II 1.  (i) "Some  Anglo-German  Comparisons". 
104.  Historically !SERBS  has  been more  generous  in certain particulars to 
workers  than  the  Bilateral Convention.  Furthermore in 1974  BSC  and 
the  steel unions  agreed.the Employment  and  Income  Security Agreement 
(EISA)  which  improved  upon  what  both the  Convention  and  !SERBS 
provided.  See  further  InterLD Report, Appendix  4,  pp.  275  et seq. 
Extra payments  offered over and  above  those  agreed with. the Commission 
are not part of our "gross  cost" o  EC  eligible cost. 
105.  See  Appendix  6 at pp.  304  et seq.  of  the Interim Report  for further 
details.  There  was  a  new  1981  RMPS  (1981  SI  No.  482)  which  applied 
for those  redundant  on  or after 11.3.81. 93 
106.  The  beginning of  the phasing-out  of  ERS  occurred  from  early 
January 1981  with a  reduction in the maximum  weekly  ERS  rate being 
introduced  then.  The  Social  Security  (No.  2)  Act  1980  s.4(2)  totally 
abolished ERS  with effect from  3  January 1982. 
107.  It should also be mentioned  that  the  RMPS  links with  the miners'  own 
special social  security schemes,  causing RMPS  basic benefit to be 
reduced. 
108.  The  other half would  be  the £3,640 EP(C)A  state ·redundancy  lump  sum 
payment. 
109.  See  generally  Interim Report,  Part C iv.  and  Appendix  4. 
110.  Also  female  steel employees  under 50  qualified for  this. 
111.  Also  femile steel employees  of at least 50  qualified for this. 
112.  For up  to a  year,  to which  the  EC  would  not contribute. 
113.  State UB  being  a  factor in this  calculation for the first  26  weeks 
of this second  period. 
114.  The  complex  position on  ERS  is fully discussed in Part C iv.  of  the 
Interim Report,  see  pp.  131-135 especially at 133,  with ERS  being 
phased out in 1981. 
115.  Set out in outline in Appendix  21  of the  Interim Report at p.  495 
for direct ease of comparison,  with  the position in other Member 
State  coal  industries.  See  also Appendix  3,  p.  268  for  recent 
developments. 
116.  See  Interim Report,  pp.  279-80,  288,  and  504. 
117.  See  Interim Report,  Part C iv.  at pp.  126-127  and  Appendices  4, 
especially at pp.  28Q-281,  284,  289,  11  and  12. 
118.  See  Interim Report,  Part  C ii. at p.  86. 
119.  See  Interim Report, Appendix  12,  where  our analysis  shows  that  the 
two  Conventions  on  Training Expenses  for  UK  coal and  steel workers 
are  couched  in the same  terms. 
120.  See  Appendices  9  and  10  of the  Interim Report. 
121.  See  Interim Report,  Ap~endix 8. 
122.  In  1982  the  EC  Commission  expressed unwillingness  to amend  the  Coal 
Convention  to grant a  better Mobility Allowance  deal  to miners  alone. 
123.  Subject to one  exception under  SV.  Severance  payments  are often made 
by  steel employers  to steelworkers in addition to the EP(C)A 
redundancy payment.  See  further  Interim Report,  Appendix  4 at pp. 
292-297  c.f.  also infra.  footnote  168. 
124.  See  Interim Report,  Appendices  6  and  7. 
125.  S~e Interim Report,  at pp.  303  and  306-3Q7. 94 
126.  See  Inter~  Report,  at pp.  308-313. 
127.  See  Interim Report,  at pp.  316-317  and  324-325. 
128.  See  Interim Report,  at pp.  321-322  and  325-328. 
129.  See  Interim Report,  discussion at pp.  269-270. 
130.  See  Interim Report,  Part  C v.  at pp.  154  et seq. 
131.  See  Interim Beport,  pp.  179-181.  The  EC  contributed on  average  £668 
per man  for  lump  sums  and  £2,060 per man  for weekly  payments.  A~ost 
19  times  as many  beneficiaries  received weekly payments  as  received 
RMPS  lump  sums. 
132.  See  Interim Report,  p.  181.  The  UK  Department  of  Energy  estimated 
in 1985  that  the  lifetime RMPS  payments  concerning  t~ose made 
redundant  in 1981  could amount  to £220m:  op.  cit., p.  182. 
133.  See  Interim Report,  p.  185. 
134.  Of  this  £4.56 m total of payments,  the  w~ekly benefits accounted 
for £4.08 m of  the payments. 
135.  A different  (though problematic)  set of data,  presented as  Table  2 
at p.  183  of  the  Interim Report,  suggested a  figure of less  than 
10%,  and  this was  the view of  the  UK  Department  of Energy. 
136.  lbe Department  of Energy,  "The  Coal  Industry:  Memorandum  42"  at 
pp.  219-220  for House  of  Commons  Energy  Committee  Session 1985-86, 
The  Coal  Industry in Memoranda  Vol.  II,  June  1986,  HMSO,  London. 
The  Department  of Energy explicitly recognised  that:  "Ckle  of  the . 
main  reasons  given  by  the  Commdssion  for their inability to offer 
further improvements  has  been  budgetary constraint  ••• "  (at p.  220). 
137.  See  Interim Report,  pp.  187-191.  The  analysis is based  on  a  25% 
sample  with at least  95%  of  the  redundancies  in  the  sample  definitely 
occurring in 1981.  See  further Appendix  16  of  the  Interim Report 
for more  detailed figures. 
138.  See  further  the Methodology,  Annex,  presented as Appendix  1  of  this 
Final Report. 
139.  This was  not because  the  Commission  had  agreed  to  contribute a 
lower proportion for Early Pensions  than  for  the other Aids:  it was 
agreed  that it would  contribute  up  to 50%  of  the  cost less  tax  (the 
lump  sum,  equivalent  to 18  months,  income  support being  transferred 
into the pension  fund). 
See  further Appendix  21  of  the  Interim Report,  "Suumary  of Main 
Provisions  on  Readaptation Aids",  p.  504. 
140.  There  are unexplained disparities across  UK  steel plants  in  terms 
of EC  contribution per head  and per man  week,  most  particularly for 
Tideover Allowances  and  Earnings  Supplements  but  to a  lesser extent 
for Training. 
141.  This  is fully  documented  in the  Interim Report,  Part C iv. 
142.  Instead it placed  some  emphasis  on  lump  sum  payments.  See  Interim 
Report. 143.  See  further Interim Report,  especially Appendices  2 and  6. 
144.  The  UK  did  claim for  these Ai.ds  in  the early years of  the  Bilateral 
Convention  but  the  EC  contributions were  relatively small  (£0.19 m 
for earnings  supplements  and  £0.64  m for mobility allowances 
in  toto over  the first three years  of  the Bilateral Convention's 
operation  1973-75).  On  NCB  Transfer Allowances  generally,  see 
Interim Report,  Appendix  8  and  for  comparison  with the steel 
position Appendix  10. 
145.  Source:  Commission  of  the European  Communities,  DG  V/A/3,  Mixed 
Committee  for  the Harmonisation  of  the Working  Conditions in  the 
Coal  Industry,  Doc.  No.  V/792/86-EN,"Mobility of personnel in  coal 
mining".  Presented by  UK:  Author,  NCB,  1986.  For a more  detailed 
breakdown  for 1981-86  (the first 9 months  of  1985-86)  on  an  annual 
basis,  see  "The  Coal  Indus try: Memorandum  2"  submitted by  the NCB 
to  House  of  Commons  Energy  Canmittee  Session 1985-86  on  The  Coal 
Industry,  Memoranda,  196-i January 1986,  HMSO,  London.  However, 
the  two  sets of  figures  do  not  tally precisely. 
146.  From  June  1980  the  NCB  improved  their long  distance  transfer 
arrangements. 
147.  See  further Part C vii:  "UK  Expenditure on  Readaptation Aid"  of 
our UK  Interim Report,  and  our revised analysis  on  the  UK  supra. 
148.  Supra.  in this chapter. 
149.  See  further our Interim Report,  pp.  119-130 and  Appendix  4  which 
fully  analyse  the genesis  of  this Bilateral Convention  and  the 
original !SERBS. 
150.  It may  not  be  possible  to prove  this  last statement irrefutably 
largely because  the EC's  influence was  so strong and  from  so  early 
in  the  conception  and  design of  the  scheme  (with  the  Commission 
being involved in discussions before  the  UK  had  become  a  member 
of  the  Community). 
151.  There  is, however,  no  evidence of  this phenomenon  in  Belgium or 
France. 
152.  On  the  latter,  see Appendix  8 on  Italy. 
153.  See  the French Report,  pp.  169-70. 
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154.  Also  the Coal  Social Volet was  offered  largely in order to facilitate 
Commission  industrial/energy policies  and  implemented  through  the 
determination of Viscount  Davignon. 
155.  There  is no  ECSC  Aid  for workers  affected in excess of  the number 
of  jobs  recorded as  redundant.  But  the Federal Government  will 
still contribute  towards  Aid  given  in  such  circumstances. 
156.  There  is bussing of workers  when  they  are  transferred from  one  area 
to  another.  For example,  Ruhrkohle  has quite  a  complex  bussing 
system but  obta.ins no  reimbursement  for this from  the  EC. 
157.  This does not generally quite apply in steel to  this extent. 
158.  For which  the  Social Volet has been  extremely helpful. 159.  This particularly applies  to the  steel companiea who  are  concerned 
to make  their balance  sheets  look good  so  that  timing is often 
important.  Precisely which Aids  are  soug~t and at what  time  can 
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make  a  difference  to  the out-turn of their accounts.  Early pensions, 
which are expensive,  figure prominently in their calculations here. 
160.  This is a  basis accepted by  both management  and  unions. 
161.  It has  been  concerned  to  have  a  younger workforce. 
162.  Though  there  have  been  same  transfers  from  the North to Lorraine. 
163.  See  Interim Report,  Appendix  6,  p.  308  et seq.  generally. 
164.  The  UK's  decision in  the early 1980s not  to  seek EC  contribution 
to Mobility Aids  is fully discussed elsewhere in this Report. 
165.  It was  up  to £675  provided  that  the  worker  was  at  least  40.  In 
1985  the  EC  contribution ceiling went  up  to £1,175,  and  the  age 
requirement was  dropped. 
166.  This still applies in 1986.  One  slight qualification to  the general 
point concerns older white collar workers  (not miners as  such) 
choosing to take up  the early pension option. 
167.  It was  agreed  in 1985  that the  Commission  would  contribute up  to 
50%  of  the  cost of  compensation  for  loss of concessionary  coal  for 
24  months  under  the  Bilateral Convention  for workers  aged at least 
50  (with  10  years'  service). 
168.  That is, under the Bilateral Convention.  However,  the  Commission 
agreed  to contribute effectively retroactively to severance payments 
paid to  BSC  employees made  redundant between April  1979  and 
March  19ar-under the Social Volet No.  1.  See  further  Interim Report, 
p.  169.  Being a  retroactive decision effectively it could have  no 
direct impact  on  the  choice of Aids  offered and  taken up  in 1981. 
169.  The  position has not greatly altered since that  time  since  !SERBS 
basically has  consistently provided  the same  Aids  to  the  same  age 
groups unlike  the  RMPS  which has  been  significantly amended  quite 
regula~ly. 
170.  And  redundant  women  under  50. 
171.  See  Interim Report,  Part  C iv., pp.  126-127.  ~have evidence  that 
steelworkers  regard it as an  attractive option.  Nevertheless,  for 
example,  just under  17%  opted  for training in  the private sector 
Brymbo  labour force  rundown  in 1981.  (See  Interim Report,  Appendix 
17,  p.  421).  This  is in line with the finding  in our sample  of 
steelworkers  for  1981  which  showed  that some  18%  opted for  training. 97 
D  THE  EFFECTS  OF  READAPTATION  AIDS 
I  The  Acceptance  of Restructuring 
1.  The  Measurement  of Acceptability 
An  important  purpose of Readaptation Aid  is  to make  the  restructuring 
of  industry more  acceptable.  It is,  in this  respect,  a  social measure  which 
is designed  to  promote  an  economic  objective.  The  social measures  have 
gained  greater significance now  that  the  context within which  economic 
1  objectives  are  pursued has  changed  from  one  of growth  and  expanding  industry 
to  one  of contraction.2 
It is hard  to quantify  the extent  to which  Readaptation Aid  has  made 
restructuring more  acceptable because  there are no  appropriate scales  of 
measurement.  There  are,  however,  two  indicato~s which  may  be  used.  The 
first is a  reduction in  the· 'costs'  of conflict.  If a  lack of overt  con-
flict can be  attributed  to  the Aid  then  this can  be  regarded  as  a  help in 
the  restructuring process.  The  second  indicator is delays  in restructuring. 
It is unlikely,  given  the  economic  imperatives,  that  closures of coal mines 
and  steel works  could  be  prevented  completely but it is almost  certain3 
that  in the  absence  of social measures  there would  be  a  slower  pace  of 
rundown.  This  indicator is not  susceptible of precise measurement  because 
it is not  possible  to be  certain what  would  have  been  the  pace  of  rundown 
had  the  Aids  not existed  (or had  been at some  different  level).  Knowledge-
able  observers of the  restructuring process are,  however,  able  to  form 
judgements  on  this matter.  Indeed,  the  great  unanimity of  the  views  of 
our  correspondents  in France,  Belgium  and  Germany  and  our  own  researches 
in  the  UK,  Ireland  and  Italy give  us  confidence  in  the validity of such 
judgements. 
It is,  however,  important  to realise that whereas  there is a  very 
strong consensus  that  the  social measures  have  helped  to make  the  re-
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what  is the  influence  on  this of  the  EC  contribution  to  the  gross  costs  of 
Readaptation Aid.  We  do  not/know  for  certain what  would  be  the  level of 
each Member  State's own  social measures  in  the  absence  of  EC  Aid.  Logic 
dictates  that if they were  higher  then  this could make  the  EC  Aid  less 
necessary  in achieving acceptability.  On  the other hand  if they were  lower 
then this  could make  the  EC  Aid  more  necessary  in achieving acceptability. 
Although it is not  possible  to measure  the degree  of acceptability 
induced  by  Readaptation Aids  it is useful  to~distinguish three aspects  of 
quantification which  contribute to our understanding of  the  force  of  the 
Aid. 
(i)  The  Level  of Aid 
The  first is the  level of Aid.  Higher  levels of Readaptation Aid  make 
restructuring more  acceptable.  This  idea  can be  illustrated very  crudely 
4  in the  following  diagram. 
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Greater acceptability is shown  on  the vertical axis  above  Point A and 
greater unacceptability below A.  Points  below A are where  the  social cost 
is  'too high'  in  terms  of overt conflict and  resistance.  Point A is a 
5  satisficing level.  If the  line MS  shows  the  influence of Member  States' 
own  social measures,  then  the appropriate  level of expenditure  on  benefits 
is AB.  A greater level is  'unnecessary'  if the  aim,  given  tight budgetary 
restraints,  is merely  to produce  a  satisfactory degree  of acceptance  (i.e. 
Point A).  A level of social benefits  less  than  AB  would  be  too  low  to make 
restructuring acceptable. If EC  Aids  are additional  to Member  States'  Aids,  as  they  should  be 
ideally,  then  the  relation between  total expenditure  on  benefits  and 
acceptance  is  shown  by  the  MS  +  EC  line.  This  means  that  a  lower  level 
of expenditure  (than  B)  by  Member  States is now  'adequate'  to achieve  the 
'satisfactory'  level of acceptance.  AC  expenditure which,  in the absence 
of  EC  Aid,  would  have  produced  the unsatisfactory point  D,  i~ now  satis-
factory because of additional  EC  Aid.  If Member  States continued  to 
spend  B then  the  EC  Aid  yields  the  'unnecessarily'  high acceptance  level 
of point E.6 
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The  key  questions  concern  the  extent  to which  the  EC  Aid  is additional 
and  whether  there  is an  adequate  level of acceptance.  If EC  Aid  merely 
replaces Member  States'  Aid  and  there is no  additionality,  then  so  far  as 
the acceptability of restructuring is concerned,  there  is  less  justification 
for it from  the  EC  Commission's  viewpoint.  Our  conclusions  are  that  there 
is  some  additionality and  that  in most  Member  States  there  is overall a 
satisfactory degree  of  acceptance  of restructuring even  given  the  continuing 
opposition of  some  prominent  trade unions. 
(ii)  The  Form  of Aid 
A second  aspect  of quantification related  to  the  form  of Aid.  The 
composition of  the  package of available Aid  might  be  crucial.  In  the  UK, 
7  for  instance,  the  substantial  lump  sum  payments  available  to workers  in 
the coal  industry have  contributed  to ensuring  that all the  redundancies 
have  been voluntary.  Workers  have  been  queueing up  to  take  voluntary 
redundancy  in the  last 18  months.  If Aid  had  only been available  in an 
alternative  form,  without  substantial  lump  sums,  then it is almost  certain 
that  there would  have  been  less willingness  to  take  redundancy  and  some 
compulsory  redundancies  would  have  been  necessary.  This  would  have  streng-
thened  the resistance of workers  to change.  However,  only  a  very  small 
proportion of  the  UK  RMPS  lump  sum  in coal  is contributed by  the  EC  so 
that  EC  Aid  as  such has  not  been  influential in this specific context. 100 
In other countries  too  the  particular  form  of benefits is significant. 
In Germany  for  example  evidence  from  interviews8  shows  that management 
knows  exactly  that it is  'cheaper'  (using this  term  in a  wide  sense which 
embraces  costs  of conflict)  to offer a  'sozialplan'  with substantial aid 
for early retirements,  and  to put  a  temporary  ban  on  recruitment,  than  to 
terminate  employment  of a  greater number  of  wor~ers by  compulsory  redundancies. 
(iii)  Acceptability  to Different Groups 
The  third aspect  of  the  quantification of acceptability is  the  fact 
that acceptability to different  groups  - governments,  employers  and  workers, 
may  differ.  Our  primary  focus  must  be  on  the workers  as  they  have  to bear 
the  social burden of  the  restructuring process,  and  there  is widespread 
agreement  that without· the  EC  Aid  the  burden would  have  been  intolerably 
high  and  thus  unacceptable.  The  greater resistance would  have  brought 
costs of conflict which would  be  unacceptably high  for  governments  and 
employers. 
The  EC  component  of Aid  is often not  known  to individual workers. 
The  studies of most  Member  States  found  that  this was  the  position.  In 
France  and  Belgium,  for  example,  workers  do  not  see  the  EC  as  a  supplier 
of aid.  Rather  they  assume  that  such  aid  is merely  part of  the national 
social security system.  Similarly,  in Germany,  individuals may  be  unaware 
of  the  European  component,  though  knowledge  of this does  go  down  to Works 
Council  level.  The  position  in  the  UK  and  Eire  is slightly different as 
there  is more  publicity given  to Aid  from  Europe. 
This  aspect  of  intransparency,  so  far  as  individuals  are  concerned, 
may  not matter greatly in that it does  not alter the  behaviour of  individual 
workers,  though  the  Commission  may  feel  that more  direct publicity about 
its  Aids  would  be  useful.  From  the viewpoint  of governments,  employers 
and  unions,  where  the  restructuring is perceived as  prompted  from  the  supra-
national  level,  then acceptability will depend  necessarily  on  there being 
an  EC  contribution,  even if there  is no  EC  additionality as  such. 2.  Conclusions 
While  virtually all observers  agree  that  EC  Aid  has  helped  to make 
the  restructuring process more  acceptable,  we  would  note  that  sometimes 
this was  by  a  more  subtle  route  than  simply  the  provision of cash.  In 
Belgium for  instance,  "the possibility to obtain co-financing of part of 
the  concessions  made  in negotiations with  the  social partners,  may  have 
had  a  psychological  impact,  making  it easier for  the  employer  and  the 
government  to make  concessions,  and  creating a  climate  in which  it was 
psychologically easier for  the  unions  to accept  restructuring" 9  In 
Ireland it was  a  factor which  enabled  Irish Steel  Ltd  to secure  the 
agreement  of  trade unions  and  employees.  In Germany  too,  there  is clear 
evidence  that without  a  substantial  level of aid,  workers  would  have 
protested against  the  process  of restructuring and  tremendous  costs of 
conflict would  have  been  incurred.  In  the  UK  steel  industry  the  sub-
stantial  EC  contribution  to  the gross  cost of Readaptation Benefit has 
been  an  important  factor  in promoting  the general acceptability of re-
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structuring.  This  substantial agreement  by  different  independent  observers 
in various Member  States enables  us  to  say with conviction that  the  aim 
of acceptability is well  served  by  ECSC  Readaptation Aid. 
The  success  in meeting  this  aim  is not,  however,  entirely unqualified 
and  it should  not  mask  the  fact  that serious  social conflict has  occurred 
in a  number  of Member  States.  For  example,  in the  UK,  in both  the steel 
and  coal  and  steel industries,  there have  been major disputes  in  1979-80 
and  1984-85  respectively.  It should also be  noted  that  the  degree of 
acceptability varies  for different kinds  of workers.  In France,  for  example, 
where  the  younger  are  the workers  involved,  the  less easily will  they 
d  d  d  1  .  10  accept  re  un  ancy  an  ear y  ret~rement.  Furthermore,  in some  Member 
States,  such  as  Italy,  the existence of  EC  Aid  for  social measures  does 
little to moderate  the general hositility felt by  the social partners, 
particularly the  trade union  side,  towards  the  restructuring process. 102 
In France  there are  parts of  the  trade  union movement  (particularly the 
CGT,  but  also more  recently  the  CFDT)  which  have  argued  strongly in  favour 
of saving French steel and  coal,  and  have  denounced  the  constrictions of 
the steel quota  system.  In  the  UK  the  NUM  also has  been  particularly 
vigorous  in its attempts  to  ~revent pit closures  in  the  1980s. 
Our  broad conclusion is that what  is achieved  by  the  Aid  is  a  very 
significant easing of  the  process  of  restructuring  though  this  achievement 
is unquantifiable  in precise  terms. 
Without  an  EC  contribution Member  States'  own  schemes  would  in many 
cases  have  been  less generous.  The  French Report  made  this  point very 
strongly.  It concluded  that  "the government  would  not  have  been able to 
get  those workers  involved  to accept  the necessary  restructuring without 
11  European Aid". 
II  Optimal  Reallocation and Withdrawal  from  the Labour  Force 
One  declared aim of Readaptation Aids  is  to  promote  the  optimum  re-
allocation of  labour,  and,  or,  withdrawal  from  the  labour  force.  The 
Commission  does  not  in general wish  to determine  the  industrial policies 
in Member  States  through its social.measures but Readaptation Aid  is 
designed  to complement  and  thus  promote  economic  policies  such  as 
restructuring. 
Economic  objectives  include a  direct concern with efficiency. 
Article  2  of  the Treaty of Paris states  that  the  ECSC 
"shall progressively bring about  conditions which will of themselves 
ensure  the most  rational distribution of production at  the highest 
possible level of productivity while safeguarding continuity of 
employment  and  taking care not  to  provoke  fundamental  and  persistent 
disturbances  in the  economies  of Member  States". 
This  statement  embodies  the  concept  of  the  optimal allocation of 
resources.  Social  and  labour market  measures  should  ~herefore support 
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If social measures  achieve  this,  then  they will  be  improving  the  efficiency 
of  the  economy  generally,  as  well  as  that of  the  coal  and  steel sectors. 
1.  What  is  Optimal  Reallocation of  Labour? 
There  are many  perspectives on  this but  for  our  purposes  it is help-
ful  to view it as  the  re-employment  of  labour  in sectors of  the  economy 
where  it can  be  used most  productively.  Furthermore,  the  speed  with which 
workers  are  transferred  from  one  job  to another  should  be  a  maximum,  given 
h  .  d.  12  t  e  constra1nts  on  a  JUStoent.  Stated  in  this  way,  optimal  reallocation 
implies  full  employment  of  labour  resources.  In practice of course Member 
States have  experienced  high  levels of unemployment  and  so  some  of  the 
Readaptation measures  have  been designed  to achieve  a  withdrawal  from  the 
labour  force  of workers  who  lose  their  jobs  in  the  coal  and  steel sectors. 
This  raises  the  importan~ issue of whether  such withdrawal  is  an  optimal 
reallocation of labour.  The  answer  to  this question hinges  in part on 
whether older workers  are more  or less  productive  than younger workers. 
If they are more  productive,  then  there is a  loss of human  captial in the 
form  of accumulated  experience,  and  the  early retirement  of older workers 
is  sub-opti~al because  the  composition of the workforce  changes  to having 
a  higher  proportion of younger,  less experienced workers.  Alternatively, 
if younger workers  are  regarded  as  actually and  potentially more  productive 
because  they are more  adaptable  and  able  t~ learn,  then early retirment is 
optimal as it leaves  a  workforce with a  higher average  productivity. 
This  matter is not  settled,  but  in general,  evidence  favours  the  view 
that younger workers  are  more  productive,  so  withdra~al of older workers 
will enhance  the  average  productivity of  the workforce  remaining.  Older 
workers,  especially in the  coal  industry,  are  often less suitable  for 
coal  face  work  and  they  tend  to have  greater health problems. 
An  important  exception  to  this  general  view was  expressed  by  our 
Belgian correspondents who  noted  that younger  workers  in  the steel 
industry were  significantly less experienced  and  adaptable  than older workers.  This was  partly because  of  a  lack of  technical manuals  which 
would  give  them  appropriate  information  about  the  job. 
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The  various  forms  of Readaptation  Aid  affect  the  optimal  reallocation 
of labour differently. 
Training and  mobility allowances  are obviously  designed  to affect 
optimal  reallocation,  though  in practice their effectiveness  in achieving 
this is  probably  limited.  This  is discussed more  fully  in Section D IV 
of  this  report.  However,  it can be  noted at this  stage  that  although  the 
cost effectiveness of  training is questionable,  it would  be  undesirable 
to rule it out.  The  Commission  is probably  justified in its view  that 
"special attention should  be  given  to vocational  training initiatives set 
up  by  firms  which  reduce  their staff  •••  (and  that it will)  •••  be 
necessary  to ensure  that  community  assistance granted  in this context is 
able  in future  to cover  periods of training  longer  than  twelve  months."13 
Whether  early pensions  contribute to optimal  reallocation depends 
crucially on  the  view  taken about whether withdrawal  from  the  labour  force 
is a  form  of optimal  reallocation.  There  is ample  evidence  that early 
pensions  do  produce  a  flow  of withdrawals  from  the market. 
Lump  sum  severance  payments  also contribute significantly to with-
drawal  from  the  labour  force.  It is much  less apparent  that  lump  sums  do 
much  to advance  the  process of optimal  reallocation generally.  They 
certainly induce  a  shake-out of  labour which  is part of the  process,  but 
they may  in fact  impede  the  speed of  job  search and  re-employment.14 
Optimal  reallocation of labour is adversely affected by  a  number  of 
factors.  One  constraint is the  regional  immobility of  labour.15  Such 
regional  immobility appears  to be  common,  especially among  older workers 
and  the availability of mobility allowances  does  l~ttle to overcome  this 
problem.  In practice transfer and  relocation benefits have  been  a  rel-
atively minor  form  of Readaptation Aid.  Where  workers  are  immobile  then 
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sectors of  the  economy  is if such  jobs are available  locally.  In many  of 
the  areas  where  coal  and  steel  jobs  have  been  shed  such  alternative employ-
ment  is often not  available.  Furthermore,  more  importantly,  such  jobs  can 
be  difficult  to attract because  the  affected  r~gions experience  a  serious 
general  economic  decline where  there has  been  a  heavy  dependence  on  coal 
or steel.  Thus,  in many  Member  States,  the  position is  one  of workers  not 
moving  to  the  work  and  problems  in  taking  the work  to  the workers.  These 
difficulties are  serious but  (as  the  French  Report  noted  p.  221)  it is 
highly  likely  that  the  problem would  only  be  aggravated  if there were  no 
EC  Readaptation  (and  other)  Aids. 
More  generally  the  process of optimal  reallocation is often frustrated 
by  the great  rise  in  unemployment  in Member  States.  The  process  of early 
retirement,  and  the  consequent withdrawal  of workers  from  the  labour force, 
is now  more  difficult  to achieve.  This  is because  many  firms  have  now 
exhausted their stock ofolderworkers who  are more  suitable  for early 
retirement.  In  the  UK  coal  industry,  for  instance,  only  3.21. of the 
16  workers  were  55  years  or over,  and  only  11.51. were  50  or over,  at March  1986. 
The  average  age  of  the workforce  has  been declining in all Member  States, 
and  this is documented  in the  reports  on  individual countries.17  Further 
rundown  of  labour would  now  require  the shedding of younger workers  who  do 
not  wish  to withdraw  from  the  labour  force  but who  might  be difficult to 
place  in new  employment  because of  the  high  levels of unemployment  prevailing. 
2.  Conclusions 
The  conclusions  with respect  to optimal  reallocation and  withdrawal 
are  that  some  of the  EC  Aids  have  contributed positively to  these  aims. 
Most  notably  the early pensions have  induced withdrawal  from  the  labour 
market.  Lump  sum  severance  payments  have  certainly contributed  to  the 
voluntary shaking out  of labour  from  the coal  and  steel  industri~s though 
they have  done  little in the  case of older workers  to ensure  re-employment 
of any  kind,  let alone re-employment  in  the most  productive uses.·  Training 106 
and  mobility allowances,  which  are designed  to achieve  optimal  reallocation, 
have  had  a  limited degree  of success. 18  Weekly  payments  in  the  form  of 
19  tideover allowances  or wage  supplements  do  not  seem  to contribute  to 
optimal  reallocation,  mainly  because  they have  been  frustrated  by  the very 
high  levels  of unemployment. 
Finally it should be  noted  that  there are  some  differences  in emphasis 
between  the  coal  and  steel industries  in Member  States.  In  the  UK  for 
instance  the  steel  industry schemes  have  been much  more  geared  to achieving 
reallocation of  labour  through  the  earnings  supplements,  retraining  an~ 
weekly  cash  payments  than  the  coal  industry where  the  predominant  for. of 
Aid,  the  Redundant  Mineworkers'  Payments  Scheme,  can be  regarded  as  seeking 
withdrawal  from  the  coal  industry labour  force,  which  is de  facto early 
retirement  for  older workers.20  Where  there is withdrawal  from  the  labour 
force,  especially of older workers,  then  this  can  lead  to  some  improvement 
in  the structure of  the  remaining  labour  force.  This  occurs  because 
younger,  and  arguably more  productive workers  remain,  and because of 
'cross-matching'  (i.e.  the process  of substituting workers  in such a  way 
that when  a  given  job is lost,  the worker holding  that  job may  be  trans-
ferred.to  the  job of  some  other worker who  is made  redundant). 
III  The  Level  of Social Protection 
It has  always  been an  important  aim of Readaptation Aid  to provide a 
reasonable  level of social protection for workers  who  lose their  jobs in 
the  rundown  of  the coal  and  steel industries.  This  idea is  the basis of 
the  tideover allowances  which  try to ensure  that  redundant workers  who 
become  unemployed  do  not  suffer excessive  loss of  income  until  they  find 
a  new  job.  Those  workers  who  are  re-employed  have  the  level of their 
income  protected  through wage  supplements. 
Other  forms  of Aid  can also be  seen as  part of  the process of social 
cushioning but  to a  lesser extent or less directly.  For  example,  short-
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way  of  compensating  for  benefits which would  otherwise  be  lost  to  them. 
Benefits  in  the  form  of  training or mobility allowances  can  be  regarded 
as  a  concern with  longer  term  income  protection by  providing greater 
possibilities  for  future  employment. 
Early  pensions  for workers  who  retire early provide  income  protection 
for  those who  withdraw  from  the  labour  force.  While  this  form  of Aid  may 
be  related  to  tideover allowances,  the  philosophy  underlying it is rather 
different  from  the  shorter  term  income  protection for  workers  who  are in 
the  process  of adjusting  to new  jobs with  a  temporary  intervening  period 
of  unemployment.  Severance  payments  also provide significant social 
protection but  they differ from  income  support  payments  in that  they are 
also ~  directly concerned with getting acceptance of restructuring and 
inducing voluntary withdrawal  of  labour. 
In this way  virtually all the Aids  could  be  seen as  a  means  of achieving 
income  protection,  though  the  key  ones  are  the  tideovers  and wage  supple-
21  ments. 
At  first sight  the  rules made  under  the Bilateral Conventions  seem 
to  provide  for  reasonable  social protection.  When  they are coupled with 
provision under  the  Social Volet,  the  social protection is enhanced.  Thus 
tideover allowances  can,  for  example,  be  up  to 36  months  in some  Member 
States and  may  raise  the  income  of  the workers  concerned  to a  level which 
22  in some  cases  approaches  1001.  of previous  wages. 
1.  What  is  'Reasonable'  Social Protection? 
The  first consideration is duration of  the benefit.  The  Commission 
has historically taken  the view  that  12  months  is reasonable  in order to 
provide  acushionfor unemployed  job  seekers.  This  would  be  hard  to 
challenge  in a  period of economic  prosperity when  alternative  jobs are 
available,  but  the"levels of benefit appear much  less  adequate  in current 
circumstances with very high  levels of unemployment.  Social  problems 
are  no  longer  transient  and  are  likely  to persist well  beyond  the  typical duration of income  support benefits.  The  Commission  has  responded  to 
this by  lengthening  the duration of  some  benefits  to which  it con-
tributes. 
A second  consideration is  the  form  of protection.  The  Commission 
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has  understandably been  primarily concerned with  the  income  level of 
affected workers but  there  may  be other aspects of an  individual's well-
being which are  important.  There may  be,  for example,  significant psychic 
benefits  from  training which  promote  a  feeling of  self-worth and  purpose 
even  if such activity does not directly  lead  to another job.  For  those 
who  withdraw  from  the  labour force,  especially those under  60  years of 
age,  there  can  be  problems  such as  a  deterioration in physical and mental 
health, which are similar to  those  suffered by  the  long•term unemployed. 
The  problem is not simply one of  income  deprivation. 
A third consideration is deciding on  an  appropriate standard of 
comparison  for judging whether  the benefits are  reasonable.  The  reference 
point which  is generally used by  the  Commission  is  the previous wage  in 
the  coal or steel industries.  This is appropriate  for it is  changes in 
the  individual's position relative to his accustomed  circumstances 
that are  likely to be  of most  concern  to him.  A broader  comparison 
would  try to compare  the position of  redundant coal or steelworkers with 
similar workers  in other countries.  In  the  longer term interests of 
harmonisation  this is desirable,  but it would  only be  a  meaningful exercise 
if  due  account were  taken of differences in purchasing power  and  other 
factors  which  influence  the  standard of  living.  A different  comparison 
would  be  to  look at the position of  redundant coal and  steel workers 
relative to  the position of redundant  workers in  other sectors of  the 
economy. 
Taking  this yardstick the  level of social protection offered  to coal 
and  steel workers  in all Member  States appears  gene.rous.  Sectors  such as 
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much  less  favourable  treatment  than coal  and  steel workers.  In  several 
countries  the  conditions  in  the  coal  industry have  been  superior  to  those 
in steel,  and  the  steel  industry has  sought  the  same  terms. 
While  it is true  that  the  coal  and  steel  levels of social protection 
appear  generous  compared  with other sectors it must  be  remembered  that 
the  scale of  the  rundown  is often  far greater  in coal  and  steel  than  in 
other sectors  and  its impact  is often more  concentrated  in particular 
communities.  Moreover,  the  economy  and  culture of such communities  is 
often dominated  by  the  industry so  that  individuals  lose more  than  just 
a  wage  when  the  coal  mine  or steel works  closes.  The  value of capital 
assets,  such  as  houses,  fall~ and  worker's  pride  in and  support  from  the 
community  declines  as  the deterioration of  the social and  physical  fabric 
of society sets  in.  This  is especially acute where  regional mobility is 
limited,  for  example  by  housing  as  in the  UK,  and  where  the  poor health 
of some  ex-miners makes  them  difficult  to place  in new  jobs. 
2.  Conclusions 
In attempting  to evaluate Community  Aid  in  terms  of whether it 
provides  reasonable social protection,  account has  to be  taken of  the 
EC  contributions.  If we  consider  income  support  in  the  form  of  tideovers 
and  wage  supplements  the ever-present question of additionality versus 
reimbursement  has  to be  considered.  Aid  payable  under Article 56(2)(b) 
should not  just be  reimbursement.  In some  cases  there  appears  to be 
genuine  additionality.  In Germany  there  is a  topping  up  of national Aids. 
But  in some  other cases  the  EC  aid  seems  to be  only a  very  small  part of 
h  b  f .  "d  d  23  t  e  ene  1ts prov1  e  •  And  sometimes  it is almost  certainly a  form  of 
reimbursement.  This  is often so  in  the  case  of  the  Social Volet.24  It 
is also  true of the  Redundant  Mineworkers'  Payments  Scheme  in the  UK 
where  the  EC  contribution is paid  under  the Bilateral Convention.25 
Where  there is simply  reimbursement  then  the  EC  contribution cannot 
be  said  to be  adding  to social protection unless it is apparent  ~at the 110 
Member  States  set  the  level of  their Aid  in  the  sure expectation of  being 
.  b  d  26  re1m  urse  .  It must  also  be  recognised  that  even  where  there  is 
apparent  additionality  there  are  sometimes  abuses  of  the  system as  where 
employers  deliberately  pay  extremely  low  wages  to ex-steel and  coal 
workers  because  they  know  that  employees  can  claim  'make-up'  pay.27  In 
this way  the  EC  is,  in effect,  subsidising the workers  in such  firms. 
(The  EC  has  always  been  aware  of  the  possibility of such  abuses  and  the 
problem  should not  be  exaggerated.  Such  abuses  tend  to  be  for  limited 
periods.  Where  this  happens  it is,  however,  possible  that  there  is 
genuine additionality because workers  in such  firms  might  not  have  been 
employed  if the  employer  had  not  been  able  to  take  advantage  of  the 
system. 
The  overall conclusion on  social protection is  that  the  income 
support benefits  provided  by  the  ECSC  do  yield  some  additional benefits28 
and  the  level of benefits has  been  'reasonable'  if former  incomes,  or 
the  levels of protection available  to workers  in other sectors of  the 
economy,  are  taken as  a  standard of comparison. 
Details of  the  actual  income  levels,  in relation to  former  earnings 
levels,  can  be  found  in the  appended  reports  on  individual countries. 
These,  in many  cases,  do  appear  to  show  a  sizeable  income at least  for 
twelve  months  but  thereafter there  is a  drop;  in Germany,  for  example, 
it was  noted  that  the  real level of protection has  fallen over  time  and 
become  less  reasonable.  The  same  point was  made  in France  now  that we 
are  in a  crisis period.  The  duration of  the benefits becomes  relevant. 
Our  overall conclusion must,  however,  be  qualified when  consider-
ation is given  to  the very high  levels of unemployment  currently pre-
vailing in Member  States.  The  duration of  the  protection now  seems 
weaker  in  the  face of  long-term unemployment, 29and  now  that •;ithdrawal 
from  the  labour  force  has  become  prevalent  the whole  concept  of 
temporary  social cushioning has  become  a  less  important  issue.30 Finally,  it must  be  emphasised  that our entire discussion of social 
protection has  made  no  mention of  those workers who  are  made  redundant 
from  the  coal  and  steel sectors but who  are not eligible for  ECSC  Aid 
under Article 56(2)(b).  Ineligible workers who  work  in  close  proximity 
to others who  are eligible,  for example  when  non-ECSC  and  ECSC  work  is 
carried out  in nearby  location,  may  perceive  some  anomalies  and  in-
justices  in their treatment. 
IV  Evaluation of Readaptation Aids 
1.  General Considerations  Concerning  the Relationship 
Between  Instruments  and Objectives 
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There are many  types  of study which  can  be used  to examine  the 
effectiveness of Aid.  These  range  from  simple monitoring with no  attempt 
to identify the effectiveness of the Aid  to a  thorough  Cost  Benefit 
Analysis.31  A rigorous evaluation of  the  cost-effectiveness of Re-
adaptation Aid  has  not been  possible,  though  some  tentative remarks  have 
been presented in Section D I  to D III and in this section  some  conclusions 
on  the  specific instruments are presented. 
Earlier discussion has  shown  that it is not possible  to assign each 
particular type of Aid  uniquely  to  one  objective.  Any  particular Aid 
serves more  than one  objective,  and  each objective is served by more  than 
one  type of Aid.  For example,  retraining may  be  seen as an  Aid which 
promotes  optimal  reallocation,  which  helps  to make  the  restructuring 
process more  acceptable,  and  which also  in  the  longer  run provides  social 
protection by  raising the  chances  of a  redundant worker getting employment. 
Thus,  one  form of Aid  contributes  to several objectives.  A different 
example  can  be  taken  to illustrate the point that  a  given objective may 
be  served by  more  than one  type of Aid.  Withdrawal  from  the  labour force, 
for instance,  may  be  achieved by  the use  of early pensions  and  by  lump  sum 
severance payments. 
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~ffectiveness of  individ~al  instrurr~nts are difficult.  Furthermore,  it 
is essential  to have  a  clear idea of  the objectives of  EC  Readaptation 
Aid  in order  to evaluate  the effectiveness o£  the Aid.  Objectives are 
a  political matter and  consequently,  and understandably,  often  imprecise 
and subject  to change.  It has not  alvays  been  easy to  disce~ the 
Commission's  objectives but our perception is that  the objectives  of 
Readaptation Aid  are: 
1.  The  acceptance  of  restructuring; 
2.  (i)  Optimal  reallocation of  labour; 
2.  (ii)  Withdrawal  from  the  labour force; 
3.  Reasonable  social protection. 
The  various instruments  of Readaptation Aid  are  related  to  these 
objectives as  shown  in Table  14.  For many  purposes it is not possible to 
separate the individual influence  of particular Aids  on particular object-
ives  and  they must  therefore  be  seen as  a  'package'.  This is certainly 
the way  that  they have  been viewed  in many  Me~ber States and at this 
general  level of analysis the  impressionistic evidence  from  different 
countries  firmly supports  the  view  that  the Aids are  cost-effective.  In 
Ireland it was  observed  that  the very variety of measures  w~ich may  be 
utilised allowed  the national authorities to channel Aid  in  a  flexible 
and  cost-effective manner.32  In  Germany  there was  seen  to be no real 
alternative  to EC  Aids if the  costs  of conflict are taken into  account, 
and  in France  the  general  conclusion was  that  althou6h it is difficult to 
gauge their effect precisely,  the  Community  does make  a  positive contribution 
.  1  .  1  ff.  .  33  Th  .  ~n a  re  at1ve  y  e  1c1ent way.  ere was  w~despread agre~ent across 
Member  States that  the acceptance  of  the  rest~lcturing process  had  been 
substantially enhanced  by  Readaptation Aid  and,  as  th~ Belgian Report 
concluded,  "the cost  of policies direc::ly supported by  the ECSC  u:tder 
Article  56(2)(b)  is  compar~tively ocdest in relaticn  tQ  the  total cost of 
th  1  d  1  .  . .  .  "  3  4  .  h  e  coa  an  stee  restructur1ng 90l1Ctes  ,  so  that  aga1~ t  e  general 
impression is one  of  cost-effectiveness  in broad  terms. 113 
Table  14 
Instruments and  Objectives 
Acceptance  Withdrawal 
of  Optimal  from  the  Social 
Restructuring  Reallocation Labour Force  Protection 
Tideovers -
for unemp loyman t  1  3  '  1 
for early retirement  1  1  1 
Earnings  Supplements  2  1  2 
Early Pension  1  1  1 
Training Allowances  2  2  2 
Mobility Allowances  3  1  2 
Severance  Payments  1  4  3  3 
Concessionary Coal  4  4 
Short  Time  Working  3  1 
A Note  on  Table  14 
Table  14  provides  a  highly simplified statement of  the  relationship between 
ends  {objectives)  and means  (forms  of Readaptation Aid).  It is based on 
our general impressions of  the  actual  impact of  the Aid.  It does not purport 
to  describe  the intended impact  (either as  formally  set out or implied in 
the Bilateral Conventions  or other agreements  on  the one  hand,  or as 
envisaged in practice on  the other); nor does it necessarily hold in every 
particular for each  Member  State, nor at every time.  ·rn  short, it presents 
our perception of the  broad picture. 
The  numbers  in each  column  show  our interpretation of  the relative importance 
of each  instrument in influencing  the specified objective.  The  number 1  shows 
those  instruments which  have  the greatest  impact  and  subsequent numbers 
show  a  correspondingly lesser impact.  It should be  stressed that this is 
no  more  than  a  perceived ranking.  The  numbers  do  not necessarily imply a 
proportional weighting of  the  impact,  nor that the  lowest  ranked  aids are 
insignificant.  Furthermore,  the  ranking in Table  14  relates  to  a  given 
objective.  The  rank  ordering is by  column  and  not by  row,  though  in most 
instances  (as it turns out)  it would  also  be  reasonable  to  interpret the 
numbers  as  a  rank  ordering by  row.  For  example,  Tideover Allowance  for 
unemployment  are  ranked l  with respect  to  both  'acceptance'  and  'social 
protection'  but 3  with respect  to 'optimal reallocation'.  We  would 
interpret the  relative impact of  the Tideover Allowance  as betng greater 
in relation  to  'acceptance'  and  'social protection'  than  for  'optimal 
reallocation'. 
We  have  referred in Table  14  to the  rank;rng  of instruments for each objective.  There is also  the question  of  ranking  the  objectives  them-
selves  in terms  of  their importance  to  the  Commission.  This  latter 
question is discussed elsewhere  (see  Section  C.  1  and  Section F).  While 
the different objectives  are  closely inter-related it is possible  to 
rank order them.  In  Section F  the view is put  forward  that achieving 
acceptance of restructuring is the highest-ranked objective because it 
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is a  precondition for the  satisfaction of other objectives  and  all 
instruments  are  considered  to have  same  impact  on  this,  as  Table  14  shows. 
The  next most  important objective is achieving·withdrawal  from  the  labour 
force.  This  has  become  such because of  the extensive  reliance on  early 
retirement in  recent years  due  to  the high unemployment.  It might appear 
from  Table  14  that withdrawal is not  widely served by  the different 
,instruments;  only three  are shown  to have  an  impact,  but  they are all 
· considered to be  of  the first  importance.  Securing  reasonable  social 
·protection is  ranked  below withdrawal.  This might  seem  surprising in 
view of the  fact  that all instruments  can  be  supposed  to affect  the 
'achievement of  reasonable social protection.  It is, however,  inherently 
easier to perceive some  direct link between  the instruments and  this 
objective,  than is the  case with other objectives,  though certain 
instruments,  such as  concessionary coal and mobility allowances,  very 
probably  have  only a  slight impact. 115 
2.  Evidence  on  Specific Aids 
Some  more  specific evidence  relating  to particular Aids  is given in 
the  UK  Phase II report  (see Appendix  5). 
Training: 
A sample  of  91  UK  steelworkers who  were  made  redundant  in 1983  and 
who  went  for retraining was  taken.  Detailed records  were  available  for 
85  of  these.  There  was  a  wide  dispersion of ages  of workers  who  opte4 
for  training and  a  variety of courses  was  taken.  At  first sight  the  results 
indicate  that  retraining is of  limited value although for  the  EC  it is 
h  .  A"d  35  t  e  most  expens1ve  1  •  Only  23  of the  85  workers  examined  got  a  job 
at the end  of  their training period and  in only  4  cases  was  this job using 
the training acquired directly.  Moreover,  there was  a  substantial fall 
in  the  income  level of  retrainees who  found  new  jobs after training.  New 
earnings were  on  average  44%  lower  than  their last pre-redundancy wage. 
These  facts  suggest  that  retraining  is not cost-effective in strictly 
financial  terms. 
There  are, however,  a  number  of points which must be  considered. 
Firstly,  some  of the  short-fall in earnings was  attributable to  the general 
.  36  d  1  - .  h  f  d  .  b  1  recess1on  an  a  contra  group  ot non-tra1nees w o  oun  new  JO  s  a  so 
exhibited a  very marked fall in earnings  compared  with their previous 
steel employment.  Thus  the trainees  do  no worse  than  re-employed  non-
trainees.  The  appropriate  comparison is whether  the particular individuals 
who  undertook  training  would  have had  even  lower wages  had  th~y not been 
retrained. 
Se~:ondly,  even  though  a  remarkably  small proportion of  trainees used 
their training directly, it is quite likely that  the fact  that workers 
had  undertaken  any  training course made  them  more  attractive to employers 
because  such workers  have  retained work  habits and  shown  a  positive 
attitude and  commitment.  It must  be  recognised however  that if more 
attention were  given  to  the provision of  celevant  training this must enhance  the cost-effectiveness,37  and  the extent of EC  support  could  be 
altered to  reflect this. 
Thirdly,  individuals almost  certainly benefit  from  retraining even 
if they do  not  get  a  new  job.  These  psychic benefits can  be  very  real 
even  though  they  are  intangible. 
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Fourthly,  the  cost per job  found  through  the retraining option was 
estimated at  about  £28,000 which,  although high,  compares  favourably with 
some  alternative forms  of job provision.  (This estimate does  not  take 
account  of any displacement effects,  i.e.  the possibility that  retrained 
workers who  get  a  job may  simply be  replacing other unemployed workers 
who  might  have  taken  the  job.) 
These qualifications to  the  apparent  low  cost-effectiveness of 
training lead us  to  the view that it would  be wrong  to curtail this form 
of Aid. 
Self-employment: 
The  UK  Phase  II study,  and various other studies noted in Appendix 5, 
have  shown  that  about  5%  of redundant workers  in steel have  become  self-
employed.  There is a  high concentration of such workers in the service 
industries.  The  average  cost of benefits paid to  these workers was 
£6,544.  Although there was  very little additional employment  generated 
by  those  who  became  self-employed,  this  seems  a  modest  figure when 
compared with assistance for  job creation.  Furthermore,  it is a  positive 
role  for  the individual. 
Lump  sums: 
Evidence  from  the  UK  suggests  that  lump  sum  payments  in the coal 
industry have certainly been effective  in buying out  jobs and  inducing 
a  shake-out  of labour from  the  industry.  But  some  important qualifications 
have  to be  made  which indicate that  they are of limited cost-effectiveness. 
The  total costs  could arguably be  lower  and still achieve  the  same  degree 
of acceptance  and  shake-out  from  the  coal industry.  There is some  evidence 117 
that at  least a  portion of the  lump  sums  are used  to buy  large  con-
sumption goods  or services  (such as  cars or holidays),  and  there is no 
direct  incentive to  seek new  employment  speedily.  Finally,  in psycho-
logical  terms  the receipt of a  lump  sum  does  not  per se contribute 
positively  (as  is the  case with retraining and  self-employment)  in 
promoting  self-confidence  and  a  sense of purpose in the  individual. 
Nevertheless,  there  can be little doubt  that workers  strongly want  lump 
sum  payments  and,  consequently,  such payments  are very significant in 
achieving  acceptance of restructuring on  the·part of the workers  (though 
the  EC  contribution to such payments  is small). 118 
Notes  to  Section D 
1.  See  Article 2 of  the Treaty of Paris. 
2.  As  Swann  has noted,  "While  in  theory restructuring is as  much 
concerned with  growth as  contraction,  in practice Community  policy 
has  been  concerned  overwhel~ngly with problems  of  how  to  cope  with 
industries that are in decline".  Swann  D,  Competition and  Industrial 
Policy in  the European  Community,  Methuen,  London,  1983. 
3.  All  our researches in Member  States indicate,  on  the basis of 
interview evidence in particular,  that this is the  case. 
4.  The  diagram is of  course  a  drastic simplification of a  complex 
position.  It is merely meant  to indicate  some  of  the characteristics 
of  the  relation between  expenditure on  aid and  the  acceptance  of 
restructuring.  The  relation in practice is likely to  be  subtle and 
changing and  it is quite possible  that the MS  line is non-linear and 
'prone to shift. 
6.  It should be stressed that the  argument  here deals  only with making 
the restructuring process acceptable and  does  not deal with other 
EC  objectives suCh  as  providing a  reasonable level of social 
protection. 
7.  See  the  UK  Report,  Appendices  6  and  7,  for a  discussion of  lump 
sum  payments.  The  lump  sums  currently available  to workers  leaving 
the  coal  industry can  be  more  than  three  times  the  annual  salary, 
depending on  age  and  length of service. 
8.  Reported  in the  German  study. 
9.  The  Belgian Report,  p.  59. 
10.  The  French Report,  p.  220. 
11.  The  French Report,  p.  220. 
12.  These  constraints include  the need  for  retraining and mobility. 
13.  See  Commission  W>rking  document  General Objectives Steel  1990, 
COM  (85)  208  final,  pages  VI/18-19. 
14.  This is perhaps  surprising because  lump  sums  are like a  wealth 
effect on  labour supply.  If workers  are concerned  to maximise  the 
present value of the discounted  stream of all  future incomes  then 
they should  aim  to find a  new  job as quickly as possible,  regardless 
of  any  lum  sum  increment  in wealth. 
15.  Historically there have  been  some  substantial movements  of  labour 
between  regions,  for example  the inter-area transfers of  coal workers 
in  the UK,  though  this example  is of course  transfer within  the 
industry and not between  industries. 
16.  In  the  UK  the new  NCB  Redundancy  Compensation  scheme  will be  aiming 
to get workers  under 50  years  of age out of the  industry when  it 
comes  into operation in March  1987. 119 
17.  See  the French Report,  p.  87;  the  Belgian Report,  p.  21. 
18.  Training was  often a  popular option amongst  workers but  there is little 
evidence  that 'trained'  workers  have  superior chances of finding  a 
job.  See,  for example,  the experiences of  UK  steelworkers  reported 
in Appendix  5  to  this study. 
19.  In  relation to  the  UK  steel industry there is abundant  evidence 
that workers  have  frequently been unable  to obtain  jobs outside  the 
industry at wages  comparable with their former  earnings. 
20.  See  the  Interim Report,  pp.  229-230. 
21.  No  specific mention has  been  made  of  the  DAC  in Luxembourg  but  this 
is of  course a  fonn  of  social  protection. 
22.  See  the  Interim Report,  Appendix  21,  for details  of  ~e provisions 
in different Member  States. 
23.  For example  in the  Belgian and  UK  coal  industries. 
24.  This is not  the  case  in Germany  where  the  Social Valet,  which started 
in July 1981,  was  discussed  simultaneously in  the  Commission  and  in 
the  German  Parliament.  Payment  of money  from  the  German  Government 
was  almost certainly influenced by  EC  policy. 
25.  This is partly because of  the historical position that  the  RMPS  was 
in existence before  the  Bilateral Convention. 
26.·  There  appears  to be  some  evidence of  this having occurred in Belgium. 
27.  For evidence  see Morris L  D,  'Patterns of Social Activity and  Post-
Redundancy  Labour-Market  Experience',  Sociology,  Vol.  18  No.  3 
August  1984. 
28.  For an  interesting example  of additionality see  the experience of 
the UK  abolishing the  State social  security earnings related 
supplement in 1982  and  tts impact  on  !SERBS,  see Interim Report 
Part C iv., pp.  131-136, especially at pp.  135-6. 
29.  In  the  UK  for example  in July 1986  more  than  60%  of  the  stock of 
unemployed  workers had  been  unemployed  for over six months,  and 
over  40%  had  been  unemployed  for over a  year. 
30.  See  our conclusions on  the  ranking  of different objectives.  In 
Section F we  argue  that withdrawal  from  the labour force  has  taken 
precedence over assuring reasonable social protection. 
31.  These  were  discussed in the  Interim Report in Part  B iii. 
32.  The  proviso was  added  that more  emphasis  could  be  put on  encouraging 
the  re-employment of  redundant ECSC  workers,  for example,  through a 
broadening of  the wage  support allowance  (e.g.  lengthening  the 
period of application). 
33.  The  French Report,  p.  222. 
34.  The  Belgian Report,  p.  83. 120 
35.  Average  ECSC  cost per head  of Steel Payments  for 1981  in  the 
UK  were: 
Gross  cost  ·Ecsc  contribution 
£  ecu  £  ecu 
Pension  7194  13007  2555  4620 
Unemployed  1725  3119  809  1462 
Employed  851  1536  426  768 
Retraining  6952  12569  3476  6285 
For  further discussion see  supra.  in C II 1.  v. 
36.  It may  also be due  in part  to abuses  by  emp layers. 
37.  The  courses available to  the  sample  in  the  UK  Phase  II study were 
largely deter.mined  by  the  providers of  the  courses. 121 
E  INFORMATION  PROBLEMS  AND  REQUIREMENTS 
I  The  Purpose of Information 
Financial and  statistical information on  the operation of EC  Re-
adaptation Aid  is required for the purpose of financial  control.  It is 
also  required  for  the monitoring and  evaluation of the aids in order to 
allow some  appraisal of how  far  the objectives  (including harmonisation) 
are being met,  and  for assessing  the  cost-effectiveness of different 
instruments.  At  present the data available are used mainly for the 
purpose of financial control.  They  are occasionally used for  some  kinds 
of appraisal such as  internal mOnitoring and  auditing,  but  these exercises 
are primarily concerned with whether the  'rules' are being complied with 
and  scarcely, if at all, with evaluation in a  more  general  sense. 
II  Problems  with  the Data 
There  are several problems with  the  data in their present form: 
1.  they are inadequately used as  a  system of financial control; 
2.  the figures  of actual job losses,  job losses  covered by 
commitments,  and the number  of beneficiaries do  not coincide; 
3.  data are used inappropriately; 
4.  data problems mean  the aid is not  transparent; 
5.  recorded payments  in any year do  not  relate to specific events. 
These  will be  dealt with in  turn.  By  far the most  important  from 
our point of view is 5. 
1.  Past  Inadequate Financial Control 
The  data presently available are used as  an  instrument of financial 
control but the effectiveness of this control has  in the past been questioned. 
The  Court of Auditors made  a  number  of critical remarks  in their 1983 
1  report  about  accounts  (in their role as  an  instrument of control in 
implementing  commitments)  but  this is beyond  the scope  of the present 
report which  is concerned with evaluation. 2.  Discrepancies  Between  Job Losses,  Beneficiaries and 
Commitments 
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The  figures  of  the number  of job losses  covered  by  commitments  entered 
into by  the  Commdssion,  do  not  correspond with  the number  of workers  for 
whom  ECSC  Aid  is planned.  In some  Member  States,  such as Italy and 
Gennany~ the number  of workers  forecast has at  times  exceeded  the  job 
losses.  The  discrepancies differ  at different times  and  for different 
countries and  this makes  the use of the  ~~ssion's record of  limited 
value for the purpose  of evaluation.  It must  be  stressed that this is 
not always  the  fault of  the Commission;  records of certain Member  States 
are sometimes  of doubtful value.  In  some  cases  requests are  even  based 
on  figures  for·which  records have not always  been kept.  This was  the 
case in France,  for example,  with  the first Social Volet.  The  figure 
given as  the number  of beneficiaries was  therefore  an  approximation. 
Figures were  sometimes  adjusted after negotiations  between  the  French 
Government  and  the  Commission.  MUch  of  the  responsibility for the  lack 
of precision lies with the French steel industry which presented records 
with insufficient care.  It should be noted however,  that more  recently 
there have been significant improvements.  (See French Report  p.  165.) 
In Belgium there were  problems  in establishing the number  of beneficiaries 
since global government statistics are based on  the number  of  'cases' 
(monthly  payments)  and not on  the number  of beneficiaries  (Belgian 
Report  p.  54),  and different information was  obtained from  different 
sources  (p.  55). 
The  commitment  decisions of the Commission  are  a  poor guide  to 
job losses in a  given period.  Not all job losses result in the application 
of Article 56(2)(b).  The  following  table  (Table 15)  illustrates this 
point.  In  the  UK  coal  industry in 1981  and 1982  the number  eligible for 
EC  Readaptation Aid was  only  about  one  half of the  reduction in employment. 123 
Table  15 
Numbers  Eli8ible for  EC  ReadaEtation Md 
in  the  UK  Coal  Industry 
1981  1982 
1.  Reduction  in Employment  14,421  10,783 
2.  Redundant  7,385  5,989 
3.  Eligible Under  Bilateral Convention  6,880  5,495 
3. as  a  percentage  of 1.  47%  5U 
Job  losses  at the  level of  the individual plant, which dtermine  the 
number  of eligible beneficiaries may  also,  on  occasion,  be  offset in  the 
global statistics by increases elsewhere. 
Another source of disparity between  job losses  and  commitments  arises 
when,  for example,  the Commission  assists in cases where  only a  small 
number  of employees is dismissed while  the  remainder is retrained for 
redeployment in  the  same  undertaking following a  change  in activity. 
3.  Data Used  InaEproEriately 
An  example  of this is the presentation in tables of both figures  of 
appropriations and of  the number  of workers,3  the juxtaposition of  which 
invites  readers  to make  comparisons.  even  though  they may  refer to quite 
separate events.  Occasionally explicit 'cost per worker affected'  (or 
'cost per job lost') figures are presented4 but  this is a  misleading use 
of data.  Sometimes  the misuse is because  the  figures  are used,  in  the 
absence of appropriate data,  as  a  very  imperfect proxy for the true figures. 
4.  Data Problems  and  TransEarency 
Data problems  of  the  kind which  have  been  discussed  so far mean  that 
EC  Readaptation Aid  is not very  transparent.  Transparency requires  that 
all parties know  what  aid is available and under what  circumstances,  and 
that  the method  of  administration and  impact  of  the aid are known. 5  This 
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storage  of  information  on  aid actually provided.  Without  this no  thorough 
evaluation or external  reporting of  the  aid programme  is possible.  The 
OECD  has  suggested  that  the kind  of  information  required  to ensure  trans-
parency would  include:  6 
(i)  The  objective of  the Aid  as well as  the legal authority 
under which  the Aid  is given.  Our  discussion of objectives 
has  shown  that  these  are not  always  clear. 
(ii)  Identification of  the  type of  the Aid  (tideover allowance, 
mobility allowance,  retirement grant,  early pension etc); 
its cost  to  the  Commdssion  (and  to Member  States); its value 
to the recipient;  and  how  this value was  d~termined. 
(iii)  Identification of  the recipients including their character-
istics  (such as  location,  their age etc). 
(iv)  Identification of  the use  actually ~e  of  the Aid  by  the 
recipient and  the direct and  indirect consequences of  the  Aid. 
(v)  Identification of performance  indicators  (preferably 
quantitative)  to evaluate  the Aid. 
By  themselves  these points  do  not give  an  immediate practical guide 
to appropriate procedures  in the  case of Readaptation Aid  but  they  do 
indicate  some  general  criteria for  transparency.  By  these  criteria much 
of  the aid does not seem  transparent.  It was  noted in a  number of our 
studies of Member  States  that individual workers do  not realise that the 
source of some  of  the  benefits  they receive is the ECSC.  Payments  are 
simply regarded by workers  as being part of the national social security 
system.  This  was  the  case in Belgium and in Germany  (though knowledge 
of EC  Aid  in Germany  did go  down  as far as Works  Council level).  This 
ignorance,  by workers,  about  the  source  of funds  was  less apparent in 
the  UK  where  newspaper h.eadlines  often made  reference to "European Money". 
However,  ignorance on  th~ part of individual  workers  may  not be  a  serious 
problem.  It is much  more  damaging  when  administrators·and policy.makers 0) 
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are not  clear about  the identification of  the recipients or the use made 
of the aid. 
5.  Payments  and  Events  are not Related 
It must  be  emphasised  that  there is proper financial control  of 
payments.  The  system is  thorough and  seems  entirely adequate.  Data 
problems  do  arise,  however,  when  one  wants  to go  beyond  financial  control 
and  use  the data for evaluation.  From  this latter standpoint perhaps  the 
most  important problem of all is that of  linking events and  payments. 
There is information on  the monetary  amounts  of the applications 
for aid  and  on  the budgetary appropriations  (or commitments)  which are 
made  in  response to  these applications.  There is also information on 
the  claims  for  payment,  which  follow approval  of  the application,  and 
on  the  consequent payments  that are made. 
These  data are each assigned a  particular date, e.g.  the  date of the 
receipt of  the· application,  or the date  of the payment,  but  crucially 
these  amounts  and  dates may  bear no  relation  to  the  timing of the ~~ 
i.e.  the date of  the  redundancy.  Thus  an  application for aid may  be  for 
some  past or current or future event.  (And  the payments  by the  ECSC,  to 
take  another example, may  be  for some  events which  took place at various 
dates in  the past.)  In some  instances applications are submitted for 
projects which  had  already finished as much  as six years  previously. 
There  are  some  understandable  reasons why  this should be  so.7  In the 
first place,  reduction in the number  of workers  employed  is typically 
phased  over a  long period.  The  Belgian  study,  for example,  observed that 
"it is difficult to determine at what  moment  in time  •••  a  plant or 
division  really and  totally closed",  (p.  54)  and  even if a  closure  can 
·be  pinpointed exactly there may  be  problems  because "certain companies 
introduce their redundancy list or supplementary redundancy  lists several 
years after the official closure date".  (p.  53) 
A number  of difficulties  arise when  the  commitments  or payments recorded in  any  year  cannot  be  related  to specific events.  Most  im-
portantly from  our point of view is the  fact  that evaluation becomes 
troublesome  or impossible.  The  notion of  the effectiveness of  EC 
Readaptation Aid  must  relate to events,  and  it is thus  imperative to 
link ECSC  contributions to particular redundancies.  Any  consideration 
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of  'value for money'  entails an  examination of the  costs and  the benefits 
of specific events.  If data are not readily available on  an  events basis, 
evaluation becomes  a  possibility only if a  realignment of the  data  can 
be achieved. 
It is also worth noting at this stage that when  payments  are made  by 
the Commission  to Member  States a  substantial time after the event then 
this may  be no more  than  reimbursement if payment  had  already been made 
to workers at the  time  of  their redundancies  (either through the National 
Budget,  or by  the undertaking  themselves).  The  Social Volet is open  to 
this  charge  of being  simply  a  reimbursement of funds.  Where  the national 
system is such  then  the workers  do  not receive anything prior to the 
Commission's  decision  that they might  receive aid at an  inappropriate 
time,  perhaps  even when  the  individuals'  problems  have  lessened so  there 
is no  real social cushioning. 
6.  Further Data Problems 
There  are various other data problems.  There  are,  for example,  some 
substantial differences between  commitments8  and payments.  These  can 
arise because  of currency variations and  because of  the  fact that 
commitments  are based  on  estimated numbers  of beneficiaries arid  estimates 
of the  age  composition of such beneficiaries and  of  the benefit options 
which  they  take  up.  These  factors are difficult to predict accurately 
and  the out-turn,  on  which payments  are based,  is therefore often different 
from  the estimates,  on  which  commitments  are based.  The  resulting dis-
crepancies  can  run  in  to many  millions of ECUs  for an  individual Member 
State.  These,  and related points,  were  discussed,  with some  exaq»les 
of the size of  the discrepancies,  in  the  Interim Report.9 127 
III  Possible Changes  in  the Use  and  Collection of Data 
While  all the  problems  described  so far are  serious,  it must  be 
recognised  that  there  is a  considerable  amount.(;f  information available. 
Much  of it, however.  is not always  readily accessible  in known  locations 
10  or in a  suitable  form  for evaluation purposes. 
What  changes  to  the present  system of gathering and  presenting 
information are desirable?  In this discussion attention will be  given 
primarily to the question of data for evaluation purposes  because this, 
rather  than data for  financial control.  is our central interest.  At  the 
outset  there are three points which must  be  recognised. 
(i)  The  past is dead.  It might  be  possible in some  cases  to 
manipulate past data  to make  them  more  meaningful.  In  the 
UK  for  instance an extremely  laborious  and  very  time-
consuming  exercise was  undertaken to make  data on  commitments 
11  and  on  particular beneficiaries correspond,  but  this may 
not be  feasible  in other countries.  It is better therefore 
to concentrate. on  future  possibilities for  change. · 
(ii)  Any  suggestion  for  change must  be  practical and  in order to 
maximise  co-operation fro. Member  States wherever.  p~ssible 
better use  should be  made  of existing information  (for 
example,  by  presenting it in a  more  useful  form)  rather  than 
calling for additional data. 
(iii)  The  information should  be  easily accessible and  then  fully 
used.  The  mere  collection of information does  not ensure 
this.  We  do  not  favour  nor advocate  the collection of 
data  for ita own  sake  (or for that of researchers). 
A number  of possible  improvements  could  be  made  to  the-present data. These  area 
(a)  the use  of  longer periods  (than one  year)  in analysing  the 
data; 
(b)  the  imposition of time  limits on  the Commission's  decisions 
following  an application for aid; 
(c)  the use of follow-up  surveys  of a  sample  of beneficiaries; 
(d)  the use of a  standard  form  of reporting. 
These will be  discussed in turn but by  far  the most  important are 
the  last  two  and  these will therefore be  examined  moat  fully. 
1.  The  Use  of Longer  Periods  in the Analysis  of Data 
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It baa  often been suggested  that if the period of analysis were  say 
3-S  years  then many  of the proble  .. of relating events  to data would  be 
dLminiahed.  All data would  thus  relate to events  and  payments  in a 
longer span of  time and  thereby stand more  chance of corresponding.  This 1 
however.  would  only be  of limited value as  there would  still be  some 
events within any  arbitrarily chosen longer period  for which  payments 
occurring later lay outside  the period. 
2.  .Time  Limits  on  the  Commission'• Decisions 
The  introduction of  time  limits into the agreements might  at first 
sight aeea attractive.  but as  the Comaiaaion  baa  already argued.  "it is 
not  self-evident that tiae limits could contribute  toward  the  shortening 
of  the period between  the  iaplementation of the  redundancy  programme  and 
the Commission's  agreement.  In particular.  the decision that a  closure 
should be  permanent.  in accordance with Article S6(2)(b) 1  may  intervene 
only  some  time after the event.  It would  also aeea impossible  to intro-
duce stricter time  limits  than  those accepted by  the National Authorities 
which  themselvea  contribute substantial amounts' of aid.  If the Commission 
refused  to reimburse eaployers who  have  financed benefits.  if they apply 
with exceasive delay.  the effect in practice aay well be  to deprive  the 
redundant  steelworkers of Community  benefits at the  bime  of greatest need". 129 
3.  Follow-up  Surveys  of a  Sample  of Beneficiaries 
A follow-up  study of a  sample of beneficiaries would  provide  some 
evidence  for judging how  far some  of  the objectives of Readaptation Aid 
were being met.  The  objectives of  providing a  reasonable level  of social 
protection,12  of promoting an  optUnal reallocation of  labour or with-
drawal  from  the  labour force,  and of promoting harmonisation across Member 
States can only  be  evaluated with information of the kind obtainable in 
follow-up  studies.  The  definitional problems which arise in the case of 
the objectives are substantial.  Some  of  the issues,  for  example,  on  the 
possible meanings  of harmonisation/equalisation were  discussed  in our 
Interim Report  (1985).13  There  are of  course very real problems  in 
comparing  levels of social protection across Member  States.  Adjustments 
have  to be made  for differences  in such  factors as purchasing power,  and 
various  indicators of  the quality of life.  The  follow-up  studies would 
also provide information on  the  general appraisal of different instruments 
.  f  h  .  ff  •  14  1n terms o  t  e1r cost-e  ect1veness. 
Follow-up studies could be  of three kinds: 
(i)  company  reports; 
(ii)  sample  surveys; 
(iii)  more  elaborate studies. 
(i)  Company  Reports 
Companies  benefiting  from  EC  Readaptation Aid  could be obliged to 
provide,  after the end  of  the programme,  a  report on  the  restructuring 
that has actually taken place and  the out-turn with respect  to job losses. 
This  would  only be  a  very slight burden on companies  but would  provide a 
systematic point for evaluation. 
(ii)  Sample  Surveys 
A sample  survey of,  say,  2%  of beneficiaries  (with a  minimum  of  say 
five  individuals  from  each programme)  should be followed-up  for at least 
the period of  their entitlement  to benefit15  and preferably for a  much . 130 
longer  period,  say 5-10 years.  Such  regular  surveys  should  provide 
profiles of  the individuals'  incomes  (and its components,  e.g.  earnings, 
make-up  pay,  etc)  and  activities  (training,  unemployment,  re-employment 
etc)  which  would  give  an  indication of what  happened  to  individuals and 
the source  of  their income.  This would  be a  basis for evaluating the 
level of  social protection which was  actually achieved.  The  type of 
information required is  that which  is set out  in question 11  of the 
revised methodology for  this study. 
(iii)  More  Elaborate  Studies 
More  elaborate follow-up  studies could be  conducted from  time  to 
time in particular regions.  These  would differ from  the regular follow-
up  survey which  has  just been described.  They  would  not  be  on  a  regular 
and  continuing basis but  they would  seek much  fuller information on  the 
circumstances  and  behaviour of individuals,  and  on  the wider  labour 
market  context.  Such  occasional  studies need  not  be  'in house'  exercises 
by  the  Commdssion  but  could be undertaken by  outside researchers.  The 
kind of proposal made  in the French Report  (pages  228-9)  could  serve as 
a  model  for such studies.  In  the French Report  (loc.  cit.) it is 
suggested that in addition to  an  examination of the mechanics  of decision 
making  there  should also be a  socio-economic  analysis of  the impact  of 
aids particularly within  the  context of local labour markets.16  The 
studies should also include an  in-depth sociological  analysis of the 
impact  of  these aids on  individuals. 
4.  Standardised Reporting 
Some  standardisation in  the  supporting documents  which  accompany 
the  applications and  requests  for payment  sent to the Commission  by 
Member  States would  be desirable.  It seems  possible  that if the infor-
mation,  which many  Member  States currently provide,  were  presented in a 
different  form it could be more  useful.  The  Commission  has  already 
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17  summary  information in a  conmon  fonnat",  and it would  be useful if the 
Commission  were  to explore  the possibility further. 
The  most  useful  form  in which  summary  material  could be presented 
b  h  ..  ..  h  h  .  18  would  e  to concentrate on  t  e  out-turn stat1st1cs rat er  t  an  expecbat1ons. 
This means  concentrating on  information  from  the  claims  for payment  rather 
than  the original applications for aid.  The  info~ation in  the  claims 
should specify  the number  of beneficiaries of each  type of  aid,19 
identified by  their year of  redundancy  (or possibly by  programme). 20  The 
gross  cost and  ECSC  contributions relating specifically to  these bene-
ficiaries  should be  given.  Thus  a  claim in,  say,  1986  may  contain requests 
for payment  in respect of workers  made  redundant in 1986,  in 1985,  and 
in other previous years.  These  should be separately identified,  and  a 
cumulative  total of  the number  of beneficiaries of  each  type of aid,  and 
21  the cost, will build up  for each year of redundancy. 
More  sophisticated information,  covering such matters as  the duration 
of  the benefit  and  the variation across plants could be  added  (again,  see 
the  Interim Report Part C (vii), especially page  190)  with very little 
additional work. 
All this should  be possible with very little or ~nimal re-arrangement 
of data provided at present.  Rather more  detailed information,  such as 
22  that suggested in the  Belgian Report,  would  require some  modest  add-
itional work by certain Member  States.  Finally it should be noted that, 
in general,  more  uniform accounting and  auditing systems  (a'nd  perhaps more 
updated  and  co-ordinated Bilateral Conventions23), together with same 
permanent monitoring,  will  serve to make  the  system more  transparent. Notes  to Section E 
1.  See  for example  point 2.7.3.2.2 of the Report on  the Accounting and 
Financial Management.  Annex  to  the Annual  Report  ECSC  1982  &y 
The  Court  of Auditors.  Criticisms of the financial management  have 
also been made  in  the Review  of  the  Bilateral Conventions,  DOC 
V/206/82. 
2.  See  the German  Report at 3-28  for a  discussion of  the  use  of  fore-
casts of beneficiaries in  the  coal  industry. 
3.  For example  in  the  EC  General  Report  each  year. 
4.  For example  in  the  Court of Auditors'  Report op.  cit. 
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5.  See  OECD,  The  Case  for Positive Adjustments,  Paris,  1979,  for a  dis-
cussion on  transparency. 
6.  See  OECD,  Transparency for Positive Adjustment,  Paris,  1983,  for a 
discussion on  these points. 
7.  See  point 3.1.11 of Annex  111  to  the  Court  of Auditors Report,  op.  cit. 
8.  'Commitments'  are  synonymous  with 'appropriations', with  'amounts 
made  available'  and with  'allocations'. 
9.  Interim Report,  pp.  14-16. 
10.  There  is very. little systematic and  regular collection of data which 
is appropriate for evaluation.  There  are,  however,  same  ad  hoc 
sample  surveys.  In  the  UK  for instance,  there is a  study of training 
on  behalf of  the Department  of Industry and  the British Steel 
Corporation, but  such  studies are not part of  a  regular monitoring 
system. 
11.  The  results were  presented in the  UK  Interim Report,  Part C. 
12.  Another,  and  arguably the most  important aim,  is to make  restructuring. 
more  acceptable,  the achievement of which  is likely to be  strongly 
linked  to  the  achievement of adequate  social protection. 
13.  See  Interim Report,  especially Part B. 
14.  The  data problems  are so severe  that none  of our studies of  individual 
countries was,  on  the  basis of presently available data,  able to 
provide  a  fully adequate  study of cost-effectiveness. 
15.  Such records would normally be  available in the Member  States at the 
agency· which  actually makes  the payments. 
16.  A number  of  such studies  do  exist  in Member  States but  they are  often 
not  comparable  because  they have different purposes and  methods.  More 
co-ordination and  a  common  for.mat  would  increase their usefulness. 
17.  See  point 3.1.25 of Annex  111  to  the  Court  of Auditors'  Report, 
op.  cit. 133 
18.  Information  in  the  form  of estimates is of  course crucial  for  some 
purposes  such as deciding  on  EC  commitments. 
19.  See  further  the German  Report at 3-61. 
20.  Where  redundancy  programmes  span  two  calendar years it may  be 
difficult to  identify all the  redundancies in a  particular year, 
and it may  be more  useful  to use  closure programmes  as  the unit 
within which beneficiaries and  payments  are  linked. 
21.  Information  of  this kind was  presented in the  Interim Report 
(Part C vii) for  the  UK  Steel Industry for  closures in  1981. 
22.  See  the  Belgian Report,  pages  56-7,  where  the  inclusion of personal 
data  such as date of  job loss,  seniority, age,  nature of previous 
jobs, new  job situation,  income,  and  amount  of Readaptation Aid, 
is advocated. 
23.  See  Belgian Report,  p.  87. 134 
F.  CONCLUSIONS  AND  RECOMMENDATIONS 
I  Publicity 
The  different EC  Commission  objectives of EC  Readaptation Aid need 
to be  well publicised because  they are not always  sufficiently well  known 
or appreciated in Member  States by  the relevant actors including Governments 
(both Ministers  and  officials), management,  trade unions and  individual 
workers.  Action needs  to continue to be  taken  to ensure that in future 
the objectives of ECSC  Aids  are clear and widely understood.  The  Comodssion's 
proposed  publication of a  brochure  on  EC  Readaptation Aid  should assist in 
this regard and  its regular updating with extensive circulation throughout 
Member  States are strongly recommended. 
II  Ranking  of Objectives 
We  shall next specify the  ranking of  the EC  objectives and their 
inter-relationship in terms  of contemporary history  (from the late 1970s 
through  to  the mid  1980s)  before putting forward  some  recommendations  on 
these matters  for both the shorter and  longer terms.  Our  interpretation 
of what  has  been  happening in recent years is set out in Table 16 
(Part A)  for ease of  comparison with our recommendations  for the future 
(Parts  B and  C)  with respect to ranking. 135 
Table  16 
The  Ranking of Objectives 
Part  A:  Recent Past 
1.  Acceptance of restructuring  (objective 1). 
2.  Achieving withdrawal  from  the  labour force 
(objective 2(2)). 
3.  Assuring reasonable  social protection  (objective 3). 
4.  Achieving optimal  reallocation of  labour 
(objective 2(1)). 
Part  B:  Shocter Term  Future 
1.  Safeguarding acceptance of restructuring (objective 1). 
2.  Assuring reasonable  social protection  (objective 3). 
2.  Achieving withdrawal  (objective 2(2)). 
4.  Achieving. optimal reallocation  (objective 2(1)). 
Part C:  Longer  Term  Future 
1.  Safeguarding acceptance of restructuring (objective 1). 
2.  Assuring reasonable social protection  (objective 3). 
2.  Achieving optimal reallocation  (objective 2(1)). 
4.  Achieving withdrawal  (objective 2 (2)) •' t36 
1.  The  Rec~nt Past 
Concerning  the position of recent years,  getting acceptance of re-
structuring has  been  the pre-condition of achieving  the other major 
objectives.  We  have  concluded  that achieving withdrawals  from  the  labour 
force  has  become  such a  high priority objective in  the  face of  the  crisis, 
particularly over the  last seven years,  that it should be  regarded as  an 
EC  objective  in its own  right rather  than  put in a  category with optimal 
reallocation of labour,  which has  become  less important  through being 
very  much  more  difficult to achieve  than  formerly  given  the state of 
the European  economy  over  the last eight or so years.  Assuring reasonable 
social protection as  an  objective has  remained a  key imperative:  it is 
so closely interlinked with the first  two  objectives that  they cannot be · 
achieved without it.  It should be  appreciated that assuring reasonable 
social protection can  remain  a  major objective without  going for the 
objective of optimal reallocation of  labour.  Equally,  reasonable  social 
protection can  be  achieved without fulfilling the  objective of optimal 
reallocation if policy makers are prepared  to write off many,  particularly 
older,  ECSC  workers as future productive workers.  But  this  cannot  surely 
be  desirable in  the medium  or longer terms  economically or socially; it 
would  be  a  recipe for stagnation. 
2.  The  Future 
While  considering future,  including possibly new,  developments,  the 
objective  of assuring reasonable social protection remains  the  key. 
Some  no  doubt would  argue  that this objective  thus  should become  the 
major primary objective, it it is not already.  But  this is, or would 
be,  to use  an  old English maxim  to  "put  the cart before  the horse"  as 
assuring  reasonable  social protection under Article 56(2)(b)  of  the  ECSC 
Treaty is a  social policy  response  to  the  economic  imperative of  the need 
for industrial  restructuring in coal and steel.  If restructuring is not 
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their jobs,  there  should be  no  need  for  the interventionist  social policy 
with its objective  of assuring reasonable  social protection because  they 
will be earning relatively reasonable  or even  good  wages  in work. 
(i)  The  Shorter Term 
So  where  should  the  EC  Commission  with its Readaptation Aid  objectives 
and  instruments  go  fromhere  and  for what  reason?  We  shall now  set out  our 
recommendations.  The  first objective of  achieving acceptance  of  re-
structuring must  not be  lost.  Indeed it must  be  safeguarded as  the first 
priority. 
In  the  shorter term future,  seeking withdrawals  from  the  labour  force 
will in our view still be  important as  an  objective particularly in certain 
countries,  especially if their ECSC  workforce has  a  rather high average 
age  and  their economy  is sluggish with very  few  growth areas offering job 
opportunities  to middle-aged  and  older ECSC-type  workers.  It must  be 
faced  that we  still have  relatively high unemployment  in Europe,  which 
will not  disappear quickly,  thus  guaranteeing  the high priority of  this 
objective as far as  the  Commission  is concerned, at least into  the early 
1990s. 
Yet  the  case  for making  assuring reasonable social protection  the 
second and equally important objective as  seeking withdrawals  from  the 
labour force  in  the  shorter term future is strong.  Same  Member  States 
with even  younger workforces  in coal and  steel are  going  to  find it extremely 
difficult  to accept  and  implement  the  EC  objective of going for withdrawals 
as  the  singular  second highest priority of objectives.  It has  only been 
the exceptionally grave crisis,  symbolised by  the need for  the  Social 
Volet which had  put withdrawal  as  the sole second objective. 
The  objective of seeking optimal  reallocation of labour in  the shorter 
term  future must  remain  the  fourth priority primarily because of  the  state 
of  the European  economies. 
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its ECSC  Readaptation  Aid  objectives  in  the way  that it has in  the  1980s. 
So  for  the shorter  te~ future  we  recommend  little shifting of the balance 
of priorities. 
(ii)  The  Longer  Term 
Nevertheless  for  the  longer  tenn we  do  recommend  raising  the  objective 
of achieving optimal  reallocation  to  rank in importance  on  a  par with 
assuring reasonable  social protection as  the.joint second objectives. 
Withdrawal  from  the  labour market  would  thus  become  the  fourth most 
important objective.  Having  taken  a  long  time  to become  an  objective 
formally for the  Commission,  it would  be  unrealistice to expect it to 
fade  away  given  that Member  State Governments  are  ready  to  see it utilised 
(and  indeed have  been  for  some  years). 
But  why  do  we  wish  to see withdrawal as an  objective dropped  down  to 
become  the least important of the four EC  objectives?  The  more  withdrawal 
is used  the younger becomes  the remaining workforce:  so we  have  recently 
seen  reductions in  the  average  age  of the workforces  in  the  ECSC  industriesin 
Belgium,  France,  Germany  and  the UK.  Increasingly it will be  the under 
50s  age  group  who  will be  sought  to be shaken-out of  coal and  steel. 
Withdrawal means.,  of  course,  early retired,  facing psychological  problems.~. 
Indeed  some  early retirees can  suffer problems  akin  to  the  longer term 
unemployed:  they  may  become  isolated, apathetic,  lacking a  sense of 
purpose,  and  inactive.  Loss  of social status achieved  from  work  can  lead 
to  loss of self-confidence and  feelings of worthlessness  which  can  lead 
to a  deterioration in  their mental  and  physical health.  FurtheDDore, 
these sorts of difficulties are  likely to be even more  serious if the 
major target group  for early retirements  were  to shift from  the over 
50s  to  the under  50s. 
We  can,  in fact,  put  forward  very positive reasons  for promoting 
optimal  reallocation from  its present  low  (i.e fourth)_ priority point as 
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determined.  Within  the  EC  there is still a  strong emphasis  on  and  belief 
in  the work  ethic.  For very many  declared redundant,  lacking  a  job is 
not  a  liberating experience.  Some  suffer an  acute  sense of failure, 
despite there being less stigma  related  to  being made  redundant.  Giving 
people productive  jobs plainly has  individual and societal benefits.  ECSC 
Readaptation Aids  are  an  essential precondition for effective reconversion 
(or job creation).  The  EC  Aids  provide financial  cushioning  allowing  for 
a  period  of  readjustment as  well  as  the possibility of  training.  Thus 
it is not  only  in relation  to  transfers through earnings  supplements  and 
mobility allowances  that EC  Readaptation Aids  can  contribute ultimately 
to  reconversion. 
III  The  Relationship  Between  Article 56(2){b)  of the Treaty of 
Paris and  Other  Instruments for Job Creation 
In  relation  to both objectives and  Aid  instruments, more  explicit 
consideration needs  to  be  given by  the  Co~ssion to clarifying and  perhaps 
developing  the interrelationship between Article  56{2)(b)  and  other 
instruments  for job creation.  Article 56(2)(b)  and  these other instruments 
are  not and  should not be perceived  as mutually exclusive and  thus  should 
not  be  used  as  a  basis for simple  alternative strategies.1  Indeed they 
should be  working  together,  reinforcing each other.  Given  the  state of 
the  European  economies  in the 1980s  and  into the  foreseeable  future, 
massive  job creation in heavily ECSC  orientated areas  cannot and will not 
be  widely achieved without strong EC  Readaptation Aid.  Equally Readaptation 
Aid  needs  to be  more  than  just picking up  the pieces left from  redundancies, 
i.e.  an  exercise in damage  limitation.  In  the  longer term it needs  to 
be  viewed more  positively as assisting people on  the move  into new  jobs: 
thus we  believe that we  should  see the  ranking of the  objectives of  EC 
. Readaptation Aid  almost moving  full  circle baCk  to  those of  the  1960s  in 
effect.  The  under 50s  shaken out will need  alternative jobs  to  those in 
ECSC  industries, unlike  a  number  of miners  and  steelworkers over 50,  and 
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very content  to  leave  their hard manual  jobs,  having  given 25,  35  or 
40  years'  service and  in quite  a  few  instances having no  longer  enjoyed 
the best physical health latterly while  at work.  While  our brief has  not 
involved us  in assessing the cost effectiveness of job creation programmes, 
we  conclude  that  the  longer  term future  of such programmes  should certainly 
be  explored in conjunction with the continued essential utilisation of 
Article 56(2)(b),  particularly given  tight budgetary constraints.  We 
acknowledge  that some  observers  have  argued  for  job  creation as  the priority 
strategy and  thus  for  cutting the  EC  element  of Readaptation Aid  in Member 
States.  While  we  recognise the considerable  relevance of job creation 
measures  in attempting  to provide extra jobs which  the European economies 
undoubtedly do  and  will need,  we  conclude  that  such job creation measures 
will be  most  effective if they work  in  harmony with the tried and  tested 
EC  Readaptation Aid  model. 
IV  The  Future Use  of Specific Instruments 
We  shall next  deal with our recommendations  for the future use of 
specific  Aid  instruments,  particularly in the light of our  recommendations 
for  rejigging the priorities in terms  of  EC  objectives.  The  Commission 
should see  the Readaptation Aids  very positively as devices  for  securing 
their priority objectives.  Some,  no  doubt, will need reconsideration. 
1.  Acceptability of Restructuring 
(i)  Lump  Sums  and Early Retirement 
While  all the  EC  Readaptation Aids  contribute  to  a  greater or  lesser 
extent to making  restructuring more  acceptable,  some  Aids  have  proved 
particularly effective.  Lump  sum  payments  whatever  the  age  of the worker 
fall  into this latter category particularly if the  lump  sum  is large, 
though  the  EC  onlycontributesa very  small element  of this whole  Aid. 
For  the older worker  an  early pension and  related early retirement package 
has  proved attractive and  succeeded  in getting such workers  out  of  the 
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has  been  additionality achieved  by  the  EC  element of  the Aid with the 
French  experience in particular suggesting that  there had been  in making 
restructuring reasonably acceptable.  This is no  mean  feat.  Indeed it 
would  be fair to  say that  the Aid  has  contributed to  the  level of 
acceptance  being surprisingly high,  particularly given the great strength 
of opposition from  many  of  the  trade unions  across  the Community;  the 
indicators  for  acceptability on which we  have  concentrated have  been 
levels of social conflict and  delays  in getting restructuring. 
(ii)  Consequences  of Reducing  or Eliminating 
EC  Readaptation Aid 
If the EC  element of Readaptation Aid were  to be  substantially cut 
back,  we  would  predict that acceptability would  be quite likely to be 
significantly reduced or even be lost.  This is because  the mature,  stable 
and  strong Readaptation Aid  system within ECSC  would  become  destabilised 
(for the first  time  in its history)  especially with the Commission  trying 
to use  its recently acquired escape clauses incorporated into Bilateral 
Conventions  (by unilateral amendment  effectively).  The  latter would 
create considerable  resentment  and  difficulty if widely used in the 
Member  States.  If the ECSC  element of Readaptation Aid were  to be 
excised altogether,  then we  would  predict that acceptability of re-
structuring would  almost  certainly go.  Many  on  both sides of  industry 
throughout  the  ECSC  now  see ECSC  Readaptation Aid  as  an unconditional 
right  for individual workers.  In relation to steel in particular it is 
perceived as  the EC  simply  'paying its dues'  for demanding  and  implementing. 
restructuring.  The  very concept of  'Community'  would  be  seriously under-
mined if the  EC  element were withdrawn with  there  no  longer being  ECSC 
Readaptation Aid  as  such at all.  Opposition to restructuring and closures 
in coal  and  steel across Europe would  become  more  fierce and  the industrial 
policy imperatives would  almost  certainly break down.  It is highly im-
probable  that all Member  State Governments  would  simply  'pick up  t~eab' left by  the Commission's  withdrawal of  financing.  The  major  practical 
purpose of  the ECSC  levy,  which  levy would  presumably continue to exist, 
would  be  undermined.  Indeed what  future,  if any,  would  the  ECSC  have 
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in such circumstances of  those just outlined of EC  Readaptation Aid  being 
dropped? 
2.  Optimal Reallocation 
Turning  to  the  objective of optimal reallocation,  which  has  been 
given light weight  in  the  period of high unemployment,  we  advocate its 
being given higher priority in the  longer  term.  But  how  and with what 
Aids?  Unquestionably  the EC  Commission  will need  to be  imaginative and 
innovative. 
{i)  Training 
We  have noted that training has  not  been cost effective in relation 
to  UK  steel according to our own  research evidence.  Nevertheless we 
still recommend  training to be continued  as  an  EC  Aid.  Our  UK  research 
evidence is limited  and it covers  a  fairly bleak economic  period for  the 
UK.  We  would  not seek to generalise from  this particular.  It is by  its 
very nature bound  to be an  expensive Aid.  We  have noted  that there are 
psychic benefits from undertaking training and  that it can contribute 
to  the stock of trained workers  for  the future.  Our  research on  this 
Aid  in the  UK  has not permitted us  to look at the  longer tenD position 
of beneficiaries undergoing training.  Such  research needs  to be  under-
taken in the  future across  the Community.  It may  be  found  that there 
is deferred gratification from  training and  that  there are indeed  longer 
term benefits.  While  more  general  training can help workers  to be more 
adaptable  in a  rapidly changing world  and  needs  to  have  a  place in EC 
Aid,  one  future  consideration might  be  to relate training to specific 
jobs.  Careful  selection of workers  for  training has its merits for likely 
cost  effectiveness as  does  careful choice of suitable training courses. 
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finding  jobs at the  end of  their courses.  Re-employment  bonuses  for 
workers  are  one  possibility.  There  are various ways  of making  training 
more  effective apart  from  the European  economies'  coming  out of  recession 
and  generating new  jobs,  which  would  admittedly be  the  most  important 
development.  Consideration needs  to be  given,  for example,  to extending 
the  French ploy of  requiring jobs  to  be  offered at  the end  of  the  training 
period or otherwise  the  employer has  responsibility for continuing  to 
train  the worker  receiving no  job offers.  Training for jobs is very much 
preferable  to  the  alternative possibility of offering training for leisure 
activities  (e.g.  sports or carpentry}  or for local  community  activity 
(e.g.  management  of a  tenants'  association).  In short,  sensible  EC 
investment  in training represents hope  for  the  future;  to drop  it as  an 
EC  Aid  would  contribute to undermining  the  attainment of  the  objective of 
optimal  reallocation of labour so  that in the  longer  term it would  not 
have  the position of second equal priority objective with  assuring 
reasonable  social protection. 
(ii)  Earnings  Supplements  and  Mobility Allowances 
Earnings  supplements  and mobility allowances both need  to  be  continued 
as  Aids.  Any  methods  that  can  be  found  for beginning  to overcome  the 
strong  tendency  towards  regional  immobility in  coal  and  steel regions  in 
the  Community  (viz.  France  and  the  UK  for example)  should be  implemented. 
For example,  consideration could be  given  to  the  idea  of  the EC  offering 
financial  aid in relation to workers,  who  cannot sedl  their houses within 
a  reasonable  period,  so that  they  can  be  facilitated to move  to another 
area where  a  job awaits  them.  EC  financial assistance for purchase  of a 
property in the new  area by  the worker is also worthwhile. 
(iii)  Self-Employment 
On  the basis of  the  results  concerning our small UK  sample,  and  in 
the  light of current discussions for the new  Bilateral Convention  wit~ 
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as  one  limited but  potentially useful way  of contributing  towards  an 
optimal reallocation of certain,  but not all, members  of the labour force. 
3.  Social Protection 
We  have  noted  that all the individual Aids  contribute  to assuring 
reasonable social protection.  In relation to early retirement Aids,  we 
recommend  that the  Commission  should give more  explicit recognition  to 
the role of early pensions  in providing reasonable  social protection.  It 
would  be  beneficial if the Commission  were  to monitor the degree of 
counselling undertaken  for  early retirement in each Member  State; 
counselling should be offered during workers'  early retirement rather 
than  just immediately prior to it (in this context training for  leisure 
and  community  activities would  be  very useful). 
We  recommend  that the eligibility criteria for Readaptation Aid  under 
Article 56(2)(b)  should be kept under  review.  There  is a  case for extend-
ing  the  criteria so  that more  workers  are included.  While  recognising 
that workers basically have  to be  declared  redundant as a  result of re-
structuring rather than exhaustion of coal seams,  it should be noted that, 
for  example,  only about  a  half of those  declared redundant in  the UK coal 
industry are eligible for EC  Aid.  Changing  the eligibility criteria 
would  require a  reinterpretation of Article 56(2)(b) but,  as we  have 
earlier noted,  there are precedents  for this.  If the  EC  wishes  to maximise 
its contribution  to achieving reasonable social protection,  this could 
usefully be  done. 
4.  Further Considerations 
(i)  Lump  Sums 
Conventional  lump  sum  payments  are very important for acceptance of 
restructuring and  also for achieving withdrawals.  While  they are excellent 
for  'shaking out'  workers,  they  do  not necessarily help us  to get workers 
back into work.  Large  lump  sums  give workers  plenty of freedom.  of choice 
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actually do  with the  lump  sums,  the  EC's objective of assuring reasonable 
social protection will or will not be fulfilled  by  this Aid.  It should 
be  stressed that  the  present small contribution which  the  EC  makes  to 
severance payments  is explicable in historical  terms.  The  UK  coal 
industry is the best exemplar of heavy  reliance upon  lump  sums  as  a 
major Aid  but it has not proved possible to interview workers  to find 
out  how  they  spend  them.  We  fully accept  that  the  EC  should  continue  to 
pay  towards  lump  sum  payments  but further  research would need  to be  done 
to provide  an  evidential justification for a  significant alteration  to 
the present possibilities for development  in  the  future.  One  possible 
such development which could be usefully considered  immediately is 
raising the  EC's  contribution  to  lump  sums  in specified  limited  circumstances. 
This  could be  done  where  a  worker obtains another job so  that the  EC  could 
then,  say,  in relation to  the  UK  coal industry provide an  Aid  whiCh 
offered genuine additionality for there is no  evidence  to suggest that 
this will be  done  at national level within  the  UK.  While  at present 
under  the  RMPS  certain redundant  coal miners may  receive a  lump  sum 
worth  some  three and  a  half  times  their annual wage,  this lump  sum  is 
a  'once and  for all' payment  which will be  received regardless of whether 
the miner concerned  finds  another job  the next day,  next month  or next 
year or never works  again~ 
Under  the  'British Coal'  (called  NCB  until recently) unilateral 
redundancy  compensation  scheme  to be introduced next Spring  to replace 
the  RMPS  statutory instrument,  lump  sums  will continue  to be  offered but 
on  a  less generous basis.  Since  the new  scheme  is in part designed  to 
encourage  shake-outs of  the under 50  age  group,  the  case for giving 
emphasis  to  the  EC  objective of their optimal  reallocation is strong. 
(ii)  Re-Employment  Bonus 
While  recognising historically the EC  Commission's  justification for 
not  substantially increasing its share of the lump  sum  payments, .not  least because  the  lump  sums  would be offered anyway  at national level,  there 
is a  case  now  for  the  EC  to act as  a  catalyst to  introduce a  specific 
social measure,  namely  a  re-employment  bonus,  which would  require 
additional finance  from national  level  (here  arguably the  UK  Government 
rather than  British Coal). 
The  notion of a  re-employment bonus  is not novel with ECSC2  but 
would  be  considered  to be  highly  so within  the  UK.  The  amount  of  the 
re-employment bonus  could be  calculated on  the basis of a  sliding sc·ale 
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so  that  the  lump  sum  could be  larger the more  quickly  the  worker  obtained 
a  new  job  outside his  ECSC  industry.  Safeguards would  need  to be  devised 
to deal with  the worker who  took  a  job  for only a  short period in order 
to get the  re-employment  bonus.  This whole  proposal would  represent a 
significant incentive to workers  to obtain a  new  job (if such is available) 
and at an  early date post-redundancy.  It also takes into account  that 
many  ECSC  workers are  rather immobile  geographically and  so  could be 
specifically designed to contribute  to  overco~ng this  tendency. 
Particularly in those Member  States  and  ECSC  industries where  lump 
sums  are not as  central to the Readaptation Aid  strategy at national 
level,  consideration could be  given, particularly in the longer  te~, to 
the ECSC  only contributing  to  re-employment  bonus  lump  sum  payments  and 
then  doing  so  on  a  much  more  substantial basis  than at present to  lump 
sum  payments.  This would  represent a  shift away  from  the severance 
payment  or quasi-job property  concept.  Thus  the  re-employment  bonus  and 
the severance  payment  can be  regarded as.two  separate Aids  to be on  offer 
or as alternatives.  Use  of a  re-employment bonus  represents placing a 
higher emphasis  on  reallocation of  labour - our recommendation  for  the 
longer  te~ - and  is posited critically on  the basis  that alternative 
jobs are available  so that they may  have  more  longer ter.m  relevance  than 
in the shorter ter.m.  Our  proposal  in relation  to UK  coal avoids  the 
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instead  of  a  severance  payment  as  an  EC  Aid.  This difficulty is that 
the person who  fails  to find an  alternative job ha.s  a  sense  of double 
failure  in  that he  has  both  lost his original job  and  has  no  lump  sum 
either.  By  way  of  contrast,  the  job finder  has  a  new  job and a  lump  sum 
payment  so  that he has  a  double  success.  In present circumstances  this 
would  be very hard  to justify in social  terms  and it would  create con-
siderable  resentments in practice.  In short,  in  the  longer  term,  it will 
be  a  question of getting the  balance right depending on  the state of·  the 
labour market. 
(iii)  Weekly  Payments 
Weekly  payments  (income  support in  the event of unemployment)  are in 
the present period primarily about providing reasonable social protection. 
They  can provide social protection for  the younger  looking for new  jobs 
as well as  for the older withdrawing from  the  labour market.  Unless  they 
offer sustained high replacement rates  (viz.  90%  of  former earnings)  and 
are of  long  duration  (and  the EC  itself has only  relatively recently, 
under  the  Social Volet - when  combined with Bilateral Conventions - agreed 
to contribute for up  to  three years),  weekly payments  safeguard  acceptance 
of  restructuring  in a  very limited way.  Weekly  payments  can  and do 
cont~ibute towards  getting older men  to withdraw from  the labour market, 
especially if they are  linked with providing early pensions.  There is a 
strong case  (resources permitting)  for the  EC  Commission  continuing  to 
contribute towards weekly  payments  for three years  even after the very 
,re~ent  demise  of  the  Social Volet.  Short  tenn financial  cushionipg 
has  some  utility for  the younger;  but given  the high unemployment  levels 
and  l~ited opportunities  for alternative employment,  so  that it takes 
longer to find a  new  job,  the social protection offered has become  less 
adequate under the rules of  the Bilateral Conventions  than it was 
historically.  There is certainly a  case  on  the grounds of maximising 
both acceptance and  reasonable social protection for extending  the EC's  contribution beyond  three years but for practical budgetary 
3  reasons  we  cannot strongly advocate it. 
V  Data Requirements 
Concerning  data  requirements  there are a  number  of rather serious 
difficulties and  deficiencies at present.  Most  crucially the  data are 
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not suitable for evaluation because  payments  and  specific events are not 
related.  It should be  recognised  that much  of  the data currently provided 
by  Member  States is provided  solely in order not only  to obtain but  to 
maximise  EC  contributions  to Readaptation Aid.  We  make  above  all two 
basic recommendations.  The  first is for better use  of existing data, 
by  more  standardisation of. its presentation,  which  identifies actual 
numbers  of beneficiaries,  categorised  by  the  type  of aid which  they 
receive,  and  the  time of their redundancy.  The  second  recommendation 
is  to consider explicitly both regular and more  specialised occasional 
follow-up  studies.  It is very important  that future  studies which  follow 
up  workers  should be  on  a  comparable basis in each Member  State. 
VI  Concluding  Comments 
We  should like  to make  some  final concluding remarks.  We  are  fully 
aware  of  the difficulties faced  by  the  Co~ssion with regard  to budgetary 
constraints.  There is possibly a  tendency for Member  States  to want 
'more  for less'  which  is understandable, particularly in a  period of 
major  recession, when  negotiating with  the Commission  about a  Bilateral 
Convention.  In  times  of both severe financial  stringency and  recession, 
it is all the more  imperative for the  Commission  to have  and  to publicise 
clear  prioritie~ in the application of Article 56(2)(b).  We  fully 
acknowledge  that some  expansion of  aggregate  demand  in  the European 
economies  is essential in  the longer term  for  the higher priority that 
we  accord  to the objective of optimal  reallocation of  labour to be 
fulfilled. Notes  to Section F 
1.  Article 56(2)(b)  does  itself permit a  lUmited  fonn of  job creation 
through  the use  of  self-employment. 
2.  Viz.  the French experience.  It is briefly described as  an  EC  Aid 
at p. 46  supra of  this Report. 
3.  For  example,  in  1981  in relation to  the  British coal  industry,  the 
EC  contributed almost  sixty times  as much  on  weekly payments  as  on 
lump  sums.  See  Interim Report,  p.  180 • 
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